Por que os trabalhadores do setor financeiro dos EUA não são sindicalizados? : um problema atual com raízes no século 19 by Strong, Steven Michael, 1981-
i 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STEVEN MICHAEL STRONG 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Why US Financial Workers are Unorganized: the 19
th
 century 
origin of a current problem 
 
 
Porque os trabalhadores do setor financeiro dos EUA  
não são sindicalizados? Um problema atual com raízes  
no século 19 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Campinas 
2014 
 
 
iii 
 
  
iv 
 
 
 
 
  
v 
  
vii 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
 
A special thanks to Professor Maria Alejandra Caporale Madi, whose research 
experience with CONTRAF led her to suggest this topic for me. Also inspiring me to take 
on the challenge of an understudied topic was CONTRAF itself, and the bank workers’ 
unions in Sao Paulo and Campinas. They invited me to many events, and provided me 
the opportunity to shadow staff and join union actions. Multiple leaders and staff from 
these unions, and particularly SP union director Rita Berlofa, were essential for the initial 
impulse of this work. I also was fortunate to find upon my arrival to UNICAMP two 
students, Ana Paula Colombi and Jo Portillo, who were bank workers and provided 
useful discussion to help motivate me to take on this challenge. 
I appreciate the Global Labour University program and the 14 months of funding 
from the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, whose support was essential to my participation in 
this program. My co-workers from the hotels in Los Angeles and the worker leaders from 
my union UNITE HERE Local 11 both enabled me to attend this program, and provided 
me with years of organizing experiences to draw upon in thinking about labor history and 
organizing. Jana Silverman from the Solidarity Center and UNITE HERE Local 75 gave 
me the opportunity to pursue my original master’s dissertation proposal on hotel workers 
in Brazil, who are overlooked in the same way US trade unionists miss the importance of 
financial sector workers to the US’s economy and working class. Being able to complete 
my original goal made me more enthusiastic to take on an additional project. The CWA 
and Amalgamated Bank provided me the opportunity to visit a bank and improve my 
understanding of bank operations. 
A special thanks to Professor Mark Naison, an old mentor whose many 
discussions, reviews, and recommendations in the early stages of this text were 
essential, and whose enthusiasm for the subject encouraged me to overcome frustrating 
moments in its conception. Plínio Sampaio Arruda Jr. also advised me in the initial 
stages, and provided useful feedback by participating in my qualification. Completion 
would not have been possible without the valuable contributions of the UNICAMP 
Instituto de Economia professors in GLU and CESIT. CESIT professors have provided 
not only academic support, but along with Jacqueline Souen and other CESIT staff, 
provide an incredible service in welcoming and supporting foreign students adjusting to 
life in Brazil. I especially thank my adviser Professor Carlos Salas, and my committee: 
Professors Anselmo Luis dos Santos, Sean Purdy (USP), José Daré Klein, and Angela 
Maria Carneiro Araújo. 
Thank you to Mary and Doug from the EPI in Washington, DC for hosting me and 
enabling me to do interviews with union staff on current thinking around bank worker 
organizing possibilities. The union staff and leadership from the AFL-CIO, Change to 
Win, SEIU, CWA, AFSCME, UNITE HERE and UNI all took the time to speak with me. 
viii 
Lucy Lewis, Greg Kenefick, Zane Farr, and Professors John Holmes, Jack Fiorito, 
Gregor Gall, Richard Sylla, Stephanie Luce, Ileen Devault, and Ivan Hou provided useful 
correspondence. Fordham University archivists Patrice and Viviane were kind and 
helpful, and even fed me on occasion while I examined the Xavier Labor School 
archives. Rebecca Carlson closely proofread my final draft, providing useful corrections 
and feedback. 
I am grateful to count on the love and support of my family. I have much gratitude 
for my friends from around the world in the GLU program, for those in the US from the 
student and union movement, and for those who have long or recently supported me: 
Jay, Peter, Cidinha, João & Celeste, Lu, Bia, Erika, Rebecca & family, Behrman, Iuri, 
Igor, Daphane, Flavia, Andre, Julio, Bia M, Ju, Princessa Dolly e Rep Sem Saida, 
Cinthia, Dona Elsa, Dag and many others. And special thanks to Camila, whose 
patience I repeatedly tested, but who in the end always gave loving support. 
Finally, I would like to thank the Brazilian people for their support of public 
institutions, for without such funding and the services of the education, healthcare, 
transportation, food service, and janitorial workers, this research would have been 
impossible. 
 ix 
Resumo 
 
Trabalhadores do setor financeiro dos EUA apresentam a menor taxa de sindicalização em 
comparação aos trabalhadores de outras indústrias, e estão entre os menos organizados do 
mundo. À luz da recente crise econômica, o movimento operário dos EUA, junto com os 
sindicatos internacionais, tem tido grande interesse em reverter as sombrias taxas de 
sindicalização, devido à importância destes trabalhadores, que estão dentro de um mercado 
financeiro globalizado altamente dominado por empresas norte-americanas. O atual desafio 
em organizar estes trabalhadores está enraizado em uma história profunda de evasão, 
ignorância, desorientação, repressão, e derrotas para os interesses do sindicalismo dos 
trabalhadores de escritórios. Este trabalho explora as primeiras raízes dos obstáculos atuais 
que os trabalhadores do setor financeiro enfrentam na tentativa de se sindicalizar, 
examinando a resistência popular à formação do Setor Financeiro dos EUA no século 19. 
Uma visão geral do desenvolvimento inicial do setor financeiro, de suas respostas políticas e 
da organização do trabalho é fornecida, incluindo informações específicas sobre os 
trabalhadores do setor financeiro, quando disponíveis. O aumento da feminização do 
trabalho de colarinho branco após a Guerra Civil dos EUA também é explorado. Os fatores 
chave que contribuem para as baixas taxas de sindicalização incluem o impacto da liderança 
sindical influenciada pelo populismo, o que contribuiu para as reformas que promovem uma 
estrutura financeira descentralizada, a exclusão dos trabalhadores de escritório, a 
feminização da força de trabalho de escritórios, as atitudes das lideranças sindicais em 
relação às mulheres e trabalhadores de escritório, e a falta de um partido trabalhista nos 
EUA, tudo isso combinado com a repressão do governo contra os comunistas que 
pretendiam organizar o setor. Na conclusão, são apresentadas sugestões para a continuação 
da pesquisa sobre o porquê de os EUA não possuírem um sindicato dos trabalhadores do 
setor financeiro. 
Palavras-chaves 
EUA Setor Financeiro História – Movimento Trabalho dos EUA História – Sindicatos Banco 
trabalhador – sindicatos do setor financeiro – Escriturário Trabalhadores – Feminização 
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Abstract 
 
Financial sector workers in the US suffer from the lowest rate of unionization of workers in 
any of the industries in the US, and are among the least organized in the world. In light of the 
recent economic crisis, and given the importance of US financial workers within a globalized 
financial market highly dominated by US firms, the US labor movement, along with unions 
internationally, has taken great interest in reversing these dismal unionization rates. The 
current challenge to organizing these workers is rooted in a deep history of avoidance, 
ignorance, misguidance, repression, and defeats for the interests of office worker unionism. 
This work explores the early roots of the current obstacles these workers face in attempting to 
unionize by examining the popular resistance to US Financial Sector formation in the 19th 
century. An overview of early financial sector development, political responses, and labor 
organization is provided, including specific information on financial sector workers when 
available. The increase and feminization of white-collar work after the US Civil War is 
explored, especially in the clerical industries of the financial sector. Key factors contributing to 
low unionization rates include the impact of populist-influenced labor leadership that preferred 
a decentralized financial structure and excluded clerical workers, the feminization of the 
clerical labor force, the attitudes of trade union leaders towards women and clerical workers, 
and the combination of a lack of a labor party in the US and government repression of 
communists who had the vision to organize the sector. Suggestions for continued research on 
why the US does not have a financial sector workers union are presented in the conclusion. 
 
Keywords 
US Financial Sector History – US Labor Movement History – Bank Worker Unions – Financial 
Sector Unions – Clerical Workers – Feminization 
 
 
 xiii 
List of Abbreviations 
 
ACORN Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now 
AFL  American Federation of Labor 
BSAU  Bookkeepers, Stenographers, Accountants, and Assistants Union 
CIO  Congressof IndustrialOrganizations 
CONTRAF Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores do Ramo Financeiro 
CP   Communist Party, USA 
CWA   Communication Workers of America 
ETI  Economically Targeted Investment 
FBI  Federal Bureau of Investigation 
FIRE  Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate 
ICT  Information, Communications, and Technology 
NLRA  National Labor Relations Act 
NLU   National Labor Union 
OEIU   Office Employees International Union 
OPEIU   Office and Professional Employees International Union 
SEIU   Service Employees International Union 
TUEL   Trade Union Education League 
TUUL  Trade Union Unity League 
UFE  United Financial Employees 
UOPWA  United Office and Professional Workers of America 
WWI  World War I 
WTUL   Women’s Trade Union League 
 
 xv 
List of Tables 
 
Table 1          Growth of Clerical Workforce and Female Clerks, 1870-1930 ................. 58 
Table 2 Employment by Industry as Percent of Total Labor Force,  
1870-1930 ................................................................................................ 61 
Table 3          Stenographer and Typist Feminization, 1870-1930 ................................. 67 
Table 4 Clerical Employment as Percent of Labor Force by Industry,  
1870-1930 ................................................................................................ 72 
Table 5 New Clerical Work Positions and Hires by Gender,  
1880-1930 ................................................................................................ 77 
Table 6 Race & Gender of Insurance Workers by Job Classification,  
1910 and 1930 ......................................................................................... 86 
Table 7 Race & Gender of Bank Workers by Job Classification,  
1910 and 1930 ......................................................................................... 87 
 
List of Figures 
 
Figure 1 Willmar 8: The First Bank Worker Strike in the US, 1977 ........................ 23 
Figure 2        Cartoon: Women Tellers during WII ......................................................... 95 
Figure 3        BSAU-AFL No. 12646 in New York City, 1935 ......................................... 109 
Figure 4        OEIU Campaign Literature against the UOPWA ...................................... 117 
Figure 5 UOPWA fights salary inequities through job classification demands ....... 122 
Figure 6        NYT Pictures of UFE Strike ...................................................................... 141 
Figure 7 Police Violence against UFE Picket Line in front on  
Wall Street ............................................................................................... 142 
Figure 8 Anti-union letter used against UFE bank worker  
organizing drive ........................................................................................ 143 
Figure 9 UNITE HERE Local 5 Supports Bank Workers ........................................ 151 
 xvii 
Why US Financial Workers are Unorganized 
The 19th century origins of a current problem 
Table of Contents 
 
Acknowledgements .......................................................................................................................... i 
Resumo .......................................................................................................................................... ix 
Abstract .......................................................................................................................................... xi 
List of Abbreviations ..................................................................................................................... xiii 
List of Tables ................................................................................................................................. xv 
List of Figures ................................................................................................................................ xv 
Chapter 1 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 1 
Chapter 2 Labor, Populism, and the Developing Financial Sector ................................................. 19 
Chapter 3 Clerks and the Financial Sector at the Turn of the Century ........................................... 43 
Chapter 4  The Rise of the First Clerical Worker Unions to the Present ........................................ 83 
Chapter 5 Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 143 
Appendix 1 US Labor Regulatory Framework Timeline ............................................................... 157 
Appendix 2 State Development Banks in the US ........................................................................ 173 
Appendix 3 Financial Sector Office Automation .......................................................................... 179 
Appendix 4 Racism in the Financial Sector ................................................................................. 181 
Appendix 5 Lewis Merrill, UOPWA, Statement to Congress on Insurance and Finance Workers 189 
Appendix 6 Conflicting Visions: Production Unions and the OEIU ............................................... 193 
Appendix 7 OEIU and Gender .................................................................................................... 197 
Appendix 8 Notes on books comparing white collar unionism ..................................................... 199 
Works Cited ................................................................................................................................ 205 
Works Consulted ........................................................................................................................ 211 
 
 1 
 
Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
 In Brazilian Portuguese, I quickly learned the difference between Banqueiro 
and Bancário; Banqueiro was clear enough—the Banker is notorious in American 
English—but Bancário, the bank worker? Prior to studying in Brazil it had been 
perhaps twelve years since I’d interacted in person with a bank worker, so vocabulary 
distinguishing the bank worker from the banker caught my attention. 1  In Brazil, 
Bancário carries the respect won through a trade union with a long history and many 
victories. These include national pattern bargaining and industry-wide bank strikes, 
which I witnessed first-hand.2 The Brazilian bank workers have achieved middle-
class status through their struggle. They have a visible presence in society because 
of their social movement unionism model, and because consumer behavior still 
facilitates contact with the bank worker despite the trend towards automation. Such 
trends are well studied along with other issues affecting the bancário, creating an 
abundance of published and unpublished scholarship on the sector from the 
perspective of the workers’ interests.3 Many of these studies are available at the Sao 
                                                 
1
 Further distancing teller-client contact, to encourage online banking and ATM services, Bank of 
America recently began charging $8.95 a month for customers who use a teller for any transaction, 
and technological innovations in ATM’s continue to develop. www2.bankofamerica.com
/efulfillment/documents/91-11-3000ED.20120227.htm, accessed March 2012. 
2
 The Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores do Ramo Financeiro (CONTRAF) is influential in the 
main union federation, the Central Única dos Trabalhadores (CUT). When Lula, the PT candidate from 
the Metalworkers, was elected president, he appointed several CONTRAF leaders to top government 
positions. 
3
 The Brazilian bank workers movement has four main periods. First, there was a period of 
consolidation of the movement until the military dictatorship, which caused the bank workers union to 
suffer from new fragmentation. They were then part of the new unionism movement that helped end 
military dictatorship, reconsolidating power through social movement unionism. The current period 
presents the challenges of automation, privatization, and international competition. In English see for 
example: Maria Alejandra Caporale Madi, José Ricardo Barbosa Gonçalves and José Dari Krein 
“Financialization, Employability and their Impacts on the Bank Workers’ Union Movement in Brazil 
(1994‐2004)” in Frederic S. Lee and Jon Bekken (eds), Radical Economics and Labor: Essays inspired 
by the IWW Centennial, New York: Routledge, 2009ç and Sandoval, Salvador A. M. "Alternative 
Forms of Working-Class Organization and the Mobilization of Informal-Sector Workers in Brazil in the 
Era of Neoliberalism." International Labor and Working Class History 72, no. 1 (Fall, 2007): 63-89; and 
in Portuguese, see for example: Canedo, Leticia Bicalho, Bancarios: Moviemento Sindical e 
Participaao Politica, Campinas: UNICAMP, 1986; Colombi, Ana Paula Fregnani, Entre a fragmentação 
e acao  unificada: uma análise da atuação do Sindicato dos Bancários e Financiários de São Paulo, 
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Paulo Bank Workers Union’s office, which has a library filling its entire basement to 
provide primary and secondary resources documenting past and current struggles. 
The union values its members access to this information enough to staff a full-time 
librarian, and the library even contains a literature and poetry section in case the 
member coming in for services, or visiting the union’s bar and restaurant, has other 
cultural interests. Many Brazilians I met identified the bancários as one of the three 
strongest unions in the country; this came as a surprise, since I, like many trade 
unionists in the US, was only familiar with Lula and the autoworkers, perhaps an 
unconscious reflection of what we privilege in our own labor movement in terms of 
gender and industrial importance. It was therefore no surprise that professors 
working within CESIT, the Brazilian wing of the Global Labor University, strongly 
encouraged me to understand why there is no financial sector workers’ union in the 
US.4 
The financial worker in the US, in contrast to her counterpart in Brazil, has 
perhaps one of the most neglected occupations with regards to academic literature 
and the labor movement’s concern.5 The US labor movement has organized only 1% 
                                                                                                                                                        
Osasco e Região durante os anos 2000, Master’s Dissertation, Campinas, UNICAMP: 2014; Sanches, 
Ana Tercia. Terceirização e terceirizados no setor bancário: relações de emprego, condições de 
trabalho e ação sindical. Master’sthesis. São Paulo: PUC, 2005; Atunes, Ludmila Rodrigues. 
Reestruturação produtiva e sistema bancário: movimento sindical bancário brasileiro nos anos 90. 
DoctoralDissertation. Campinas: UNICAMP, 2001; Barreto, Eleonora Frenkel. Desemprego e (des) 
mobilização política: a luta do sindicato dos bancarios de Campinas e região. Master’s thesis. 
Campinas: UNICAMP, 2004; Malbera, Paulo Eduardo Silva. As transformações do setor financeiro no 
Brasil: os trabalhadores e a fragmentação da representação sindical. Master’s Dissertation. 
Campinas: UNICAMP, 2011;Goncalves, José Ricardo Barbosa; Krein, José Dari;Madi, Maria 
Alejandra Caporale. “Condições de trabalho e sindicalismo no setor bancário no Brasil.” In: Krein, 
José Dari et alii. (Org.). As transformações no mundo do trabalho e os direitos dos trabalhadores. 15ª 
ed. São Paulo: TRT, 2006, p. 99-120;Goncalves, José Ricardo Barbosa; Krein, José Dari; Madi, Maria 
AlejandraCaporale. “Bancos, bancários e representação sindical no Brasil contemporâneo.” In: XI 
Encontro Nacional da ABET, Campinas, 2009; Jinkings, Nise. “A reestruturação do trabalho nos 
bancos.” In: Antunes, Ricardo (org.). Riqueza e Miséria do Trabalho no Brasil. São Paulo: Boitempo, 
2006, p. 189-205; Oliveira, Ana Lucia Valença de Santa Cruz. Sindicalismo bancário: origens. São 
Paulo, SP: Obore Editorial, 1990; Larangeria, Sônia. Reestruturação produtiva no setor bancário: a 
realidade dos anos 90. In: Educação e Sociedade. Ano XVIII, dez./1997, n°. 61/especial;Karpovs, 
Dainis, A Historia dos bancários: lutas e conquistas: 1923-1993. São Paulo, SP: Sindicato dos 
Bancários e Financiários de São Paulo, 1994.  
4
 CESIT: www.eco.unicamp.br/cesit; GLU: www.global-labour-university.org 
5
 “Arno J. Mayer offers several reasons American and European scholars have paid less attention to 
lower-level white-collar workers. He argues that academicians have little sympathy for this social 
group. Mayer pointedly asks, ‘Could it be that social scientists are hesitant to expose the aspirations, 
life-style, and world view of the social class in which so many of them originate and from which they 
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of the sector, a rate comparable only to the agricultural sector, which is excluded 
from the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).6 Although they would ostensibly be 
under the jurisdiction of the Office and Professional Employees International Union 
(OPEIU), there are a variety of unions representing a few thousand financial sector 
workers, but not a single union with a committed industrial strategy to organize 
financial sector workers.7 Hope was raised in CONTRAF, the federation of financial 
workers unions in Brazil, when the US-based Service Employees International Union 
(SEIU) agreed in 2010 to take on a campaign in the sector. Despite their 
collaboration with CONTRAF, the effort quickly lost steam when internal differences 
within SEIU and inter-union conflict deflected efforts to gain a foothold in the US’s 
least-unionized industry.8 Despite fifteen years of supposed reform and change within 
                                                                                                                                                        
seek to escape?’ He contends that study of powerful elites or the working class and poor-the poles of 
Western social structure-has preoccupied scholars. They have neglected the middle. Most 
convincingly, Mayer describes the lower middle class's structure as complex, unstable, constantly 
changing, and thus difficult to study.” (Bjelopera 9) One exception is Mark McColloch who examines 
the bank workers in White Collars in Transition: The Boom Years, 1940-1970. 
6
 In the US in 2013, there were 7.2 million public sector union members, and 7.3 million private sector 
union members.  The union density for the public sector is 35.3%, while the private sector is only 
6.7%. Local government has a union density of 40.8%, and includes teachers, librarians, police, and 
firefighters, which are the most unionized occupations in the US. Utilities (25.6%), transportation and 
warehousing (19.6%), telecommunications (14.4%), and construction (14.1 %) have the highest 
unionization rates in the private sector. Agriculture(1.0 %), finance (1.0 %), and food services and 
drinking places (1.3%) have the lowest rates. By occupation, farming, fishing, and forestry occupations 
(2.1%) and sales and related occupations (2.9%) had the lowest unionization rates. BLS, “Union 
Members- 2013,” BLS,www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf, accessed March 20, 2014. The 
2012-2013 CPS survey shows 1.24% union density in US banking/insurance, and only 4.22 % union 
density in NYC, the world’s financial capital. Real estate unionization is around a third of the workers in 
New York, but drops to fewer than 5% nationally. See Appendix 1 for more details about the NLRA or 
other questions related to US labor regulatory framework. CWA researchers estimated that in 2010, 
there were over 5 million workers in banking and insurance, making it bigger than the retail sector, with 
about 1.8 million workers that could be unionized in commercial banking (half in bank branches), and 
another 1.6 million that could be unionized in the insurance industry. One in every four bank branch 
workers in the US are employed by one of the six largest banks in the US (Bank of America, Wells 
Fargo, JPMorgan Chase, Citibank, PNC and US bank), a reflection of a high industry consolidation. 
This concentration of employment in major banks is even more pronounced in major cities, increasing 
the number employed in the biggest banks to 30%, and to about 50% in top 5 banks in major urban 
markets on the West coast. Large bank call centers can have over a thousand workers in one work 
site. (Interview with CWA research staff, July 2011) 
7
 The AFL-CIO Investments department, Change to Win researchers, and staff from SEIU, CWA, 
AFSCME, and UNITE-HERE were willing and eager to meet with me about organizing financial sector 
workers. The OPEIU, however, did not respond to my e-mails. When I showed up at their office, they 
declined to meet with me, took my information, and never followed up with me. The union most 
responsible for organizing this sector seemed the least enthusiastic about discussing it.  
8
 CONTRAF: www.contrafcut.org.br; São Paulo Bancários: www.spbancarios.com.br. See Steve 
Early, The Civil Wars in U.S. Labor: Birth of a New Workers’ Movement or Death Throes of the Old? 
 4 
the US labor movement to organize the unorganized, to grow in the service sector, to 
launch corporate campaigns with an industrial organizing strategy, to organize 
previously neglected groups such as women, and to take on Wall Street and the 
financial sector in the worst financial crisis of recent history—no sustained effort 
currently exists to organize financial sector workers.9 
There are almost a half million tellers in the US, 90% of them women, a third 
of them part-time, and only 1.4% are union members.10  Along with many other 
occupations within the financial sector, they receive next to no attention from the US 
labor movement, including unions, academic institutions, and social movement 
organizations such as worker centers. The history of the OPEIU, the union technically 
responsible for organizing office workers, is rarely studied, while its current activities 
are even less scrutinized.11 Therefore, it is not surprising that even SEIU’s limited 
effort in the financial sector gained media attention. 
SEIU’s mere mention of financial reform coming from labor brought much 
hostility from sections of the media. Glenn Beck, a popular right-wing critic who 
worked with the Fox network, helped bring down a national progressive community 
organization (ACORN) through his show, and then set his sight on a new target. In 
March 2011, he accused Stephen Lerner from SEIU of plotting what he called a 
“clear case of economic terrorism,” stating:  
                                                 
9
 CONTRAF and Stephen Lerner, a former SEIU staffer, have facilitated renewed collaboration 
through the Communication Workers of America (CWA) and SEIU supported community organizations 
committed to financial reform in the US. The Committee for Better Banks is an alliance of the 
Communications Workers of America, Alliance for a Greater New York, New York Communities for 
Change, and Make the Road Action Fund that collaborates with UNI’s Global Finance Campaign. See 
their “US Bank Workers Report” (Feb. 2, 2014) for recent information on current conditions in the 
industry: www.uniglobalunion.org; For more on recent developments in the US labor movement, see 
Steve Early: Embedded With Organized Labor: Journalistic Reflections on the Class War at Home 
(Monthly Review Press, 2009) and The Civil Wars in U.S. Labor: Birth of a New Workers’ Movement or 
Death Throes of the Old?, and Save Our Unions: Dispatches from a Movement in Distress, MRP, 
2014. 
10
 The average median wages of tellers in 2012 were $12 per hour and $24,940 per year. BLS Outlook 
Handbook, www.bls.gov/ooh/office-and-administrative-support/tellers.htm, accessed March 20, 2014. 
CPS 2012-2013 data shows 1.5% unionization of tellers. 
11
 See footnote seven above about the OPEIU’s lack of receptiveness to this study. The one book on 
their history was commissioned by the union and written by a friend of the president in an almost 
completely uncritical manner, and deceptively in regards to its part in destroying the United Office and 
Professional Workers of America (UOPWA). 
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We listened to Americans describe how they were going to take down 
a major U.S. bank in May and how they were going to collapse the 
stock market and bring on a second economic collapse, how this 
could not appear to be coordinated or union backed, how the unions 
were dead and the only way to really restart the unions is to collapse 
the system.12 
 
It is preposterous that any union in the US has such capacity when the union 
membership and strike activity of the US working class has declined so significantly 
over the last few decades. It is quite illogical unions could be “dead” and still manage 
to bring down a bank and the stock market, especially when the US labor movement 
has organized hardly any bank workers, and rarely even thinks about changing this. 
Nevertheless, the mere possibility of labor law reform proposed in the Employee Free 
Choice Act—nothing nearly as strong as the passage of the NLRA in the 1930s nor 
as impactful as the repeal of the Taft-Hartley Act could be for workers—awoke fears 
among the bankers and most of the employer class, who quickly and successfully 
mobilized to defeat the bill. The American Banker, in its premature fears of a bank 
employee’s union wrote: 
Most banks are non-union, but if concentrations of bank employees 
at, say, call centers or large urban branch offices take advantage of 
these new rules to organize, there can be a substantial impact to not 
only a bank's salary and wage structure, but to their capital standing 
and merger prospects as well, experts say. Union organizers typically 
set their sights on the likes of retailers and health care providers, but 
the financial crisis has set the stage for some aggressive campaigns 
against the financial-services sector.13 
 
Some of the alarmist calls from the right were indeed based on actual union 
activity. SEIU had a short-lived effort to organize US bank workers with CONTRAF as 
                                                 
12
 Beck, Glenn. “Clear Case of Economic Terrorism,” March 22, 2011. www.glennbeck.com/2011/03
/22/beck-clear-case-of-economic-terrorism/ (Accessed February 22, 2012) The barrage of right wing 
criticism included headlines such as “Eco-Terrorist Wannabe Steve Lerner Still Works for SEIU,” 
“SEIU Plan to Destroy JP Morgan,” “Caught on Tape-The Lefts Economic Terrorism Playbook,” 
“Revealed…The Chase Campaign by a Coalition of Unions, Community Groups, Lawmakers and 
Students to Take Down US Capitalism and Redistribute Wealth & Power.” (www.glennbeck.com, 
www.theblaze.com, www.businessinsider.com) 
13
 Fest, Glen. “Next up: Bank Employees Unions?” October 1, 2009. www.americanbanker.com/
magazine/119_10/next-up-bank-employee-unions-1002071-1.html, Accessed February 22, 2012. Anti-
union law firms also immediately started offering their services to banks for pre-emptive union 
avoidance. See, for example, “Possible Unionization of the Banking Industry: The Employee Free 
Choice Act and the Threat to Bank Valuations,” Griffin Financial Group LLC, March 13, 2009. 
 6 
previously mentioned, and has continued a community-based campaign for financial 
reform. While its bank organizing was ultimately an unfinished and unsuccessful 
effort, there is increasing recognition within the US labor movement that the service 
sector is extremely important to the future relevance of unions, and that the financial 
sector is a significant part of the service sector that must be organized. Also notable, 
as Stephen Lerner, a key strategist in the SEIU bank campaign commented, “it’s 
perhaps the first time in the history of the U.S. labor movement where foreign unions 
have been the driving force behind launching an organizing drive of this nature in the 
U.S.”14 
UNI, a global labor federation, is increasingly uniting the strength of financial 
sector unions throughout the world, and will hopefully continue to influence trade 
unionists in the US to take seriously the question of financial sector workers’ 
organization. It is not only for the dignity and respect of US financial workers or the 
strength of the US labor movement that the industry must be organized; with the US 
financial industry’s significant capital penetration abroad, increased trade union 
power in the US financial sector is essential to the global solidarity that could help 
maintain and raise the standards of financial sector workers throughout the world. 
Despite the lack of bank worker organizing, other efforts targeting the industry 
continue.  
When Occupy Wall Street began, hope was restored in new possibilities for 
reining in the power of Wall Street and the 1% through instituting financial reform. 
However, the question of financial sector workers—most of whom would be part of 
the 99%—seemed to be left out of the discussion. Meanwhile, in other countries, UNI 
Finance and many of its affiliate unions in the financial sector were approaching the 
question of regulating the financial industry concretely from the perspective of its 
workers leading the industry to reform. Easing pressure on the front-line employees 
who sell commission-based products, raising standards through providing necessary 
services in an honest manner, and increasing their voice and job control could help 
workers serve the needs of their customers and allow them to act as industry 
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 Elk, Mike. “Too Big Not to Organize,” In These Times. July 29, 2010. www.inthesetimes.com/article/
6273/too_big_not_to_organize, Accessed February 22, 2012. 
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watchdogs.15 This approach involves uniting the working-class of the financial sector 
with the rest of the working-class since both are exploited by the parasitic operations 
of financial capitalists.16 Occupy Wall Street could have considered more serious 
union involvement as a strategy towards workers’ control of the industry while raising 
awareness about the potential benefits of nationalization, as occurred with Indian 
bank workers in the 1970s, for example. Instead, the loudest message was “big is 
bad,” and efforts were directed towards moving money from big banks to small 
banks. 17  Even labor organizations like Jobs with Justice took this populist anti-
corporate approach, calling for a “shareholder spring” to “confront corporate power.”18 
The slogans from Occupy Wall Street, Jobs with Justice, and some labor 
unions clearly had a populist, rather than a socialist, message that has been 
unhelpful, if not harmful, to the interests of organizing financial sector workers 
historically. Such slogans are against the corporation, the 1% and the financial elite, 
but not necessarily against the capitalist, the capitalist class, or capitalism. They are 
for uniting the people—the nation—against “big finance,” but often critical class 
character distinctions within the targeted sector are lost. After investigating the history 
of the labor movement approaches to the financial sector, it became apparent these 
movements were replaying an approach quite common and deeply woven into the 
fabric of US social history. At some level, the American dream, which was built on the 
republican ideal going back to the American Revolution and resurrected repeatedly in 
popular movements since, carries on today.  Many workers ultimately want to start 
their own business, believing they too can one day own their own business and be 
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 See www.uniglobalunion.org, UNI Global Finance Union’s “Sales vs. Advice Campaign” documents 
16
 On the parasitic function of financial capitalist, see Michael Hudson, Hudson, Michael, Super 
Imperialism - New Edition: The Origin and Fundamentals of U.S. World Dominance, Pluto Press, 
2003. 
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 “Joint Effort Launched to Confront Corporate Power,” www.jwj.org/2012/01/joint-effort-launched-to-
confront-corporate-power, Accessed February 22, 2012. Jobs with Justice is student, labor, 
community coalition that advances social movement unionism in the US. See also www.
confrontcorporatepower.org 
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their own boss. Therefore, it is those who control credit that are seen to be blocking 
their aspirations; the banker becomes the preferred enemy within the capitalist class.  
The hostility towards the banker in the US is perhaps greater than such 
hostility in other countries, and has manifested in the cultural phenomenon of the 
bank robber as hero.19 For example, many movies have been made about legendary 
19th century bank and train robber Jesse James. His Robin Hood-like status helped 
him maintain support despite his use of violence. Another famous bank robber, Pretty 
Boy Floyd, had thousands of mourners attend his funeral, and has been featured in 
many movies since. He is immortalized in the Woodie Guthrie song, “The Ballad of 
Pretty Boy Floyd,” which Joan Baez, Bob Dylan, Bruce Springsteen and other 
musicians have covered. The song expresses sympathy for Pretty Boy Floyd 
knocking out a disrespectful sheriff, suggesting it is banks, not bank robbers, that 
truly rob people: 
Yes, as through this world I've wandered / I've seen lots of funny men 
/ Some will rob you with a six-gun / And some with a fountain pen / 
And as through your life you travel / Yes, as through your life you 
roam / You won't never see an outlaw / Drive a family from their 
home.20 
 
The 2009 movie Public Enemies captures Depression-era discontent with 
banks, and popular fascination with, if not support for, John Dillinger, who robbed 
banks and police stations after being unemployed and receiving a ten- to twenty-year 
prison sentence for stealing fifty dollars from a grocery store.21 Another bank robber, 
Willie Sutton, supposedly halted mid-robbery if a woman screamed or a baby cried, 
and also somehow maintained a Robin Hood image despite keeping his loot. Bonnie 
and Clyde are another famous cultural phenomenon of bank robbers as heroes, as 
historian ER Milner explained: 
                                                 
19
 On using cultural representations for understanding historical questions: “Evidence from such 
sources must be used carefully, being the product of the writer’s imagination and possibly designed to 
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20
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The country’s money simply declined…Gaunt, dazed men roamed 
the city streets seeking jobs...Breadlines and soup kitchens became 
jammed…foreclosures forced more than 38 percent of farmers from 
their lands… a catastrophic drought struck the Great Plains…By the 
time Bonnie and Clyde became well known, many had felt the 
capitalistic system had been abused by big business and government 
officials… Now here were Bonnie and Clyde striking back.22 
 
The villain in the Christmas film classic It’s a Wonderful Life (1946) is a banker, 
and a long-time Republican Party member that tries to make citizens into renters 
rather than owners, while constantly trying to find ways to profit off others. Although 
the film is slightly anti-capitalist, the solution to the corrupting influence of wealth is 
the community, family, and love rather than socialist expropriation of the bankers. 
Nevertheless, the critique was enough for the FBI to investigate and report that the 
movie “represented a rather obvious attempt to discredit bankers by casting Lionel 
Barrymore [Mr. Potter, the villain] as a 'scrooge-type' so that he would be the most 
hated man in the picture. …a common trick used by communists.”23 Similar themes 
permeate the 1964 classic Mary Poppins, where the bankers are also portrayed as 
robbers, and there is a run on the bank in response.24 
Unlike these popular bank robbers, financial worker organizing has a lost 
history not found in expressions of popular culture. The book There Comes a Time, a 
fictional account of a bank worker forming a union and changing his life, is largely 
unknown and out of print.25 The documentary The Willmar 8 and the TV movie A 
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stories have shown up in film. 
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Matter of Sex, are about bank workers who went on strike in 1977 for two years to 
fight against sexual discrimination. The strike, the first and longest for US bank 
workers, met fierce employer, political, and community opposition, yet their struggle 
is known by few today given the unavailability of the documentary and movie.26 Even 
the slew of documentaries about the last recession neglected the workers in the 
financial industries. 27  In the US social fabric, contrary to Brazil’s, the banker is 
notorious, a source of popular scorn countered by the idolized bank robber hero. The 
bank worker, on the other hand, is at worst equated with the banker, and at best, 
invisible.   
 
Figure 1 
Willmar 8: The US’s First Bank Worker Strike, 1977 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
impacted C Wrights Mills through his mentor Hans Gerth, and Emil Ledner who wrote The New Middle 
Class in 1926. (Russell Jacoby afterword in Mills 367-369) 
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Sep 26), Star Tribune. 
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Methodology 
 The primary method used in this study to understand why there is no financial 
workers union in the US is historical analysis. A narrative is constructed about the 
labor movement’s approach to the financial sector at various highpoints of union 
strength, considering specific developments towards the labor organization of the 
financial workers. Limited comparative descriptions are sometimes employed to 
understand similarities and differences between the financial sectors of the US and 
other countries, and the labor organizations within.28 In addition to secondary sources 
mainly from the fields of economic and labor history, I examined primary sources in 
archives, and secondary data on the financial sector and its workers. The study is 
aided by conjectural understanding and instincts gained through my trade union 
experience as a worker who spent several years organizing my own workplace, and 
working as a staff union organizer. 
Areas studied include industrial relations, gender, economic development, 
economic crisis, the financial sector and crisis, international union solidarity 
campaigns, the organization and strategies of the US labor movement, and 
comparative financial and labor histories. For understanding some recent activity 
related to the topic, I informally interviewed the capital strategies and research staff in 
several trade unions, many of whom had some financial workers as members. I also 
spent time with CONTRAF members, staff and leaders to get a direct feel of what a 
strong bank workers union looks and feels like. In the last few years, simply living in 
Brazil, I spent more time in banks than I may have in my entire life prior in the US. 
Thus, I had human interactions with tellers in the course of transactions enough to 
learn workers’ names, and even run into them going out in my local community. This 
experience has helped me consider how a Brazilian may think of the bank worker 
question coming to the US, and indeed I did think about this as part of my reverse 
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culture shock every visit back to the US. In addition to reviewing historical literature 
on the question, I have gathered demographic data, reviewed union strategy 
literature, and examined recent campaigns that will be of direct use to US and 
international trade union leaders exploring the possibility of organizing US financial 
sector workers. Above all, this study is an attempt to synthesize relevant literature to 
labor in the financial sector, and provoke further research on the question of financial 
workers in the US. For the purpose of this master’s dissertation, the primary focus is 
on the 19th century roots of the problem related to the early financial sector and labor 
movement formation, with subsequent developments reviewed and a proposal to 
encourage continued research in the interest of Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate 
(FIRE) workers and their unionization. 
Since there is no direct research or analysis on record specifically asking my 
initial research question, “why is there no financial sector workers’ union in the US,” I 
examined an extensive array of sources that peripherally provide insight to the 
question, allowing the construction of a narrative worthy of further development 
through new research. In the process, I discovered more and more sources that are 
relevant to constructing an argument for why there is no financial sector union in the 
US and what might be done to create one. This dissertation attempts to synthesize 
these findings from a variety of secondary and primary sources that only peripherally 
touch on the question in an attempt to create the first argument for why no financial 
sector union exists in the US. 
The fact that we are taking on this topic is not a product of individual 
significance or haphazard occurrence. Rather, it is a concrete development arising 
from the re-organization of the labor movement and its academic partners to combat 
new and unresolved problems arising from neoliberalism and the globalization of 
capital. The response of CONTRAF to US capital's entrance into the Brazilian 
financial sector has been to directly challenge the US labor movement's failure to 
organize financial sector workers, and to bring its struggle in Brazil directly to 
financial capital's most luxurious and comfortable home. Multiple labor studies 
programs, union centers, national unions, and the ILO participated in the formation of 
the GLU program, enabling us to do this study. My entrance into the program was 
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dependent on a recommendation from a local hotel workers union in Los Angeles of 
which I was a member, and the partial funding from Germany's Friedrich Ebert 
Foundation. These new and diverse partnerships represent a changing worldview 
and a “Polanyi-esque” counter-movement to financial capital's dominance, thus 
creating the conditions for the development of this master's dissertation. 
 
Background: from the Present to the early 20th Century 
The financial sector has significant economic weight within the service sector 
and the economy as a whole in the US, and has received much attention since the 
recent crisis. Unionization rates, membership and strike activity are quite low 
compared to Brazil, and most other countries in the world. US financial service 
workers’ demographics for non-managerial jobs are comparable to the population at 
large in terms of race and ethnicity as a result of civil rights movements’ 
achievements, but highly skewed towards women in service positions such as tellers. 
Despite the failure of the SEIU campaign mentioned above, CWA, UNI, and 
CONTRAF are still working together to find innovative ways to organize financial 
workers through international campaigns and framework agreements. In conjunction 
with advocacy for larger financial reforms, some staff in the AFL-CIO and Change to 
Win union centers occasionally discuss the idea of organizing the sector, viewing 
capital strategies campaigns, such as mobilizing the leverage of labor’s capital in 
pension funds, as the best foothold into the financial sector workforce. Efforts 
towards public sector banking in the US and other alternatives are being pursued in 
some community- and state-based movements, but nothing at a scale that could lead 
to significant nationalization of the financial sector.29 Overall, however, there are few 
academics or activists within the labor movement that see financial sector workers as 
an important point of leverage within the US economy to building working class 
power. Therefore, there is little investment in the research or organization that would 
be required to organize the sector. Furthermore, CONTRAF from Brazil and UNI are 
the only unions outside the US pushing and aiding the US labor movement through 
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their international solidarity despite the fact that many more countries have stronger 
financial sector worker unions than the US, and potential interests in seeing them 
organized. 
The last forty years have seen a revolution in the Information, Communication, 
and Technology (ICT) sector. These innovations have had a radical effect on labor 
productivity, and deregulation has contributed to an explosive growth of the financial 
services industry, making the workers of the industry a crucial part of the labor force 
and therefore instrumental to any discussion about building a strong labor movement. 
Unfortunately, these changes over the last forty years occurred during a period after 
the communist led union, the United Office and Professional Workers of America 
(UOPWA), formerly affiliated to the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), was 
destroyed by anti-communist hysteria and the opportunistic maneuvering of the 
American Federation of Labor (AFL) affiliated Office and Professional Employees 
International Union (OPEIU), which has failed to build union density in the financial 
sector since. The feminist movements of the 1970s made some noteworthy efforts in 
supporting financial sector worker organization to fill the void the OPEIU and the 
AFL-CIO left, but these were on an ad hoc, small-scale basis. As a result, many 
financial sector workers’ wages, conditions, and power within the economy suffers 
from a lack of union organization.  
The first efforts towards organization of bank workers occurred in the early 20th 
century. This organization began in AFL locals: primarily those with significant 
socialist and communist political influence. Left-wing labor activists of the period were 
the first to recognize the need to organize the growing white-collar category of 
workers, and pushed ahead with the organization of office workers despite 
impediments from the AFL officialdom. Differences culminated with the separation of 
over a dozen of these AFL locals, who formed the UOPWA, which is discussed in 
chapter four of this work. Led by communists with a vision to build industrial unionism 
in the financial sector, this period was perhaps the most hopeful moment for the 
creation of financial sector unionism. The UOPWA made significant inroads into the 
insurance industry, but its nascent bank worker organizing fell with the rest of the 
union, which was destroyed by the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 and the ensuing 
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McCarthyist witch hunt to persecute communists; liberals in the unions happily 
assisted with self-policing to push their opponents out of the labor movement. The 
communists’ failure to build a labor party at a time when it seemed more possible 
than at any other point in US history, as well as the adoption of policies such as the 
no-strike pledge which contributed to the union’s downfall, impeded efforts toward 
financial sector worker organization. 30  The OEIU (OPEIU’s predecessor) built its 
organization primarily around the principle of being anti-communist and opposing the 
UOPWA, and exploited ethnic rivalry during the period to advance its aim of 
eliminating the UOPWA. The OEIU, along with several other unions, took over what 
was left of the UOPWA in the aftermath of the communist purges, and is the main 
union responsible for financial worker organizing today despite its lack of success or 
sense of urgency to organize. 
 
19th Century Origins of Obstacles to Financial Sector Worker Organization 
 
 This work primarily explores the financial sector and the labor movement 
formation from the American Revolution to approximately 1930, around the eve of the 
Great Depression and the rise of the CIO. In its early crescendos, the labor 
movement focused political action in the interest of monetary reform, easing access 
to credit in two major periods, and appealing to the yeoman farmer and skilled 
workers who viewed themselves as the producer class. In this context, the bank 
worker perhaps seemed to be the least likely ally to the workers in the labor 
movements, or to the farmers in the populist movements. The impact of Jeffersonian 
republicanism and Jacksonian populism on the labor movement, including the 
National Labor Union and Knights of Labor, is assessed in the second chapter. It is in 
the 19th century that we also find the first craft unions of clerks and a bank clerk 
association; significant literature exists about clerical workers from the period of 1870 
to 1930, which is explored in the third chapter. Crucial to this period is the 
exponential growth of all industries, but especially the clerical industries (FIRE 
sector), which benefitted from changes in gender attitudes and innovations in 
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scientific management applied to the office. The 1890s was a crucial period where 
the labor movement failed to build a labor party. Having done so could have altered 
the labor regulatory framework to facilitate financial sector organizing and created 
more public institutions within the financial sector, both of which are elements of other 
societies, including Brazil, that have stronger financial sector unions.31 The failure to 
build a financial sector workers union or general clerks union in the period of 1890 to 
1930 is also explored in the fourth chapter. 
This master’s dissertation sought answers to the following questions: What, if 
anything, in the history of the nascent US labor movement of the 18th and 19th 
century’s approach to financial reform and financial workers enables us to 
understand why no financial workers union formed then, and why none exists today? 
Are there factors specific to the peculiarities of the development of capitalism and the 
financial sector in the US, or are there specific political factors and shortcomings of 
the labor leadership during this period? Are there examples in other countries of bank 
worker unions forming in the 19th century that could give us a comparative basis to 
isolate variables that would most explain the lack of financial worker organization in 
the US? While the complete answers to these questions exceed the scope of this 
work, I have nevertheless provided an introductory exploration to encourage other 
researchers to develop more significant work on the rise and fall of the UOPWA, the 
union which made the most inroads into organizing the US financial sector, and had 
the biggest chance of creating industrial unionism in the financial sector. 
In this study of resistance to US Financial Sector formation in the late 18th and 
19th Century, I discovered many roots of 20th century phenomena that help explain 
the failure to build a financial workers union in the US. These include the banker-
bank clerk proximity and mobility, approaches to financial sector reform and 
perspectives of labor leadership that may have alienated bank workers, the 
exclusiveness of trade unions and negative attitudes towards specific sectors of the 
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working class, republican idealism rather than socialism’s influence over the working 
class, feminization of the clerical labor force, craft rather than industrial unionism 
strength, the limits of Jeffersonian reform to influence capitalist development, and 
finally, the weakness of Marxist influences in the US, which contributed to the failure 
to build a labor party that could create the political power necessary for a labor 
regulatory environment that facilitated union organizing in social democratic 
countries. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Labor, Populism, and the Developing Financial Sector 
 
One possible starting point for understanding the lack of a national financial 
sector workers union in the US would be to examine why the development of a national 
banking industry, the base of financial sector unionism in most countries, was delayed. 
The question of national banking mainly gained support in the financing of war and its 
aftermath in early US history. For example, there was the Morris Bank (Bank of North 
America) to finance the revolutionary war,32 the First National Bank to deal with the 
aftermath of that war (backed by Hamilton while Jefferson opposed), and the Second 
US Bank to deal with the war of 1812 debts.33 Each of these did not last, however, 
because of the popular distrust of power concentrated in a few hands, which resembled 
British tyranny and control from a distance to the citizens of the new independent nation 
in the Americas according to historian Jerry Markham. Jackson let the charter of the 
Second US Bank expire, bringing in the free banking period, which only allowed charters 
for state based banks. The War of 1812 convinced the US that it needed to protect and 
develop its own manufacturing sector, but once the war ended, it could not compete with 
the surge of British goods, whose manufacturers had access to more capital. Southern 
plantation owners resisted the implementation of tariffs to protect US industry, 
concentrated in the North, since southern planters benefited primarily from exporting to 
England. However, the US did benefit from a rapid population growth and transportation 
improvements which expanded domestic markets beyond what European exports could 
fulfill, stimulating domestic industry.34 So with Jackson ending national banking, bankers 
continued to build state based power in spite of popular resistance, and the 
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development of industry towards a national scale continued to produce powerful national 
financial interests. 
Again, the expenses of war, which were significant during the American Civil War 
(1861-1865), raised new financing issues that led to the National Banking act, which 
paved the way for a national currency and national bank charters to meet the needs of 
powerful national industrial interests. Just prior to the Civil War, the US was fourth in the 
world for industrial production when Karl Marx predicted the rise of the factory system 
and industry concentration would cause the US to overtake Europe. The Civil War, with 
its lucrative government contracts for the biggest owners of capital involved in the war 
effort, freed the industrialists from the political control of the slave-holding plantation 
class, with the US achieving Karl Marx’s prediction by 1894.35 It was not until after the 
Civil War when financial and industrial interests fully coalesced and had the political 
power to overcome popular opposition to monopolies that national universal banking 
began to develop. The power of concentrated financial interests expanded until new 
regulation was imposed during the Great Depression of the 1930s as a result of the 
economic crisis and powerful new forces of industrial unionism. 
Popular movements dealing with questions of the financial sector were mainly 
expressed politically by supporting Jeffersonian democracy against Hamilton’s 
federalism, and through Jacksonian populism against the practical federalism of James 
Madison and Nicholas Biddle, the financier president of the second national bank. Labor 
and their organizations were a critical part of this opposition to the rise of a financial elite 
and the organization of financial capital at the national level, with expressions of this 
opposition sometimes more radical than those expressed by elected political leaders. 
Labor organizations began to form as early as banking developed. Thus, this section 
examines the positions labor organizations, including unions and political organizations, 
took towards the financial sector at various points important to the development of the 
labor movement and the financial sector. 
We examine the impact of Jeffersonian democracy and Jacksonian populism on 
how reformers dealt with financial crisis, which occurred in the following years of the 19th 
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century: 1819, 1837, 1854, 1857, 1860, and 1873. The history of these early populist 
movements must be understood to examine why labor and social movements capable of 
organizing bank workers instead started the tradition of advocating for either the 
abolishment of banks or decentralizing approaches to financial reform. It is during this 
period specific questions concerning craft unionism’s development may have impeded 
the development of an industrial or craft unionism capable of organizing workers in the 
banking industry. Although the first “white collar workers,” clerks, formed craft unions 
during this period, bank workers and their associations must also be examined 
independently since they were not part of such movements in the 19th century, perhaps 
a fault of the major labor organizations, but also due to factors peculiar to the industry.  
In the 19th century, there were two distinct working class formations, one 
“dominated by native Yankee men and women and British immigrants,” prior to 1848, 
and another after primarily “of Irish and German immigrants (and their children) and free 
blacks,” demonstrating  
from the beginning… American labor history involved not a linear 
progression of class formation and development but an unceasing 
construction and reconstruction of the working class, drawn from new 
groups of rural people in this country and immigrants from around the 
globe.36 
 
Despite these and other “discontinuities” in class formation, fighting under the 
framework of preventing “the decline of democratic republicanism” as the essential 
element of the American Dream, has been articulated by popular movements throughout 
US history, often limiting the analysis of capitalist development in the US while 
instigating reforms that encouraged a decentralized development of the financial 
sector.37 It is important to consider these peculiarities of US political, labor, and financial 
sector history, as they are at the root of understanding why, at the moment of most 
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potential to build a financial sector workers union—during the heights of CIO power in 
the 1940s—such efforts failed. 
 When farmers and artisans marched together in Massachusetts to demand the 
creation of a land bank to issue paper money, mercantile aristocrats, “the hated creditors 
who were sending Colonial silver to Europe and refusing to accept payments of debts in 
paper money,” appealed to the British King and Parliament. Although the Colonial 
Assembly approved of a Land Bank, the “usurers” did not want the workers and poor “to 
control the public life of the colony,” succeeding in getting the British government to 
prevent the Land Bank.38 The example of Massachusetts in 1740 was generalized to all 
the colonies through the Currency Act of 1764, which in the interest of “British 
manufacturers, merchants, and landlords…deprived [colonists] of the right to use legal 
tender paper money and to establish colonial mints and land banks.”39 Urban workers 
and artisans, along with farmers and pro-revolutionary merchants and planters, would 
unite to drive the British out of the American colonies, but the experience with British 
financial control would leave many of them suspicious of concentrated financial 
interests. 
This suspicion first emerged in the form of Jeffersonian democracy, a movement 
which grew from the farmer and worker soldiers of the revolutionary war who took 
political action. Since voting was restricted to property owners, they also relied on direct 
action against the wealthy merchants and landed elites who had assumed leadership 
after the revolutionary defeat of the British.40 The mechanics, laborers, and farmers who 
made up the Democratic-Republican clubs led by Thomas Jefferson emphasized the 
value of the laboring society, the producers, and welcomed the news of the French 
Revolution. Alexander Hamilton and the Federalists who based their power on landed 
and merchant capitalist interests, however, feared Jacobinism. Many of the members of 
these clubs would go on to form the base of the Democratic-Republican Party while also 
holding membership in journeymen associations, the precursors to trade unions. 
Through political action at the local level, they helped get Jefferson elected as president 
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even though they lacked the right to vote. Jefferson in turn helped expand voting rights 
for the property-less white working population. In 1803, Jefferson, who along with 
Madison did not renew the charter of the First Bank of the US, called it “an institution of 
the ‘most deadly hostility existing, against the principles and form of our Constitution.”41 
Federalists feared the spread of democracy; so much so that some of them even 
considered organizing an armed coup to separate New England from the US to unite 
with Britain, or to divide eastern and western states.42 
Federalists therefore supported Britain’s attempt to control trade with Europe, 
including a European embargo that resulted in the seizure of US ships. Federalists tried 
to sabotage President James Madison’s (a Jeffersonian) efforts to prepare for war, with 
“federalist merchants and bankers refusing to lend money to their country.”43 Meanwhile, 
Black workers and union workers fought in the War of 1812 to defend US democracy 
and sovereignty against the collusion of British and New England merchant capitalist 
interests. After their victory over Britain in the War of 1812, Jeffersonians continued 
growing in power until all property qualifications for voting were lifted for non-slave 
males, creating the tradition of fighting for universal suffrage, as women, African-
Americans and immigrants have struggled for full citizen rights since.44 Responding to 
the Federalists’ fears of enfranchisement, Jefferson wrote in 1816, “I am not among 
those who fear the people…they and not the rich are our dependence for continued 
freedom.”45 
Ironically, through the necessity of the war efforts, despite being a Jeffersonian, 
James Madison was forced to support the creation of a national bank just as his 
predecessors required such measures during the revolutionary war. Therefore, one of 
Alexander Hamilton’s lifelong ambitions was only possible through the circumstances of 
war and the popular leadership of a Jeffersonian. Meanwhile, labor organizations faced 
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a major setback with a depression lasting from 1819-1822. It created a new basis for the 
fomentation of labor organizations and political action, again reviving Jeffersonian 
traditions, while workers fought for better wages and a shorter working day in the 
growing factories and textile mills of the Northeast.46 
In the 1830s workers began to take political action through the Working Men’s 
Party, advocating the end of convict labor, compulsory militias, and poll or sales taxes 
that unfairly burdened the poor. They fought for public education as a source of 
democracy and a means to resist the “crafty and wicked…deceitful machination…of a 
monopolized and monied aristocracy.”47 Imprisonment of debtors, sometimes for as little 
as five dollars, was another major source of resentment towards growing monopoly, of 
which banks and bankers were the most feared and despised. Wealthy merchants were 
also bank directors, enabling them to control who received credit, and often limiting the 
access of small businessmen and journeymen. The distrust of banks perhaps was 
further cemented through the failure of early cooperative efforts of journeymen and 
master organizations, whose power was severely limited by 1835 as the rising 
merchant-capitalist class controlled new markets in the South and West. In addition to 
new forms of transport, “the banking system had expanded, enabling the capitalist to 
convert customers’ credits into bank credits and to stock up a surplus of goods in 
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advance of actual orders,” part of a process that helped the merchant-capitalist “to 
compel masters and journeymen to compete severely against each other.” 48  Small 
producers and manufacturers tried to join together to raise their own capital and 
provided loans, but their efforts were futile since merchant capitalists had much more 
capital and access to credit abroad.49 The disadvantaged needed other means, such as 
trade unions and political action, to resist the merchant capitalists. The gains in voting 
rights, and the growing trade unionism of the 1820s and 1830s, facilitated interest in 
new efforts for worker political action as the Federalists had triumphed politically in this 
period, often with workers’ votes.  
Farmers, mechanics, and journeymen parties united in Working Men’s parties in 
Philadelphia, New York, and Boston as well as in small towns and villages. Thomas 
Skidmore, a leader of the NY Working Men’s Party, proposed equal distribution of 
property to create a society based on the self-employed; a society with “no lenders, no 
borrowers, no landlords, no tenants; no masters, no journeymen; no Wealth, no Want.”50 
An advocate of land redistribution, he was eventually removed from the party for being 
too radical since moderate proponents of the republican ideal focused their opposition 
on the “array of government-conferred monopolies that propped up the system of 
merchants’ capital—the corporate charters regularly granted to private companies 
engaged in banking, insurance, transportation, communication, and certain fields of 
manufacturing.” 51  These parties specifically wanted “to limit or outlaw corporate 
monopolies, of which chartered banks were deemed the most powerful and insidious.”52 
Their calls for protections for small producers, cheap land for urban and rural wage 
laborers rather than speculators, and the end of paper money and debtors prisons, 
“enjoyed wide popular support [in the 1830s and 1840s], addressing the concerns not 
only of wage-earners but also of poor small masters and other petty proprietors.”53 
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Workers resented wages being paid in bank notes, which often fluctuated 
depending on the solvency of the issuing bank. Merchants could discount the value to 
account for fluctuations, while workers were stuck with the face value, severely affecting 
their purchasing power. Workers saw banks as “part of a gigantic monopolistic 
conspiracy to stifle competition, reduce employment, and raise prices,”54 leading them to 
resist the chartering of new banks, and calling for payment in specie rather than bank 
notes. Others called for the repeal of bank charters and other laws that regulated banks, 
and some advocated that “the government should take over control of banking and 
issuing of currency, thereby providing a stabilized currency system which would check 
inflation and at the same time prevent any domination of political life by banking 
monopolists.”55 Still others advocated that they “destroy banks altogether.”56 
James Madison’s Second National Bank was a product of rising federalism even 
though Madison claimed he was a Jeffersonian. This resulted in the re-birth of the 
Jeffersonian tradition in opposition to federalism through the election of Andrew 
Jackson. Jackson’s populist victory resulted in the end of the Second National Bank. 
Just as Jeffersonians saw Federalists as traitors in their collaborations with the British 
prior to the War of 1812, the early labor party advocates saw their goals as a product of 
patriotism, and the completion “of the glorious work of the Revolution” that “Jefferson, if 
he yet lived would receive and recognize as his own” because he believed “the cause of 
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the workingmen is the cause of the country.”57 Labor parties were not strong enough to 
take power on their own. As a result, independent ideas such as total bank and currency 
nationalization were not sufficiently widespread. This enabled Jackson to control the 
reform efforts, which only resulted in short-lived solutions to the workers grievances. 
Jackson’s militarism and oppression of Native Americans also made him inferior to 
Jefferson from the viewpoint of the Working Men’s Party.58 
Nevertheless, these reform efforts led to the expansion of voting rights and the 
popular movement to elect Andrew Jackson, who despite defending inequality, was 
against the specific privileges of a federally chartered corporation. These reform efforts 
also propelled Jackson’s decision to abolish the second Bank of the US.59 As result of 
this popular measure, the Whigs split from the Democrats in support of the bank, and 
the Democrats gained much of the Working Men’s base. Many of the activists were 
involved in the General Trades Union and National Trade Union, the first unions to 
organize unskilled workers, women, and clerks.60 Farmers in the west and workers in 
the east gave much support to Jackson. They saw the Whigs as the defenders of the 
bank, as the aristocrats who restricted their voting rights, the traitors who opposed the 
War of 1812, and the candidate of their employers who had opposed their strikes and 
union organizing. From their perspective, the (second) National bank was an 
unaccountable organization of concentrated wealth aided by deposits from the 
government that ran contrary to the aspirations of Jeffersonian democracy. The idea of 
the national bank also resembled the Bank of England, which belonged to a country with 
a monarch, not the free American people. To make matters worse, a Congressional 
Investigating Committee found foreigners held nine million dollars in bank stock. The 
committee discovered the “nobility of Europe” held ownership as well, threatening the 
independence of the new nation. Some of the trade unionists drew support from English 
trade unionists and chartists, who backed Jackson’s efforts to boost their own movement 
to end “the cursed Banks in England.”61 Despite the intense resistance from Biddle and 
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the business community, workers defended Jackson’s decision, still believing their 
action to limit the banking system would prevent making a “large number of men 
dependent upon a few employers.”62 
A society of independent producers still seemed possible in the early 19th century, 
but the anti-corporate, anti-monopoly tradition continued to affect reform movements 
even when such a society became highly unlikely after the consolidation of industrial 
and financial power during the Civil War. The appeal of the Jeffersonian and Jacksonian 
republican ideal of “a society offering all Americans the chance to obtain or enhance 
their personal independence by accumulating wealth and ascending the social ladder,”63 
had already profoundly impacted the way popular movements approached the financial 
sector. The sentimental appeal of this republican ideal continues to the present day, 
visible in how labor and popular reform movements advocate curbing financial capital’s 
power, while failing to build a labor party that could truly confront it, never mind a 
revolutionary party that could overthrow it.64 
It is difficult to know exactly what the attitude of bank workers may have been 
towards trade unions and the Working Men’s Party in the Jacksonian era, but it is 
probable that the limited access to credit, and the role of the clerk as the gatekeeper 
working in close proximity with the merchant kept them separate from these movements. 
For example, one author found evidence of complaints of “rudeness of bank employees, 
even at the savings banks, towards members of “the laboring classes” and small 
businessmen: 
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…and apply to one of the banks…for a loan to that amount on the 
security of his next coming week’s wages, he will have a refusal from 
the principals, and be quizzed…by the clerks, because he is poor. If a 
full-pursed, well-dressed, white-handed monopolizer applies at the 
bank for the loan of 1000 dollars for six months, and offers his 
promissory note, he will be “accommodated,” because he is rich.65 
 
Perhaps the abolishment of the Second Bank of the US and ushering in of the 
“free banking period” was a victory in providing increased access to credit and possibly 
expanding the number of banks and employees in the sector. The period, however, was 
also prone to crises that damaged the working-class since the reformists did not realize 
“an unrestricted monetary system contained evils which were detrimental to the pursuit 
of sound business.”66 These reformists contributed to the increase in crises by focusing 
only on the problem of bank note issuing through eliminating restrictions on state banks, 
not realizing there could be a need to regulate deposit banking as well. The Working 
Men’s Party “shared the general confusion concerning the nature of speculation, 
disagreeing among themselves as well as with others on where to draw the line between 
credit for legitimate investment and credit which encouraged unwholesome 
speculation.”67 
Without the Working Men’s Party, anti-monopoly workingmen within the 
Democratic Party resisted the Democrats who supported state bank charters, 
sometimes calling to “end entirely this standing army of non-producers called 
Bankers.”68 One such example were the “Loco-focos,” who were named for after their 
matches used to light candles in late night meetings organized to resist party machine 
efforts to exclude them. Candidates in the “Loco-Foco” movement defeated Bank 
Democrats and Bank Whigs in New York State elections as a result of their organizing. 
The movement spread to other states, and after the Panic of 1837 caused severe price 
increases, the movement went national when banks refused to convert bank notes to 
hard money. Workers gathered in meetings of more than 20,000 to call for “the national 
government to end the power of financial institutions over the nation’s economy.” The 
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movement called “for a government banking system to check the tide of speculation 
fostered by private and state banks.”69 As a result of their pressure, President Martin 
Van Buren, Jackson’s handpicked successor, responded by creating a government 
treasury system independent of the banks. This was a victory for “the separation of 
government and banking institutions, the limitation of the power and control of the banks 
and the adoption of a hard money policy.” 70  Legal restrictions, however, plus the 
depression of 1837 dealt severe blows to trade union organization.71  
Many years passed before unions recuperated enough to lead the movement for 
a ten hour work day. The depression enabled the ownership of the new factories and 
machinery to concentrate in few hands, further damaging the hope of a producer’s 
society. At the same time, neither the leaders of Owenite and Fourierist efforts to form 
consumer and producer cooperatives nor those who led land reform movements were 
sufficiently supportive of trade union organization or its demands to build a broad social 
movement capable of resisting the growth of industrial capitalism.72 Several decades 
would pass before the working-class again built significant trade union and political 
organization to advance its interests.73 
From 1840-1860, the labor movement advocated for a ten hour day, and the 
average work day moved from 12.5 to 11 hours and even lower in industries with union 
activity.74 The 1854 and 1857 crises were blows to labor, but unions had learned the 
importance of good finances to building permanent organizations, and more of them 
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survived the latter crisis.75 Unemployed workers also organized after the crisis of 1857, 
including a mass meeting of 15,000 workers in New York City that turned into a march 
on Wall Street where the unemployed “paraded around the Stock Exchange, shouting: 
‘We Want Work.’”76 Public works programs were created out of popular pressure, and 
the largest strike prior to the Civil War occurred shortly after the 1857 depression.77 
During this period of the ten hour work day movement, clerks began to organize 
and found popular support for their cause. Trade unionism has a rich history in the US 
as we have seen so far, with the craft-based model most predominant in the 1800s. If 
we were to conceive of the project of organizing workers and others in the financial 
sector from the craft unionist perspective, the organization of the clerks in retail trade 
would be their historical antecedent. The goods that clerks sold in the 1800s generally 
came from journeyman trade organizations organized for the mutual benefit of skilled 
craftsmen. Likely copying other workers in New York City (NYC), retail salesmen created 
the Dry Goods Clerks’ Mutual Benefit and Protective Association in 1849. Their primary 
objective was to shorten the working day, calling for stores to close at 8 PM not through 
strike threats, but through attempts to persuade employers and customers. They won 
the moral support of professionals such as doctors and lawyers, and appealed to 
working men and women through the help of the Industrial Congress.78  
The American Labor Union was a similar effort led by Germans, whose exiles 
from the 1848 revolution played an important role in the labor movement of the 1850s 
contemporaneously with English immigrants who brought Chartist and trade union 
experience to the US. These immigrant groups, even with their radical political 
experience, were not able to build labor based political movements as strong as those of 
the 1830s discussed above. 79  Nevertheless, they were successful in their goal of 
reducing their work week by 15 to 25 hours, and caused the movement to spread to 
                                                 
75
 Foner 1:218 and Wilentz 116 
76
 Foner 1:239 
77
 Foner 1:240, The strike of the shoemakers in New England included at least 20,000 men and women 
out for three months with community support. (Nicholson 88) The largest prior was probably the 
Philadelphia General Strike of 1835. (Nicholson 69-70) 
78
 The Industrial congress was an effort from 1845 to 1856 to federate the labor movement at the national 
level. Foner 1:234 
79
 Foner 1:227-235 
 32 
other parts of NYC. For example, other workers, such as the hat and shoe clerks, 
formed their own unions of salesmen and won 8PM store closings from merchants.80 
Despite some local victories, efforts to create a national labor federation were not 
successful in the 1850s. Local craft unions were successful however in forming national 
and international organizations to maintain wage scales in the larger markets and 
increased urban populations, which were products of improved communication and 
transportation. These were mainly local craft unions based on specific skilled workers, 
with the exception of one building trade union organized on a multi-craft basis. The 
clerks’ union was not among the locals that began to organize on a national scale at this 
time.81 
The Civil War interrupted some of this growth in membership and militancy. 
During the Civil War, most workers contributed to the liberation of black slaves by 
supporting the North, although others denounced the conscription of workers as long as 
the rich were excluded. Some workers also feared freeing slaves was an attempt by 
northern abolitionists to replace militant workers with former slaves in order to drive 
wages down.82 Prior to the Civil War, state chartered banks issued their own bank notes, 
and the federal government used gold and silver to pay expenses. By the end of the 
war, the US had a national currency, federally chartered banks, huge budgets, debts, 
and federal employment; all of which were supported by northern manufacturers 
because of the stimulus war gave to the economy.83 Measures taken during the Civil 
War, such as the Legal Tender Acts of 1862, helped stimulate industry and employment 
by putting 300 million greenbacks into circulation. Inflation, however, also resulted, and 
exceeded wage increases by 15 to 30 percent.84 This situation led to increased trade 
union organization, and political action by labor. Despite their efforts, the lack of liquidity, 
and the outbreak of a recession and ensuing unemployment—an environment 
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recognized as detrimental to strike action—caused new energy to be redirected towards 
building producer cooperatives.85 
One of the challenges faced by these cooperatives was obtaining credit, which 
led the National Labor Union (NLU) to place monetary reform at the center of its 
program in 1867. The NLU (1866-1872) was composed of trade unions and 
cooperatives federated to challenge the rise of nationally concentrated capital, and often 
took positions on national questions based on farmers’ interests.86 The NLU’s Address 
to the Workingmen of the United States called for women and black workers to enter the 
unions and receive equal pay for equal work, agitated for the eight hour work day, and 
called for labor’s political independence from capitalist parties. This address also 
directed political action towards the “abolition of ‘our iniquitous monetary and financial 
system,’ which reduced the ‘producing classes’ to a state of servitude.”87 During the Civil 
War, wage demands were central even as farmers and small manufacturers were 
satisfied with price increases. But the falling prices after the war brought these groups 
together as “producing classes” against the capitalist class. Some of the NLU leaders 
thought monetary reform could replace the need for unions, and focused on the 
“financial oligarchy” at a time when strikes and political struggle against an increasingly 
powerful industrial bourgeoisie were needed. The NLU wanted “to do away with Wall 
Street” and “the national banking system.” They 
 
…demanded that the rate of interest should be fixed by the government 
instead of by the banks, and called upon the government to reduce the 
rate of interest on its bonds to three per cent and at the same time make 
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them convertible into greenbacks which would be legal tender at the 
option of the holder.88 
 
The idea was that cooperatives and small businesses could obtain loans directly from 
the government at one percent interest rates, which would help create jobs for the 
unemployed. Much of the NLU’s political action focused in these areas instead of 
creating a labor party or strong industrial unionism.89 The NLU was the first real national 
labor federation, and although composed of many craft unions based in the building 
trades, it aimed to organize the unorganized and establish “an international organization 
in every branch of industry.”90 However, the first national labor federation was too short-
lived to affect the organization of financial sector workers or to form a labor party due to 
a political orientation overly influenced by Greenbackism, and not on the actual needs of 
the working class and their organization.91 
Despite much of the labor movement of the 1870s being made up of ethnic and 
immigrant workers with “little direct connection to the Jacksonian labor movement,” they 
“retrieved the established republican values of ‘independence’” and “enunciated a 
distinctive producer ideology.”92 The “producerist language of social conflict sometimes 
obscured class lines,” but many workers had still risen through the trades at that time to 
become manufacturers with interests against “capital.”93 During this period, there was 
plenty of “middle-class sympathy for employers, and middle-class self-identification as 
distinct from workers,” and “opportunities remained for some ambitious workers to set up 
on their own—as small shopkeepers, artisans, or subcontractors—or to advance through 
the ranks as foremen and managers.”94 Given “the ideal of self-improvement—an ideal 
central to the labor movement—could easily be turned toward improving one’s individual 
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situation, at the expense of collective action,” it is not surprising the labor movement 
faced obstacles.95 With many state and national chartered banks to offer opportunities 
for advancement, it is likely workers in the financial sector identified with an upwardly 
mobile middle class, which likely limited self-organization, or at best would have oriented 
them towards then predominant craft models of organization based on exclusivity. 
The depression of 1873-1878, which was started by “the failure of the banking 
company of Jay Cooke and Company, was by every measure the worst and longest in 
duration in the nation’s history up to that time.”96 Workers faced major setbacks in their 
struggles. Only nine of the thirty national unions that existed before the depression 
remained by the end of it, all having suffered significant membership loss. 97 
Nevertheless, the unemployed organized, and smaller towns and cities would often 
erupt in rebellion as employers tried to deepen wage cuts. Industrialists turned to “the 
state government, the National Guard, [and] private police forces to bolster their 
authority” in the face of quite organized and militant local resistance, demonstrating its 
strongest expression in the great railroad strikes of 1877.98 Reconstruction ended in 
1877 with the Republicans’ turn to the right after the Civil War, a result of “northern 
industrialists and southern planters notic[ing] that they faced a potentially hazardous 
challenge from… [sic] freemen, displaced yeomen, and  reconstituted labor movement.“ 
99 Reconstruction created railway development that helped to commercialize the South, 
but left it as “an under-developed sectional colony, ruled by an American planter 
capitalist elite.”100 This reconsolidation of “the nation’s economic and political elites” 
enabled a full attack on labor reforms through the state and federal courts in the 1880s.  
It also led to calls for a national army to prevent further worker rebellion from threatening 
what they believed was still a “republican” capitalist state.101  While capital claimed to 
hold the future of the republican ideal and that such measures were needed to prevent a 
Paris commune type insurrection, labor “again raised doubts voiced by the Jacksonian 
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Journeymen” about the republic being corrupted by “a new oligarchy of capital.” For 
example, one labor leader wrote: 
After a century of political independence, we find that our social system 
is not better than that of Europe and that labor in this Republic, as in 
the European monarchies, is the slave of capitalism, instead of being 
master of its own products.102 
 
It is against this background, during the period from 1880 to 1900 when 
nonagricultural workers more than doubled and went from 48 percent of the employed to 
60, that the Knights of Labor and the American Federation of Labor formed. 
The Knights of Labor started as a secret organization of multi-craft skilled and 
unskilled workers in 1873, but went on to embrace producer and consumer 
cooperatives, and even employers. It favored arbitration over strikes, and denounced 
socialism in preference for the anti-monopoly positions of the time. The Knights were 
more open to women and black workers than the trade unions.103 This effort towards 
wider inclusiveness and solidarity was important since “the vast majority of workers 
outside the building trades in 1880 were either first- or second-generation immigrants or 
blacks, in major cities and smaller towns alike; in some places the figures ranged as 
high as 90 percent.”104 Its secrecy had been a response to lost union struggles, but 
when it expanded into mining areas with many Catholics, and the Catholic Church finally 
accepted the right of workers to join, members decided to go public. While the National 
Trade Union of the 1830s excluded politics and the National Labor Union of the 1860s 
moved away from trade unionism exclusively to politics, the Knights of Labor was neither 
apolitical nor completely political in its outlook.105 Terrence Powderly again carried the 
tradition of the republican dream, building the organization on a cooperative model to 
“make everyman his own master.”106 Powderly excluded “drones,” saying “no lawyers, 
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no bankers, no doctors, no professional politicians,” but included the clerks among those 
who “by the sweat of [their] brow shall eat bread” and could be included for membership 
alongside of “the machinist, the blacksmith, molder, pattern maker, laborer and 
miner.”107  Women were also welcome. The Knights of Labor claimed in The Labor 
Movement Today “nearly every trade and occupation has had in the past, as most of 
them have in the present, some form of a trades organization,” but did not mention 
clerks or financial sector workers.108 
In the early 1900s, the industry organization of the bankers, the American 
Bankers Association (ABA), faced a challenge from below as bank workers, who were 
included in the organization at one time, began to organize from within. Bank clerks 
attempted to force the ABA to fund the bank worker created American Institute of Bank 
Clerks to provide training and education for them. Bankers, however, used the positions 
of the Knights of Labor to dissuade the bank clerks from turning to unions. Some of the 
bankers were nervous about the bank clerks, who were demanding in the thousands for 
better training, “and it began to whisper in the backrooms that we would have a labor 
union on our hands if we didn’t look out.” One banker told the clerks in response: 
 
Personally, I did not lose sleep over that. In the first place, you are not 
fools, and in the second place, I don’t believe you could join the labor 
unions if you wanted to; they wouldn’t have you. When the present great 
labor movement in the US began with the Knights of Labor about thirty 
years ago, the constitution of the unions excluded two classes of 
workers: bartenders and bank clerks. Doubtless bank clerks were 
excluded for a different reasons than bartenders were. Mr. Powderly 
said, when asked about it, that bank clerks don’t need the assistance of 
unions. The real fight for labor unions is for the right of those who work 
with their hands to some little share in the better things of life. It is an 
effort to do away with child labor, with sweat shops, with pace makers, 
with unreasonable hours and unhealthy surroundings, with uncertainty 
and irregularity of employment, with the cutting down of wages to the 
lowest point at which human wages can be sustained under degrading 
conditions. In spite of the arrogance and the cowardice and the crimes 
that have made trade unionism hateful, it is essentially an effort to 
establish a fundamental principle, that all those who do honest work that 
is necessary to be done shall have a chance to live a decent, self-
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supporting lives. Bank clerks have nothing but a sympathetic interest in 
any of these questions. They are already getting about everything the 
labor unions are trying to get, or have any right to try to get, by the union 
method.109 
 
Ultimately, the officers of the ABA feared the clerks’ independence, but also 
wanted them to self-fund their own institute of training and education. Their position 
towards the bank clerks resembled company unionism, which was not to become illegal 
until the 1930s in the US. The clerks were in fact treated with a certain amount of 
respect as professionals worthy of self-governance, reflecting the skills still necessary 
for the jobs in the first decade of the 20th century, the possibility of them being 
developed into officers, and limited fears of unionism given the attitude of unions and 
other popular movements towards the banker and bank clerk alike.110 
The Knights of Labor wanted the post office to replace banks for deposits and 
exchange, and they made the following demand in their preamble: “The establishment of 
a national monetary system, in which a circulating medium in necessary quantity shall 
issue direct to the people, without the intervention of banks; that all the national issue 
shall be full legal tender in payment of all debts, public and private; and that the 
government shall not guarantee or recognize any private banks, or create any banking 
corporations.”111Many of the Knights of Labor Leaders supported the Greenback-Labor 
Party, which grew out of the failed efforts of the NLU, and included in its program “repeal 
of the Resumption Act and the National Banking Act and restriction of the issuance of 
money to the government, a graduated income tax, complete control by the government 
over all corporate bodies, and abolition of paying wages in store scrip.”112 
Socialists in the labor movement, many of them German immigrants who were 
versed in Marx and formed the Workingmen’s Party, the American section of the 
International Workingmen’s Association, rejected the Greenbacks for not taking a stand 
for the black workers in the South who faced the white terrorism of the Ku Klux Klan, and 
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for advocating a financial reform program that instead of helping labor would mainly 
alleviate national debt, helping real estate speculators and politicians.113 The Knights of 
Labor believed legislative action was necessary to end monopolies, or “corporate 
tyranny,” through “government ownership of the railroads, telegraphs, and telephones; 
elimination of the private banking system, and substitution for it by a postal savings 
bank.”114 However, “its structure and methods were not suited towards the attainment of 
these objectives,” with Powderly discouraging strikes and boycotts, and instead arguing 
“only through self-employment could labor obtain lasting victories.”115 Nevertheless, the 
organization grew from less than 10,000 members in 1878, to more than 600,000 
members by 1886. Although some members were sympathetic to the socialists, “the 
Knights sought a radical transformation of the nation in the continuing tradition of 
Jefferson and Paine, through educational enlightenment and the mobilization of all 
producers.”116 In fact, workers in the US were drawn less to alternative socialist visions 
of societies than Europeans, but “acted more militantly when they confronted their 
employers than their European counterparts in this era...Strikes in the US were more 
numerous, longer, and more often resulted in violent or legal clashes with police or 
military forces than the labor conflicts of their European and more outwardly socialist 
counterparts.”117 
The 1880s were filled with massive strikes, culminating with the death of two 
workers in a march of 80,000 workers on May 1, 1886. The next day, a smaller protest in 
response to May first’s tragedy resulted in the death of a policeman after a bomb was 
thrown. Despite the lack of proof demonstrating who was responsible for the bomb, 
seven radical labor organizers were sentenced to death, an event known as the 
Haymarket Affair. Even though the Knights of Labor renounced socialism and even 
strikes in many cases, their organization, along with the rest of the labor and socialist 
movements of the time, was hurt by increasingly repressive conditions resulting from 
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policy and policing trends resulting from the Haymarket Affair.118 The Knights of Labor 
did not replace the need for a labor federation, so many trade unions continued efforts 
throughout the 1880s to organize a central trade union federation even if they were also 
card carrying members of the Knights of Labor.119 The Knights of Labor was often 
ineffective in cases where strikes were necessary to address workers grievances and 
wage demands, which caused further support for the creation of a national trade union 
federation. The efforts of the national trade unions and the failure of the Knights of 
Labor, partly a product of the reaction to the Haymarket Affair and the aggressive 
actions and power of unrestrained employer associations, led to the conservative 
unionism developed by Samuel Gompers, in the founding of the American Federation of 
Labor (AFL).120 These in conservative influences will be seen again in later chapter four, 
were they clearly had an impact on inhibiting the organization of financial sector 
workers.121 
The tradition of populism, even if it promoted solutions antiquated to the 
conditions of capitalist development in which it existed, was quite influential in the US’s 
labor movements, political formations and financial sector development. While populist 
struggles did build working-class movements and expand full citizenship rights, they also 
failed to build a labor party and promoted programs that contributed to the development 
of a fragmented financial sector prone to crises that undermined the labor movement’s 
gains. After the Civil War, there was a series of crises. In 1907, JP Morgan had to save 
the financial sector, which lead to the creation of the Federal Reserve System in 1913. 
Prior to this period, the financial sector was perhaps too tumultuous for unions to have 
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gotten a serious foothold. The financial sector became more centralized and 
concentrated, until the depression and new regulations in 1933, which were eroded in 
1980 and 1999. There may be something unique to the US in these repeated efforts to 
limit banking monopoly power. Since financial sector unions had more success in the 
insurance industry, perhaps they would have been more successful if Glass-Steagall 
never existed.122 Perhaps they could have had more leverage to enter the banking 
sector, and perhaps even Wall Street. Further exploration is needed to examine what 
options are best for labor around options such as nationalized banks, decentralized 
banks, credit unions, etc. The delay in the US establishing a central bank, and the fact 
that populist movements still manifest discontent through votes for presidential 
candidates that calls for abolishing it, should also be explored further. 
The character of the financial sector’s development and the populist political 
traditions in which the AFL arose would contribute to its eschewing both the organization 
of financial workers and the building of a labor party that could have helped create a 
social regulatory framework that would have made organizing all workers easier.123 The 
next chapter explores the post-Civil War 19th century financial sector and the explosive 
growth and transformation of clerical workers, ultimately a challenge that neither the 
Knights of Labor nor the AFL effectively addressed.124 
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Chapter 3 
 
Clerks and the Financial Sector at the Turn of the Century 
 
 Before we continue with the central question of financial worker organization, or 
more broadly, clerical worker organization, let us discuss further the structure of the 
financial sector, and the position of clerks in the US in the 19th century. In some ways, 
early banking in the US was unique. In New England for example, there was little 
difference between the banker and the industrialist in the early 19th century since both 
had interests coalesced around the cotton textile industry. Often a banker would only 
lend to a company in which he had an ownership stake.125 Scotland, on the other hand, 
had a banking environment that was quite competitive compared to both England and 
New England. By 1826 Scotland had 35 banks with 134 branches, making it one of the 
first countries to realize branching benefits such as “increased competition, greater 
diversification of bank portfolio risk, and ease of coordinating payment transfers within a 
small number of institutions.”126 The US however, made greater use of limited-liability 
banking, which was considered useful for finance in a society that otherwise lacked 
large concentrations of wealth, and faced popular opposition and regulation when wealth 
became concentrated.  
Popular opposition to concentrated wealth as discussed above in the section on 
Jacksonian populism led to the dual banking system: the chartering and regulating of 
banks at both the state and national level. This Supreme Court backed regulatory 
framework is at the historical roots of a modern banking system that has been highly 
fragmented, both politically and economically.127 Dual banking created an incentive for 
states “to protect their own chartered institutions, effectively prevent[ing] interstate 
banking,” and “decentralization made it easier for certain special interests (unit bankers 
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and landowning farmers) to succeed in restricting bank branching within states,” which 
was part of the movements in the 1880s mentioned above.128 These circumstances are 
important to consider because although countries such as Scotland had branching in the 
early 19th century, the US was unique in that even with bank consolidation in certain 
periods such as the 1920s, the interests of “unit bankers and their allies succeeded in 
preventing significant changes in branching laws until the 1980s and 1990s.”129 Other 
countries perhaps had more stable financial firm structures sooner. England had copied 
Scotland by the mid-19th century, while Germany allowed universal banking, the 
combining of commercial and investment banking, which perhaps created a lower risk 
environment and therefore more toleration of unionization.130 
Additionally, although industrialization did begin prior to the Civil War, the 
northern victory over southern plantation economic and political interests helped 
accelerate industrial advancements. Industrial manufacturing in New England produced 
mainly for regional markets prior to the Civil War. Trains did not travel significant 
distances until the 1850s, and the east and west coasts were not effectively connected 
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to allow for the formation of national markets until 1869. 131 The first transcontinental rail 
line was completed and the amount of railroad track tripled in the twenty-five years after 
the Civil War. Then, from 1890 to WWI, the amount of track doubled. Immigration 
increased, and the westward expansion of settlers, combined with military campaigns, 
forced the indigenous population into a reservation system at the same time the factory 
system expanded and produced for new regional and national markets.132 Industrial 
production more than quadrupled from the end of the Civil War to the turn of the century, 
and then almost doubled from the turn of the century to WWI. Likewise, the percentage 
of the labor force involved in industry increased from 20% in 1860 to 28% in 1890, and 
to about a third of the population at the start of WWI.133 The GDP increased from 9 to 26 
billion dollars from 1870 to 1890 ($223 to $405 per capita), and to another 71 billion 
($683 per capita) by 1917.134 From 1840 to 1920, the native population increased almost 
six times over, from 14 to 83 million, and the immigrant population more than 13 times, 
from 3 to 40 million. These immigrants, who were first from northern and western 
Europe, then from southern, eastern and southwestern Europe, made up about 40% of 
the population in the US’s 12 largest cities at the turn of century, with their children 
making up an additional 20%.135 A large national market (in land and people, unified by 
an expanding transportation system), significant mineral wealth, and policies favorable 
to industry such as “protective tariffs, favorable taxation absence of direct intervention, 
and land grants” contributed to this rapid economic growth.136 
During this period of industrial growth, great mergers took place despite populist 
movements achieving the implementation of anti-trust laws (as discussed in the previous 
chapter). The insurance industry provided capital for much of this growth, and large 
banks “such as J. P. Morgan, Kuhn & Loeb, and the National City Bank of New York 
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often played a directing and coordinating role in these combinations; they thus attained 
great and lasting influence on these industrial concerns.”137 Along with the growth of the 
firm, new layers of management and planning departments grew apart from the 
production process. In between production and planning were the clerical workers, who 
“serviced both the ‘brain’ and the ‘hands’ of a firm and often connected these two 
functions.” 138  As consumer demand increased, so did the final goods of the 
manufacturing process, as well as clerical output as an intermediate good. Braverman 
describes much of the financial sector as "pure clerical industries," noting:  
Banks and credit agencies conduct only one mode of labor, the clerical, 
and below the managerial level the labor employed consists almost 
entirely of clerks who work in offices and service workers who clean 
offices. The only thing that prevents this from being the case with 
brokerage and investment houses and insurance companies is the need 
for a large number of salespeople.139 
 
For clerical industries such as banking and insurance, “their primary tangible 
product was financial capital, and their main production process the generation of paper 
records.”140 
This chapter explores clerical workers against a backdrop of industrial 
development creating unprecedented opportunities in the financial industries for 
financing corporate growth and investment. First, manufacturing and retail increasingly 
merged and consolidated, creating new opportunities for commercial loans to 
businesses. The population increased dramatically through immigration, and new 
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opportunities for selling financial products such as home mortgages, automobile loans, 
checking, and saving accounts expanded. Bank failures, especially in rural areas in the 
1920s, caused an increase of mergers and consolidations, giving growing cities new 
importance to an increasingly powerful financial sector. Branch banking increased by 
seven in the 1920s, new loan opportunities abounded, and buying on credit surged in 
popularity; half of all retail purchases were made on credit by 1930.141 The middle class 
grew, and the popularity of life insurance products as a savings mechanism increased 
substantially. Small companies of the late 19th century moved into the tallest skyscrapers 
of growing urban centers, and over half of all clerical workers were employed in offices 
with at least 50 office workers in 1930. 142  Government regulation of the bank’s 
accounting system and the need to process the paperwork involved in expanding 
commercial and consumer credit demanded increased hiring of clerical workers. The 
defeat of the 19th century workers of the “producer class” described in chapter two shook 
up the ideal of men earning a family wage along with Victorian era notions of a 
segregated gender space, sending many women into the workplace for their first time, 
made possible by the engendered technological developments of new office machinery. 
 C Wright Mills described the highly visible white-collar middle class that emerged 
after WWII, and Harry Braverman described how only 25 years later the clerical workers 
among them faced even more alienating conditions as deskilling increasingly made 
white-collar clerical jobs like factory work. Building on the contributions of these authors, 
economists, labor historians, and women’s studies scholars have intensely studied the 
dramatic increase of the clerical workforce during the period of 1870-1930 (see Table 1 
below).143 The US workforce more than tripled, but grew at least 14 times in iron and 
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from 1.5 million to 7 million. By 1930 Chicago had 3.5 million, and Detroit and Los Angeles 1.5 million 
each. Dozens of smaller cites also grew substantially, and by 1930 nearly four hundred buildings of more 
than twenty stories-"skyscrapers"-had been added to the American landscape. The growth of cities-
especially in the Northeast, along the Pacific Coast, across the Great Lakes region, and in southern 
commercial centers-was in part a result of the increased importance of cities as regional centers of trade 
and finance and their expanding paperwork industries." (Strom 1994,230-231) 
143
 Studies (cited below) on DC, LA, Chicago, Pittsburgh, and Philadelphia exist, but none on New York 
City, which would be significant for the financial sector in general and financial sector unionism in 
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steel and 35 times in rubber, with clerical work increasing the most, at over 35 times.144 
Women entered the workforce in unprecedented numbers, leading to many of the 
scholars of this period to analyze how the Victorian era ideal of a separate public (male) 
and private (female) sphere was challenged at the same time it was brought into the 
workplace.145 It is the period when the increase in white-collar work first outpaced that of 
manual work, and is as the root of understanding white-collar jobs which became the 
dominant form of work in the US in the post-WWII era. These workers typically had more 
education than blue-collar workers, but usually in the form of technical training rather 
than college education. This enabled even lower-level sales and clerical workers to 
sometimes earn more than blue-collar workers, to enjoy safer work conditions, and to 
escape unemployment in economic downturns, at least until the Great Depression. 
                                                                                                                                                              
particular. Engendering Business examines the insurance industry, offering more insight into employment 
relations in the financial sector than other works cited, but is limited in its examination of unionization. Lisa 
M Fine notes that this “scholarship has focused on (1) the effects of technology and scientific 
management on office and clerical work and those who perform it; (2) the relationship between women 
and office work; (3) unionization; and (4) economic transformations of late twentieth century capitalism.” 
(Fine 2007, 261-262) These studies are thorough on most of these points in regards to the clerical work 
and social history of the time, but with the exception of Sharon Hartman Strom’s Beyond the Typewriter, 
are limited on questions of formal organization and clerical workers, especially prior to the rise of UOPWA, 
which is the period most of this scholarship focuses on.  These works are excellent in addressing Fine’s 
second point, although the banking industry is an exception since feminization occurred later, therefore 
warranting an additional industry specific study. 
144
 Devault 1990, 12 
145
 Architect Charles Loring noted: “The offices of our grandfathers were without steel frames and files, 
without elevators and radiators, without telephones,—and without skirts.” (Kwolek-Folland 94) 
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The first half of the period, 1870 to 1900, known mainly for the industrialization of 
the US, also marks significant shifts within the white-collar category. Prior to the 
accelerated industrialization after the Civil War, the proprietary and professional sections 
of the white-collar category outnumbered the clerical section, but this shifted by 1900 in 
urban areas.146 Clerical occupations grew faster than any other occupation in every 
decade from 1870 to 1930, growing from “1.3% to 10.5% of the total non-agricultural 
labor force in just 60 years.”147 Women contributed greatly to this growth, as “in 1870 
less than .2% of all women in the non-agricultural labor force were employed as clerical 
workers: by 1930 this had risen to 20%.”148 
 
                                                 
146
 Bjelopera 2-3 
147
 Rotella 27; Mills 1-15; The average clerical worker growth rate for 1870-1930 was 6.75% , and during 
the 1910s  “grew at 3.5 times the rate experienced by the non-agricultural labor force ” while in the 1880s 
“the female clerical labor force grew at 5.75 times the growth rate of the female non-agricultural labor 
force.” (Rotella 65-66) 
148
 Rotella 61; “From 1870 to 1930 the size of the non-agricultural labor force increased by over 32 million; 
more than 3.6 million (11.35%) of these additional workers were in clerical pursuits. Up until 1920 the 
clerical share of additional workers increased each decade. The most dramatic change took place from 
1910 to 1920 when fully one-quarter of all added workers went into clerical occupations. For women the 
clerical sector was even more important for nonagricultural labor force growth, with 23.43% of the 60-year 
increase coming in the clerical sector.” (Rotella 65) 
Total Female Male Total
tCLF % 
of NALF Female
fCLF% of 
fNALF Males
mCLF % of 
mNALF
F % of 
CLF
1870 6,075 1,463 4,613 74.2 1.2 1.8 0.1 72.4 1.6 2.4
1880 8,807 2,021 6,786 150.4 1.7 6.6 0.3 143.8 2.1 4.4
1890 13,380 3,210 10,170 380.8 2.8 73.4 2.3 307.4 3.0 19.3
1900 18,161 4,311 13,850 708.2 3.9 214.2 5.0 494.0 3.6 30.2
1910 25,779 6,269 19,510 1,523.9 5.9 573.1 9.1 950.8 4.9 37.6
1920 30,985 7,466 23,518 2,837.7 9.2 1,396.0 18.7 1,441.7 6.1 49.2
1930 38,358 9,842 28,516 3,738.8 9.7 1,964.4 20.0 1,774.4 6.2 52.5
Table 1
                cashiers, stenographers, types, and clerks (excluding stores)
Non-Agricultural 
Labor Force (NALF)
Clerical Labor Force (CLF)*
Growth of  Clerical Worforce and Female Clerks, 1870-1930 (in thousands)
Source : Adapted from Elyce J Rotella,  From Home to Office: US Women at Work, 1870-1930
                (Ann Arbor: UMI Press, 1981), Table 4.1. *CLF includes bookkeepers, accountants,  
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The sector most based on clerical work, the Finance/Insurance/Real Estate 
(FIRE) sector, was among the fastest-growing industries in late 19th century. A record 
number of women entered the financial industries between 1870 and 1930.149 This was 
due to the increase of women customers in financial product markets, which helped 
increase the hiring of women employees in banking and insurance. Banking and 
insurance industries “were the first clerical sector industries to evolve to a national scale 
and to incorporate the new technologies and systems of the modern office,” which 
contributed to the feminization of the clerical workforce. 150  The following chapter 
summarizes the significant developments within clerical work during this period, 
highlighting the experience of the workers in the FIRE sector where specific data is 
available, as relevant to understanding its lack of union organization during the period of 
this study, and the obstacles that would be faced by later efforts. 
Prior to the Civil War and the subsequent industrialization, the US was primarily 
agrarian, with most businesses operating on a small scale. The family economy was still 
important, and what was not consumed was sold in the market to help with the purchase 
of needed goods. Farmers were 75% of the US labor force in 1820, but were reduced to 
50% by 1880 and continued to decline thereafter.151 The small independent farmer, 
important in the US class structure from the American Revolution to the Civil War, 
declined with the rise of industrial capitalism and was almost completely eliminated by 
price falls and mortgage defaults in the 1920s and 1940s. Since then, large capitalist 
farms have dominated the agricultural sector.152 Many of these displaced workers and 
their families supplied the labor for expanding urban office work.153 Men moved “from 
agriculture to non-agriculture at approximately the same rate that women were moving 
from being outside the measured labor force into nonagricultural gainful employment” 
(see Table 2 below).154 Middle-class women entered the workforce to help their families 
                                                 
149
 Kwolek-Folland 2 
150
 Kwolek-Folland 3 
151
 “Although the final debacle of the American yeomanry would not arrive until the 1890s, capitalist 
agriculture had clearly overtaken independent rural production in large areas of the countryside by the late 
1870s.” (Wilentz 132) 
152
 Davies 59-60; Mills 13-20 
153
 Davies 60-61 
154
 Rotella 5 
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during crisis, and working class women found the opportunities in clerical work to offer 
better pay and working conditions than the factory jobs available to women.155 
Similarly, Antebellum clerical staffing was minimal, and often involved a variety of 
tasks that facilitated learning the business. 156  For example, a copyist was perhaps 
necessary only in a lawyer’s office. Many of the richest businessmen went without not 
only copyists, but even bookkeepers. And when they were employed, bookkeepers 
learned all aspects of the business, and did not experience divisions of labor in 
maintaining the books. The most entry level job for a business career was the message 
boy, who in addition to deliveries, ordered supplies and sometimes cleaned the office. A 
clerk in the early 19th century office had a wide range of duties that enabled him to 
master office operations as a craftsman in a workshop would master all aspects of 
producing a product.157 
A typical office of this era may have had only 3 or 4 clerks all of whom had 
proximity to the employer, facilitating closer relationships than even the small factories 
that had began to develop. A clerk in a bank, for example, could  
Table 2 
Employment by Industry as Percent of Total Labor Force, 1870-
1930    
  1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 50.2 50.1 42.8 37.6 31.6 27.4 22 
Manufacturing 17.4 18.2 20 21.8 22.4 26.1 22.5 
Trade 6.1 6.7 7.7 8.5 9.2 9.8 12.3 
Domestic/Personal Service 9.2 8.3 9.1 9.3 10 8 9.9 
Transportation/Public Utilities 5 4.9 6.4 7.2 8.7 10.1 9.9 
Construction 5.8 4.8 6.1 5.7 6.3 5.2 6.2 
Professional Services 2.6 3 3.6 4 4.5 5.4 7 
                                                 
155
 Davies 64-68. Mills notes that the protagonist in three novels about office workers, The Job, Alice 
Adams, and Kitty Foyle, were forced to enter the office “after the death or failure of her father and in each 
case the father was an old middle-class [as opposed to Mill’s new middle class concept, not age] man  
who had not been doing well.” (200) 
156
 Mills 190-192 
157
 Davies 11-17 
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Finance/Insurance/Real Estate 0.3 0.4 0.7 1 1.4 1.9 2.9 
Mining 1.5 1.8 2 2.6 2.9 3 2.4 
Government 0.8 0.8 0.8 1 1.5 2.2 2.1 
Not Allocated 1.1 1.1 0.7 1.3 1.6 0.9 2.7 
Commodity Producing 75 74.8 70.9 67.7 63.1 61.7 53 
Service Producing 23.9 24 28.3 31 35.3 37.4 44.2 
Not Allocated 1.1 1.1 0.7 1.3 1.6 0.9 2.7 
Source: Adapted from Elyce J. Rotella,  From Home to Office: US Women at Work, 1870-1930  
(Ann Arbor: UMI Press, 1981), Table 4.5. 
 
expect promotion to a teller position, resulting in important relationships with the 
business community. The example of the Massachusetts National Bank in 1864 was 
typical, with an accountant, teller, clerk, and messenger counting as the only four 
employees, and demonstrating the proximity of the clerk to bank management and 
ownership. Trust was an important part of the relationship since supervision would 
demand unwanted time and costs at the expense of the employer. This relationship was 
similar to other apprenticeships during the period; reduced wages might be paid to learn 
the trade, but sacrifices in wages often led to the apprentice becoming a manager or 
even an owner. 158  In short, a clerical worker was a male apprentice to the petit 
bourgeoisie or the capitalist, with realistic expectations to move up in the business or 
become an independent businessman. 
The craftsman- and apprentice-like qualities of the relationship did not lead to 
trade union organization as occurred in other crafts, as discussed in the previous 
chapter. The personal relationship with the employer triumphed, and if the clerk had 
problems with his employer, he would simply look for a kinder employer. He was likely to 
be white, native, and from a middle to upper class background that could afford some 
education when public high school education was not universal. Even at the end of the 
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 Davies 21-22; According to David Lockwood, the name clerk was synonymous with manager, and 
clerks were often paid from the managers salaries as assistants. One British observer of the same time 
period in the UK noted the clerk-employer was feudal-like, and he was more of a "family servant than a 
wage labourer." (Braverman 294) 
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19th century, one commentator observed: “For clerks a trade union has no attraction. Its 
advantages are not apparent, the relationship between employer and employed being in 
this case essentially personal.”159  Building trust and avoiding conflict benefitted this 
personal relationship, resulting in promotion, and sometimes, even equality. One 
business manager who started his career in a small office in 1869 later recalled:  
 
There were no telephones, stenographers or typewriters, and business 
was done face to face. A man would travel hundreds of miles to buy a 
carload of iron (15 tons), rather than write because he could see all the 
iron manufacturers, and felt he could more than save his expenses in 
getting the lowest price. There were probably more callers at our office 
then than there are today. Business hours began at seven in the morning 
and six in the evening was recognized as quitting time only if the day's 
work was finished. And it was not unusual to continue work after 
supper.160 
 
These personal relationships, the proximity to the employer-owner, and the lack of 
technology and the lack of scientific management created real opportunities for 
promotion.161These types of employer-employee relationships continued even after the 
Civil War to a significant degree despite the drastic growth of office work and decreased 
opportunities for advancement.162 The first clerks seemed to be more like “the ancestors 
of modern professional management than of the present classification of clerical 
workers, and despite “a new stratum created in the last decades of the nineteenth 
century and tremendously enlarged since,”163 success of some early managers and 
owners who started out as clerks “created an ideology about clerks that survived long 
after the facts no longer warranted it.”164 Rags to riches stories based on real upward 
mobility and fictionalized events abounded. Financial magnate Jay Cooke is an example 
of a clerk who rose through the ranks quickly. Andrew Carnegie started as a messenger 
                                                 
159
 Davies 23 quoting Charles Booth in Lockwood 32 
160
 Willis Larimer King quoted in Devault 1990, 9 
161
 See Daniel Nelson’s books (1975 and 1980 55-78) for more on Federick W. Taylor’s development of 
scientific management: the replacing of traditional entrepreneurs and managers based on “wealth, social 
and familial ties, or business acumen” with management “based on technical knowledge, education, and 
organizational skills,” which radically altered the factory system.(Nelson 1980, ix) 
162
 Davies 23-24 
163
 Braverman 293 
164
 Davies 27 
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boy, John D. Rockefeller as a bookkeeper. Likewise, many clerks and bookkeepers 
commonly expected upward mobility.165 
By the turn of the century, however, the gender and class position of the typical 
clerical worker was rapidly changing, along with the potential for advancement. Clerical 
work expanded in multiple industries, new machinery deskilled many office jobs, and 
most workers starting in clerical work remained in clerical work, with the few who 
received promotions remaining in lower management. 166  Combined with increasing 
managerial hierarchy, many typists and other office workers were quite distant from 
upper management and owners. Promotions and upward mobility common prior to the 
Civil War likewise decreased, leaving women at the bottom of the hierarchy.167 Women 
often accepted the preferential promotions of men, believing a transitory presence in the 
workforce was a means to uphold the Victorian era ideal of men earning the family 
wage; others however complained about receiving lower salaries when performing the 
same work. Men on the other hand, could be comforted by the fact that they earned 25-
45% more than women, and their low salaries would be temporary since they had 
opportunities for promotion, while, women faced “discrimination at every turn in the 
office.”168 In the 20th century, promotions to upper management or ownership were quite 
rare.169 Upward mobility still existed occasionally in limited clerical positions still reserved 
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 Bjelopera 10-12 
166
 Davies 5; Mills 192-209; “Virtually all clerical workers were men, and clerical positions often served as 
entry points into management careers. While many who entered the business world as clerks never rose 
above that position, pamphlets of the day make it clear that most who entered clerical positions did so with 
the hope of rising through the ranks to become managers or partners. The distinction between clerical and 
managerial functions was not as clearly drawn as it is today, and clerks and bookkeepers were regularly 
expected to assume responsibilities that would now be classified as managerial.” (Rotella 67) 
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 Davies 39-50; “The idea of a young male boss employing a female secretary upset both the traditional 
age hierarchy and notions of male dominance; the proper role for an older woman was that of mother.” 
(Kwolek-Folland  169) 
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 Strom 1994, 290; Bjelopera 57-58; On discrimination of women for promotions, Rotella found “men 
were preferred for supervisory positions because women were expected to have lower productivity as 
supervisors because of discrimination by fellow employees. After noting that most chief clerks were men, 
the National Industrial Conference Board explained: ‘It is generally recognized that employers are 
reluctant to place women in positions involving supervision of a large number of male employees. It is also 
true, as a general rule, that women employees work more willingly and contentedly under the supervision 
of a man than under that of a woman.’” (167) 
169
 “Many industrial-era male clerks still clung to dreams of business ownership. Unfortunately for them, 
the small counting-floor setting in which a shopkeeper passed on the secrets of his trade to his only clerk 
became harder to find. These more intimate settings had made it easier to learn the tricks of the trade, so 
to speak. The administrative revolution made it a growing rarity for clerks to work directly with business 
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for men, but it increasingly required ambitious climbing up the corporate ladder through 
new layers of middle management rather than simply working an apprenticeship as a 
clerk.170 
The pioneers of the “new middle class” were the federal government workers of 
the late 19th century, who expanded from 1,268 in 1869 to 25,000 in 1900, nearly half of 
them working as clerks.171 The Civil War created a shortage of hirable men, leading to 
the hiring of high school educated middle class women by the federal government. In 
total, about half of the approximately 2,000 women clerical workers in 1870 worked for 
the federal government.172 One government employer commented: “some of the females 
are doing more and better work for $900 per annum than many male clerks who were 
paid double that amount.”173 Cindy Sodnik Aron gives an account of the first “old middle-
class” creating a “new middle-class” and describes the first major expansion of salaried 
employees in the federal government during a period when clerical work remained 
sexually segregated. After examining archives and constructing a profile of these 
applicants and workers, Aron concluded the old middle-class was formerly dependent 
on a self-employment that afforded autonomy and leisure, but financial and family crisis 
largely propelled them to search for new employment as opportunities in salaried clerical 
work expanded. She also notes bureaucratic advancement and security replaced 
traditional middle-class goals of becoming rich as a result of this transformation. 
Occasionally, women also entered private sector positions during the Civil War, with one 
businessman from New York bragging he “had replaced his $1,800 a year male 
bookkeeper with a woman earning $500 a year.”174 The effectiveness of the women and 
the reduced labor costs contributed to their continued and increased employment in 
clerical work after the Civil War in both the public and private sector. 
                                                                                                                                                              
owners. Rather, they interacted with a wide variety of middle-level managers and received much of their 
training in specialized schools. Replacing apprenticeship, educational institutions such as clerical high-
school programs and business colleges arose to instruct the emerging clerical workforce." (Bjelopera 14) 
170
 Bjelopera 15 
171
 Civil service jobs also provided the first white-collar opportunities for women in Western Europe. 
(Kwolek-Folland 7) 
172
 Rotella 128; Strom 1994, 176-178 
173
 Davies 51 quoting US Treasurer General Francis Elias Spinner in 1869 
174
 Davies 52 
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Women most rapidly replaced men in jobs that were new and not defined as 
“men’s jobs” prior to the Civil War, such as stenographer and typist positions. Telephone 
operators, almost exclusively women, also came about after the Civil War and replaced 
the need for messenger boys. Bookkeepers, accountants, cashiers, and clerks became 
significantly feminized by 1930, but at a slower rate than jobs defined as “women’s work” 
from their creation.175 According to Margery W. Davies, the typewriter was not “sex-
typed as masculine,” and “women were claimed to be more manually dexterous and 
tolerant of routine than men and therefore more suited, by virtue of their very natures, to 
operate typewriters,” 176  which were compared to the sewing machine by early 
producers. The inventor of the typewriter, C Latham Sholes, used his daughter to 
demonstrate his machine. Using attractive young women for its marketing was replicated 
elsewhere.177 In fact, many middle-class women had some piano training, which was 
considered a transferable skill for a typewriter, and sometimes required in early hiring of 
typists.178 
A prototype for a functioning typewriter existed as early as 1830, but it was not 
until after the Civil War that the changes in the office enticed investors to finance further 
development by inventors. Success was achieved in 1869, and the first mass production 
and distribution of the typewriter began in 1872. It still had problems and faced cultural 
obstacles since businesses still preferred handwriting in the 1870s. By the late 1880s, 
however, when offices work grew significantly, Remington could not keep up with the 
demand even as its factory produced at least 1,500 a month.179 The typewriter began to 
be produced on a large scale by the Remington company in 1874, and as noted above, 
it became a machine associated with female operators from the beginning of its mass 
production. Remington promoted the typewriter in demonstrations with female operators, 
and offered to provide one with the purchase of the typewriter.180 In 1874, Mark Twain 
purchased one after seeing a woman demonstrating it typing faster than he could 
handwrite, and advertisements as early as 1875 celebrated the invention for creating 
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 Davies 52-53 
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 Davies 55; For more on the origins of sex-typing by job classification, see Matthaei 192-223. 
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 Rotella 128 
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 Fine 2007, 265 
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 Davies 32-38 
180
 Devault 1990, 17; Davies 53-55 
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good employment for women.181 In 1886 US businesses produced 15,000 typewriters 
per year, and by 1890 the US census listed typewriters (typists) as a women’s 
occupation.182  The FIRE sector’s growth was greatly aided by this technology. For 
example, Metropolitan Life Insurance company grew from just 6 officer workers 
supporting 21 agents in 1867 to having “more typewriters than any other office building 
in the world” by 1900, and 40,000 workers in what was the tallest building in the world by 
1929.183 
As a result of the typewriter, much of the early growth of women in clerical work 
was due to the increase in typists (see Table 3 below). The typewriter changed the office 
and the possibilities for clerical output and the pace of feminization. The highest 
employment of men in the occupation was in 1910, when 5.6% of male clerical workers 
were stenographers or typists, but they rapidly declined in absolute number thereafter. 
After 1910, overall hiring of men into white-collar work also increased, but they were 
more likely to find opportunities in management due to the new gender hierarchy in the 
office.184 Women, on the other hand, worked as typists and stenographers more than 
any other clerical occupation after 1900.185 
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 Davies 33; An example of an advertisement: "And the benevolent can, by the gift of a 'Type-Writer' to a 
poor, deserving, young woman, put her at once on the way of earning a good living as a copyist or 
corresponding clerk. No invention has opened for women so broad and easy an avenue to profitable and 
suitable employment as the 'Type-Writer' and it merits the careful consideration of all thoughtful and 
charitable persons interested in the subject of employment for women." (Rotella 128) 
182
 Bjelopera 44 
183
 Kwolek-Folland 15 
184
 Strom 1994, 212 
185
 Strom 1994, 21; Rotella 125;  Rotella states the decline occurs in 1910, while Strom says 1930. (Strom 
1994, 48) 
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Table 3 
Stenographer and Typist Feminization, 1870-
1930 
  Men Women Total % Women 
1870 147 7 154 5 
1880 3,000 2,000 5000 40 
1890 12,148 21,270 33,418 64 
1900 26,246 86,118 112,364 77 
1910 53,378 263,315 316,693 83 
1920 50,410 564,744 615,154 92 
1930 36,050 775,140 811,190 96 
Source: Adapted from Angel Kwolek-Folland,  
                 Engendering Business: Men and Women  
                 in the Corporate Office, 1870-1930 
                (Baltimore: JHU Press, 1994), Table 3. 
 
Along with the increase in technology, Taylorism and concepts of scientific 
management, a capitalist effort to gain control over “time repeatedly lost to job actions, 
strikes, and walkouts” according to Sharon Hartman Strom, began to affect office work in 
the 1890s. 186  It was a period of mergers where corporations in various industries 
integrated vertically and horizontally. As the scale and scope of markets increased, 
correspondence increased, as did the need for improved record keeping. Business 
became larger, operations became centralized, and managers began to rely on data and 
record keeping for both planning and loss prevention. The four basic office work 
positions that existed prior to the Civil War increasingly became subdivided into multiple 
semi-skilled positions. For example, stenographers and typists replaced copyists, and 
clerks became specialized. A bookkeeper often supervised multiple assistants.187 
There also was what Alfred D. Chandler, Jr called a managerial revolution in 
business control when ownership of the business became separate from professional 
management because of rising administrative needs to coordinate information between 
                                                 
186
 Devault 1990, 20-21; Bjelopera 20; Braverman 305-312, describing the pioneering work of William 
Henry Leffingwell (Scientific Office Management) and Lee Galloway to bring Taylorism methods of 
scientific management into the office. 
187
 Davies 28-30 
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managers of different divisions and owners for decision making.188 Precise statistics and 
accounting, which increased clerical staffing, were essential for managerial control, 
decision-making, and increasing profits. The number of bookkeepers and accountants 
grew from less than 39,000 in 1870 to almost 735,000 in 1920.189 Clerical workers 
originally had jobs and skill sets that would be considered managerial today, including 
enough job control to make significant decisions affecting the business. Training was 
firm-specific rather than firm-general, creating the apprenticeship type relationship 
discussed above. 190  Scientific management concepts and methods elevated 
accountants to middle management for their analysis role, while bookkeepers 
maintained the books as non-management clerical workers.191 Clerical workers lost job 
control along with promotional opportunities, and as education increased and office 
technology improved in the rapidly expanding post-Civil War economy, clerical worker 
skillsets became firm-general rather than firm-specific.192 Women filled jobs requiring 
firm-general skills, while the remaining clerical jobs with firm-specific skills were primarily 
reserved for men by employers who were grooming them for career advancement.193 
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 According to Rosabeth Moss Kanter, the process of entrepreneurs  trusting and delegating to 
managers was a major change in capitalist firms from the 18
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to  the 20
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along the way. (Kanter 50-52)  
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 Chandler 6-8, 10 9 and Devault 1990, 12-13. At the same time, the proportion of both male and female 
accountants, bookkeepers, and cashiers declined in relation to the clerical work total because of 
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 Devault 1990, 22 
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 In studying this distinction, Rotella uses the work of Gary Becker, and explains its relevance to the 
feminization of clerical work: “Specific skills are those that increase a worker's productivity more in the firm 
providing the training. General skills are those that increase productivity in all firms. The theory predicts 
that whenever skills are firm-specific, the individual firm will be willing to absorb at least part of the 
investment in training and will pay a premium over the wage that the employee could command in other 
firms. However, the willingness of the firm to offer specific training and absorb the costs is inversely 
related to the expected turnover rate of the employee. 
Since women were expected to have shorter tenure with an employer because they usually left the labor 
force when they married, the theory predicts that women would most likely be hired for occupations in 
which the required skills were general rather than specific and that women would be expected to move 
into jobs whenever the required skills became more general.” (166) 
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 Rotella concludes Becker’s theory fits well: “The changes which took place in clerical work during this 
period fit the model very well. Mechanization and routinization reduced the specific skill component of 
most clerical jobs. Training in the new general skills could take place in schools where costs would be 
borne by the students (and by the public in the case of commercial education in public schools). 
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In the 1890s, stenography also started shifting to become a largely feminized 
occupation, causing it to become associated with low-paying women’s work.194  The 
typewriter in turn facilitated the division of labor by department and job classification, in 
line with other production and managerial innovations of the late 19th century related to 
scientific management and the lowering of labor costs.195 As a consequence, according 
to Braverman, even more than manufacturing jobs affected by new labor processes, 
office work was able to be  
parceled out among a great many detail workers, who now lose all 
comprehension of the process as a whole and the policies which underlie 
it. The special privilege of the clerk of old, that of being witness to the 
operation of the enterprise as a whole and gaining a view of its progress 
toward its end and its condition at any moment, disappears. Each of the 
activities requiring interpretation of policy or contact beyond the 
department or section becomes the province of a higher functionary.196 
 
Braverman notes the methods of scientific management to rationalize work were 
even easier to apply to the financial sector since no actual physical commodities are 
moved, making the office “just as much a site of manual labor as the factory floor.”197 
                                                                                                                                                              
Employers would be willing to hire women, despite their high expected turnover, for jobs in which the on-
the-job training requirement was low. Since women's wages were lower than men's, women would be 
expected to completely dominate in jobs with the lowest firm-specific skill component. This appears to be 
the case in the most mechanical and routine jobs such as typing and filing which were rapidly taken over 
by women. When men were observed to be working in these jobs, they were often serving as entry points 
to high level positions.” (166) Strom, along with many sociologists and economists challenge reliance on 
human capital theory to explain feminization of the labor market and low wages. See for example, 
sociologists Samuel Cohn, The Process of Occupational Sex-Typing: The Feminization of Clerical Labor 
in Great Britain (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1985), 5-13 and Graham S. Lowe, Women in the 
Administrative Revolution: The Feminization of Clerical Work (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987) 
21-22.  The following economists also recognize the important role sexual discrimination has in relation to 
women receiving low wages: 
Mark Aldrich and Randy Albelda, "Determinants of Working Women's Wages during the Progressive Era," 
Explorations in Economic History 17 (1980):323-41; Mary Corcoran, Greg J. Duncan, and Michael Panza, 
"A Longitudinal Analysis of White Women's Wages," Journal of Human Resources 18(Fall1983): 497-520; 
Paula England, "The Failure of Human Capital Theory to Explain Occupational Sex Segregation," Journal 
of Human Resources17 (Summer 1982): 358-70; Mary Huff Stevenson, Determinants of Low Wages for 
Women Workers (New York: Praeger, 1984), SO-57; and Mary Huff Stevenson," Wage Differences 
between Men and Women: Economic Theories," in Women Working, ed. Ann H. Stromberg and Shirley 
Harkess [Palo Alto: Mayfield Publishing, 19861,89-107.  
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(See Appendix 3 for more on scientific management and office automation in the 
financial sector)  
Less reliance on personal relationships in business and increasing 
correspondence facilitated by first the typewriter and then the telephone also created 
more demand for clerical workers. This included correspondence between 
manufacturers and suppliers or wholesalers, as well as between the business and 
clients, especially as retail mail-orders increased.198 Elyce J. Rotella summarizes all of 
the demand-side reasons for clerical worker growth: 
larger, multi-plant, vertically integrated firms whose complex 
organizational structures depended on collection, transmission, and 
analysis of unprecedented amounts of information; increased 
interregional and international trade which stimulated more long distance 
communication; spread of scientific management techniques which 
required more measuring and record keeping; increased role of 
government, which demanded more record keeping of businesses 
because of regulation and tax laws, and which used greater numbers of 
clerical workers within its own growing bureaucracy…Increased scale of 
the economy (greater population and income) led to increases in the 
demand for all final goods and services and therefore resulted in the 
hiring of more clerical labor.199 
 
As large corporations replaced small business, the managerial bureaucracies 
grew and required more accountants and clerical output to process paperwork. Financial 
disclosure laws and the New York Stock Exchange required financial statements and 
other reports to be prepared for the government and shareholders. The more complex 
the divisions within the business as a result of mergers and multiple plants, the more 
data was required for records and communications for decision making. A corporate 
income tax law passed in 1909, and the ratification of sixteenth amendment to allow 
personal income taxes in 1913, the result of the need to finance WWI, also increased 
clerical worker demand. The Federal Reserve Board also began in 1913, which 
increased bank accountability to submit paperwork to government regulators. Therefore, 
                                                                                                                                                              
process as a whole,” making the manual/blue-collar and white-collar distinction a representation of a past 
that has disappeared from clerical work. (325-326) 
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the government can be seen as a major cause for an increase in clerical worker output 
after 1910.200  
In the FIRE sector, industry innovations and growth in demand for new products 
also stimulated clerical worker hiring. For example, according to Angel Kwolek-Folland, 
“calculated life-expectancy tables (actuarial science), mass marketing, and specialized 
types of insurance and banking products broadened the market for financial services 
and rationalized financial products.”201 The growth of urban workers disconnected from 
the security of agricultural land ownership and white-collar workers who lacked mutual 
support from unions also increased the demand for these products.202 Rotella estimates 
that this population and income growth alone explains 34% of clerical worker growth 
“from 1870 to 1880, 12% from 1880 to 1910, and 28% from 1920 to 1930.”203 This was 
especially true in the FIRE sector, which grew the fastest and employed the most clerical 
workers due consumer demand for insurance, loans to buy cars, and later homes as 
new transportation allowed suburbanization (see Table 4 below).204 
Table 4 
Clerical Employment as Percent of Labor Force by Industry, 
1870-1930  
  1870 1880 1910 1930 
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Manufacturing 0.3 0.3 5.0 8.6 
Trade 4.0 5.2 12.6 11.1 
Domestic/Personal Service 9.2 8.3 10.0 9.9 
Transportation/Public Utilities 1.3 1.7 7.7 10.3 
Construction 0.0 0.0 0.6 1.2 
Professional Services 1.9 4.9 3.8 7.3 
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate 20.2 20.8 38.6 41.2 
Mining 0.0 0.0 1.1 2.1 
Government 0.8 0.8 1.5 2.1 
As percent of total Labor Force 0.6 0.9 4.2 7.6 
As percent of NALF 1.1 1.7 6.2 9.6 
Source: Adapted from Elyce J. Rotella,  From Home to Office: US Women at  
               Work, 1870-1930 (Ann Arbor: UMI Press, 1981), Table 4.7. 
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 The above data in Table 2 and 4 shows how the clerical labor force changed 
across industries, revealing the manufacturing sector had significant growth in total 
hiring of clerical workers, and in its share of clerical workers. The FIRE sector was the 
fastest growing employer of clerical labor and “had the highest proportion of its labor 
force in clerical occupations on all dates. Over 20% of all workers in that industry were 
employed in clerical jobs in 1870, when only 1% of the total labor force was in clerical 
work. By 1930 over 40% of all workers in the finance industry were classified as 
clerical.”205  Accounting for contributions from the general growth in the labor force, 
Rotella calculated that manufacturing and trade contributed substantially to the growth of 
the clerical work force because of a disproportionate growth of the clerical work force as 
the industry grew. On the other hand, the FIRE sector’s contribution to the increase of 
the clerical workforce was primarily due to the expansion of the sector: the clerical 
workers increased in the sector proportionately to its growth.206 The clerical labor force 
grew most rapidly, and in excess of the average growth of the urban population in the 
1880s because of the growing use of the typewriter, and in the 1910s because of the 
“vastly expanding role of government through regulation and tax laws and by changes in 
business organization associated with the spread of Taylorism.”207 
Ileen A. Devault notes that although “the clerical sector may have appeared 
monolithic in its growth,” it actually “echoed, transformed, or reinforced division in the 
world beyond the office walls,” including divisions “by gender, by workers’ expectations, 
by the work performed, and by the training necessary to perform it.”208  Until 1920, 
female clerical workers tended to be younger than average female workers, most likely 
because of their higher levels of education.209 Business colleges were popular from the 
1850s to 1880s, and public high schools began to take on the same role in training 
clerical workers by the 1890s. High schools shifting from an exclusive college 
preparation orientation to a business preparation model expanded their eligibility for tax 
revenues, facilitating an increase of high school education, especially among women, 
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who had higher graduation rates than men in the late 19th century.210 As education 
levels increased and skills for clerical worker employment were introduced in public 
schools, more women over 25 were employed. However, they still tended to be younger 
than the average female worker, which may have been due to employer preferences for 
younger women as a “partly decorative” office feature.211 
Demand was not the only factor that increased female clerical workers. Supply 
side factors include the fact that literacy was the only job requirement, and women were 
more likely to have completed high school than men. Furthermore, their labor was 
cheaper since they were not expected to provide for the entire family, and they were 
seen as a transient part of the labor force. The economic growth of the late 19th century 
also expanded managerial and professional opportunities for men in office work, 
meaning literate male labor could not meet the demand for workers at the bottom of the 
office hierarchy.212 Once the example of women in government jobs during the Civil War 
proved to be successful, women began to enter copying positions in private offices.  
Since male stenographers never successfully organized on the craft-union model, they 
could not control the entrance of women into their field. Job tasks broken down and 
rationalized by scientific management became less desirable to male workers who had 
other opportunities, and as discussed above, the typewriter position was able to be 
coded as “female work” from the beginning of its technological innovation.213 This coding 
occurred “not only because a majority of those engaging in it were female, but also 
because clerical work became intimately associated with so-called feminine qualities 
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and was not considered a threat to women's domestic roles.” 214  Private business 
colleges saw a new market and profit-making opportunities and further promoted entry 
of women into the office work. 
The entry of married women into the workforce was delayed compared to the 
entry of single women. Less than “1% of all married working women were clerical 
workers” in 1890, but this rose to 13% by 1930.215  Rates of entry into the clerical 
workforce were highest for single women until 1910, at which point they began to 
equalize with the rates of entry of married women. After 1920, married women’s 
participation in the clerical labor force began to increase more rapidly than single 
women, and they constituted 41% of new female clerical workers in the 1920s. Rotella 
states this was due to earlier marriages and increasing levels of education for women 
accompanied by rising demand for clerical workers in the 1910s. This process was 
further facilitated by the increase of women from lower socio-economic backgrounds 
entering the labor force and decreasing family sizes due to the disappearing family 
economy. Still, many firms would not hire married women, and others fired women upon 
marriage. For many firms, however, married women provided an attractive alternative to 
raising wages to attract more men or single women.216 
Regarding the marriage bar, the policy or practice of firing women who married, 
Sharon Hartman Strom observed that “banks and insurance companies remained 
relatively inflexible on the issue of hiring married women workers” more often and longer 
than companies in other industries.217 Strom interviewed May, who after leaving her 
bank job in 1930 to get married later missed her job and friends, remembered: "When I 
was married ... I would walk downtown. Oh, I wanted to go into the bank the worst way 
and see if I couldn't get a position. But women didn't work after they were married then... 
It wasn't allowed."218  A worker from a large bank, Alice, said clerks “felt it was ... 
unnecessary to leave because you got married. But that was the rule and everybody just 
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took it."219 Another worker Strom interviewed, Gertrude, “had worked as a typist and filer 
at an insurance firm since 1915, was fired when she married in 1923” despite feeling her 
family could use the extra money.220 The Rhode Island Insurance Company fired Martha 
in 1924 for marrying, which she felt was selective since a few women managed to stay 
with the company despite being married.221 Arnica was an insurance company in Rhode 
Island that allowed married women, enabling Rose to have a thirty year career, but she 
remembered many other women were forced to leave because they met their husbands 
at work, which was not allowed.222 
Many single women were against married women entering or remaining in the 
workplace for the same reason 19th century male clerks first opposed the entry of young 
single women. They expressed the need to defend the family wage, claimed single 
women were more focused than married women, and believed “married women took 
positions away from women who were truly dependent upon their salaries for supporting 
not only themselves, but also, frequently, parents and siblings.” 223  Others even 
expressed fears that married women, supported by the income of their husbands, would 
drive down wages since “she can or does work for a more or less low wage,…lowering 
the salaries of all secretaries.”224 
Women’s entry into clerical work not only changed the office of the Victorian era, 
but also the very notion of public space and the city: 
 
Between the 1870s and the 1890s, women's entrance into clerical 
positions posed a direct challenge to the commonly held belief that not 
only was the office a male space, and office jobs men's work, but also 
that all sorts of urban settings-elevators, street cars, restaurants, 
boarding-houses-were inappropriate for working women. Women's 
entrance into these places set in motion a redefinition of women's sphere 
within the world of work and the city that continued throughout the 
twentieth century.225 
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Women “entering this previously forbidden world” of men’s work “had to isolate their own 
space, forge a code of behavior, and legitimize their presence in these male 
environments.” 226  The large number of women entering clerical work “provoked 
employers to provide for a separate female occupational hierarchy within many firms,” 
which included limited promotional opportunities, less pay for the same work, and 
routinized labor sometimes lacking dignity and satisfaction compared to the working 
conditions of male office workers. Lisa M. Fine suggests that “women helped to make 
clerical work ‘women's work’ and in the process, clerical work lost its promise of 
remunerative employment and advancement.”227 As a result, Fine considers the new 
occupational opportunities for women a “Pyrrhic victory” by first having a “powerful 
symbolic and material effect,” but limited when “by the 1920s, women were no longer 
imposing themselves on a male space and occupation and could no longer harbor the 
mistaken expectation of self-sufficiency and promotion.”228 In fact, women were stuck in 
work that “could no longer offer the promise of escape from the sexual division of labor 
and the consequences of ghettoized female employment.”229 Table 5, below, shows the 
increase of female hires during the period of study. 
Table 5 
New Clerical Work Positions and Hires by Gender, 1880-1930 
  1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 
New 
Positions 966 39,895 33,851 30,391 85,358 47,509 
Male hires 851 31,395 20,085 10,063 31,113 17,580 
Female 
hires 115 8,500 13,766 20,328 54,245 29,929 
% Male 88.1 78.7 59.3 33.1 36.5 37 
% Female 11.9 21.3 40.7 66.9 63.5 63 
Source: Adapted from Lisa M Fine, The Souls of the Skyscraper: 
            Female Clerical Workers in Chicago, 1870-1930 (TU  
            Press: Philadelphia, 1990), Table 2. 
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In the Victorian era, strict gender beliefs limited the entry of women into the work 
force, especially members of the white middle-class. Despite these beliefs, women were 
first able to work by providing labor for tasks they did within the home, “usually within a 
closely monitored, ‘family’ setting.”230 Domestic service therefore was the most common 
source of employment for women in most of the 19th century.231 If women did not 
threaten the concept of the “family wage,” the idea that the man earns a wage sufficient 
to support the whole family, she could also work. Working temporarily to aid their 
families or for a limited time before marriage was accepted, while self-supporting 
employment was frowned upon. Because of these beliefs, women were not expected to 
make the same wages as men, and promotions were limited since it was “considered 
unnatural for a man to work in a position subordinate to a woman.”232 Since certain 
clerical worker positions, such as machine operators, mail clerks, and order clerks were 
usually “entry-level jobs for young men, women may have found it easier to enter a clerk 
position when their competition was a younger man.”233 Job functions “such as opening, 
distributing, and dispatching the mail, filing correspondence, and composing and typing 
bills and orders” that “became segregated, rationalized, and mechanized” in large firms 
may have caused women to “dominate certain clerk occupations (and not others) 
because these functions had already become ‘women's work.’”234 Also, “it was women 
themselves, in their relentless pursuit of good employment, who began the process of 
redefining clerical work as a woman's job.”235 Strom notes that  
Women did not take over or de-skill men's jobs so much as they took 
jobs created by the revolution in new methods of communicating, cost 
accounting, and record keeping. And without what the novelist Sinclair 
Lewis had described as a "revolution in the attitude" toward women, that 
is, an end to discrimination in hiring and promotion, the opening of other 
occupations to them, and the end of the marriage bar, women continued 
to make perfect candidates for these new jobs.236 
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Once accepted as women’s work, social services by the 1920s aided women entering 
clerical work and helped them “transition from rural to urban life, from school to office, 
and from work to marriage. And, in recognition of the diversity of backgrounds from 
which office workers came, they attempted to provide this new occupational group with a 
code of middle-class morality.”237 
Prior to 1920, a private secretary position was still seen as a viable path to 
executive positions. Handbooks for private secretaries were addressed to men in 1917, 
both men and women in 1924, but only women by the 1930s.238 Secretaries retained 
enough autonomy and control over the work process that even as clerk positions 
became highly feminized, some businessmen were reluctant to trust hiring women for 
higher skilled positions. As these positions became less upwardly mobile, hiring of 
women, or “office wives” as they were often called, became preferred since it was easier 
to extract deference and acceptance from them to remain in the same position without 
promotion.239 One publication directed towards aspiring women professional workers 
warned in 1921 that “the days are fast passing when the office boy, the junior clerk, or 
the stenographer with little education can forge ahead and become a manager or an 
official of the company,” and therefore women seeking advancement in business should 
“ask themselves whether secretarial training as now given is the best approach to 
management.”240 
From 1870-1930, approximately 77% of women worked in the following nine 
categories: “clothing manufacture, textile manufacture, telephone operators, 
saleswomen and clerks in stores, teachers and professors, trained nurses, laundry 
workers, servants (largely domestic workers in private households), and clerical workers 
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(bookkeepers, clerks, accountants, clerks, stenographers, and typists).”241 Most of these 
categories already became women’s jobs by 1870 and experienced significant growth at 
the turn of the century as the economy expanded. Telephone operators first became a 
significant part of the labor force in the 1900 census, and it was a women’s occupation 
from the beginning. What makes sales and clerical employment unique is “the growth in 
the female labor force be seen as due to the movement of women into occupations 
formerly held by men,” with clerical occupations “changed from ‘men's work’ to ‘women's 
work’ by 1930 and constituting 23.43% of total female nonagricultural labor force growth 
over the period [1870-1930].”242 By 1930, 20% of all working women were clerks. Only 
50 years earlier, almost no women could be found in these positions. 243  Women 
increased to about “80% of all clerical workers, and 35% of all employed women were 
working in clerical jobs" in 1979, with the figure dropping only by one percent and ten 
percent respectively in the last 30 years even as women have increased to half of the 
labor force.244 
Multiple professions and institutions contributed to Victorian-era cultural 
presumptions of women’s natural place in the home: 
respected physicians argued that physical or mental labor destroyed 
women's reproductive organs; moralists argued that women were 
coarsened by encounters with the workshop and office so that 
employment threatened to destroy their femininity and the institution of 
the family; the courts held that women's proper place was in the home; 
economic observers and the Bureau of Labor found that women's 
employment threatened men's jobs and  wages; the employment of 
wives and daughters was regarded as a sign of masculine failure. Within 
this social framework it is unlikely that many women engaged in market 
work because of preferences for being in the paid labor force.245 
 
While such attitudes may have lingered longer within the certain occupations in 
the financial sector, they significantly changed with the increase of women in the 
workforce, especially during World War I.246 
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Banking and insurance companies, such as Aetna Life, sometimes held onto 
Victorian era ideals longer than other companies because of older management. They 
used “male clerks well into the twentieth century and did not hire its first woman office 
worker, a telephone operator, until 1908.”247  When thirty-five female machine operators 
successfully completed a project in 1911, three continued with the company 
permanently, “but were asked to use the back elevators so they would not be seen by 
the company president, who did not approve of women working in the insurance 
business.”248 In 1916 there were finally 150 women, but they were sex-segregated to all 
female departments for “typing, filing, and machine operating.”249 Strom cites a study of 
Cleveland from 1914 that showed women made up the largest share of clerical workers 
in small offices and a significant share in manufacturing and insurance, while reforms 
were creating openings for local government hiring. In the railroads, accounting, and 
banking, however, clerks remained predominantly male. Women were only 15% of 
clerical workers in Cleveland’s five banks, putting it in last place among the 11 
categories surveyed.250 
World War I changed this for the remaining banks, railroad, and insurance 
companies that resisted feminization. Due to the shortage of men during WWI, office 
machine companies consciously pushed sales of new office technology and the 
advantages of recruiting and training women for routinized work. One advertisement 
said, “'Uncle Sam took my experienced clerks. In their place I have willing workers but 
inexperienced. So I must have simple office machines.... inexperienced operators soon 
become lightning fast on the 10-key Dalton."251 The ad went on to claim that new hires 
only need to know how to read, and “with a little practice a girl…does the figure work of 
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three or more experienced men.”252 The managers of the Lincoln Insurance Company 
faced workload pressures as staff were drafted to WWI, so they reported that they 
“advanced junior clerks to positions of responsibility, and trained large groups of gals to 
perform duties formerly considered as strictly male jobs."253 The war forced even Aetna 
Insurance Company to change; it had women working alongside men in the same 
department, and they comprised 44% of the central office staff by the end of the war.254 
According to a study from the Women’s Bureau, WWI caused banks to increase their 
use of women as bookkeeping machine operators, and they took over the position by 
the end of the war. One company, Guarantee Trust of New York, said that “due to the 
demand upon our men for Government Service, opportunities for bookkeeping and 
clerical work..., private secretaryships and other junior clerical positions formerly held by 
men, are now being filled by women.”255 
After WWI a cultural shift accelerated, and “it was no longer regarded as socially 
disgraceful for unmarried women to work for pay and to lead much more independent 
lives.” 256  Cultural mediums such as movies, short stories and novels now resolved 
controversies of women entering the workplace with “happy ending” stories of female 
office clerks finding a husband to marry through their entry in the workplace. Fine finds 
movies where 
female clerical workers are rarely victims or vamps, but are everyday 
women who act as office or day-time wives. These female clerical 
workers, because of their loyalty, virtue, and initiative, are able to help 
some man, either the boss, a fellow employee, or a sweetheart, because 
of the contacts, money, and independence she has by engaging in 
clerical work.257 
 
While post-WWI cultural mediums “still dwelled on the complications that ensued 
when the classes and sexes mingled in the office,” 258  Fine found an increasing 
acceptance and even desire for the new office women in the cultural images she 
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examined. The female office worker was perhaps the middle road between the 
nineteenth century conservative Victorian woman and the  
sexually liberated and, perhaps, threatening flapper of the 1920s. The 
female clerical worker of the 1920s appeared as a fun-loving, attractive, 
resourceful, and good girl… In many of these films and stories the female 
clerical worker was a woman of respectable, middle-class' background 
who found love by becoming a more sexual, "natural," or "modern" 
woman.259 
 
Fine compares the cultural shift to the story of Cinderella’s magical 
transformation, but with the modern office woman transforming though “her own 
initiative” rather than magic.260 
In 1860, clerks were like other middle-class men, such as farmers, professionals 
and small business men, in their desire for independence.261 The clerks were employees 
of these men, “businessmen in training—young men learning the ropes, aspiring to 
partnership or hoping to begin business of their own.”262 Besides some writers and 
teachers, middle-class women tended to have limited access to employment and 
pressure to attend to domestic responsibilities, meaning most clerks were men. This 
changed by the end of the century as a result of the Civil War and the resulting 
transformation of an economy primarily reliant on small business to one increasingly 
dependent on large, industrial capital. In 1880, however, only .9% of workers were 
clerks.263 A significant expansion of clerks in the federal government and the hiring of 
women occurred first during the Civil War, and was followed by increasingly complex 
white-collar administration of business as it expanded to national scales in the end of the 
19th century. By 1900, women had become 25-30% of the clerical workforce, and 
reached 50% by 1930.264 Proprietors made up almost the majority of the white-collar 
workforce in 1860, but this flipped by 1900, and employees greatly exceeded owners by 
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1920. 265  In the financial sector, however, regulation that fragmented the business 
structure delayed the expansion of the clerical workforce, and feminization of 
employment also occurred later than other sectors. 
Several supply side changes caused growth in the female clerical labor force as 
well. The end of the family economy caused an increase of women entering the labor 
force in every decade from 1870 to 1930, especially in clerical work which was 
considered attractive compared to factory work for both better conditions and wages, 
although the wage difference each decade relative to women in other occupations and 
to the manufacturing sector as a whole narrowed.266 Women faced limited choices due 
to discrimination, while employers therefore had new choices in hiring. These women 
usually were the daughters of the old 19th century middle-class prior to WWI, and had 
more education than the average person. In the period studied, women fluctuated 
between 55-60% of high school graduates and half of business school graduates after 
1918, which Rotella sees as a reaction to an increased hiring of women rather than a 
cause. 267  Women’s growth in participation in the non-agricultural labor force grew 
steadily from 1870-1930, with the fastest growth in the 1880s and 1910s. Female 
clerical work did not grow as steadily, and grew the most in the 1880s and 1900-1910, 
meaning an increasing supply of women’s labor is not the only explanation of female 
clerical worker growth according to Rotella.268 The supply of women willing to work office 
jobs at wages lower than men was greater than the demand, which provided an 
incentive for employers “to adopt the mechanized and routine production techniques” 
that further “increased employment of women in clerical jobs” in conjunction with 
downward wage pressures.269 The pace of feminization, however, was caused by the 
demand factors, such economic growth, perceptions that women were more “fit” for 
detailed clerical work, and wage differentials, according to Rotella. The 1880s saw 
accelerated feminization because of the typewriter, and the 1910s because of the 
shortage of men due to WWI, and the increased implementation of mechanization and 
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routinization through the application of scientific method techniques to the office. These 
methods, along with the increased public education funding, further reduced the costs of 
employing women since the move from firm-specific to firm-general skill requirements 
meant less investment costs in training from employers even if a women’s time in the 
labor force was short and turnover was high.270 Rotella suggests it is supply factors that 
contributed most to long term growth of female clerical workers, but demand factors 
were most important for short term growth.271 
In 1870, women’s share of clerical employment was only 2.5%, but they were 
11% of government clerical workers. Besides government, they were only over 2% of 
clerical workers in manufacturing and professional services. Most female clerical 
workers at this time were in fact employed by the government. In the 1880s, trade 
became the largest employer of female clerical workers due to the growth of retail and 
the early acceptance of the typewriter and women in sales.272 The propensity to hire 
women grew in professional services, while the increase in women in the government 
sector was due more to its expansion than an increased propensity to hire women after 
1870. The highest increase in the tendency to hire women occurred in the private sector 
between 1880 and 1910. Rotella attributes 93% of the growth to propensity to hire 
female clerical workers, as opposed to overall growth of the labor force or industry 
growth.273 In 1910, the FIRE sector was on par with other industries in the feminization 
of stenographer and typist positions, but retained a much higher percentage of men in 
bookkeeper, accountant, cashier, and clerk positions than most other sectors. 274 
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Transportation and finance, “which also contributed significantly to overall clerical 
growth, were less important in the hiring of women in this period. Women's share of 
clerical employment increased less in these two important industries than it did 
overall.”275  Feminization of clerical work in these industries came later, likely because of 
positions in clerical employment still being used to promote firm-specific skills 
development and upward mobility. Finance was much more important for increasing 
female clerical employment from the period of 1910 to 1930. While manufacturing 
contributed to the growth of female clerical employment because of the overall 
expansion of the industry, FIRE sector growth was the result of  
a change in the propensity to hire women for clerical jobs within the 
industry. This change in hiring practices was extremely important 
because the financial sector had a higher proportion of its labor force in 
clerical occupations than did any other industry. However, as late as 
1910, this industry showed a relatively low propensity to hire women for 
clerical jobs. Therefore, even though the finance sector was small in 
terms of total employment, the change in women's share of clerical 
employment in this sector contributed 12% of the total increase over 
these 20 years.276 
 
Kwolek-Folland explains the 19th century roots of delayed feminization of clerical 
workers in the FIRE sector compared to other industries: 
Because of their ideological roots in fraternal organizations, mutual aid 
societies, and family mercantile business, the financial industries relied 
on gendered conceptions of management—of the relation between the 
family and business—and on an ideal of patrician service that gave these 
industries a special language to describe the work experience. That 
language was deeply imbedded in the gender concept of the nineteenth 
century, and it shaped the development of twentieth-century corporate 
culture.277 
 
Nevertheless, life insurance companies began to hire women as agents to 
increase insurance sales as early as the 1880s. Banks increased the hiring of women 
during World War I and after when women had “new-found economic clout…a byproduct 
of their increased earnings during the war years combined with gains in education and 
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literacy among women of all classes…” which “created a new customer base for banks 
and trust companies.”278 By the 1920s, women’s departments were common in most 
banks in major US cities.279 
The FIRE sector’s delayed feminization and the special job security and 
promotional opportunities for male clerical workers in the banking industry compared to 
clerical workers in other sectors may have contributed to the delay in the gender 
transformation of bank teller jobs until WWII, and the little, if no, unionization. Employer 
associations in the banking industry encouraged employee loyalty at the end of the 19th 
century in exchange for job security in single-branch banks where firm-specific skills still 
mattered. Moving from clerk to owner was increasingly difficult, but job security was still 
an advantage compared to other industries. By the 1910s and 1920s, however, “the 
size, systematization, and dominance of the big banks and other corporations” created 
layers of middle management that in turn created new opportunities for men to be 
promoted within a firm and across the industry.280 During this period, many local banks 
expanded to have multiple branches. Personnel departments were created in these 
larger banks, and company newsletters listed names of those who were recently 
promoted to motivate others.281 Davis explains the particular aspects of the banking 
industry that contributed to the maintenance of male dominance and promotional 
opportunities: 
Banks became strong advocates of career employees, not only because 
of the cost benefits of a stable workforce, but also because career 
personnel helped to gain depositors' confidence. Bank leaders knew that 
the presence of familiar employees would heighten customer comfort 
and trust. The lure of promotions became a centerpiece of bank efforts to 
retain staff. Internal promotion systems took on a notably familiar 
character in many banks because banks tended to be smaller more 
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localized operations than many other corporations. Leaders could 
become quite familiar with employees and their qualifications for vacant 
positions.282 
 
Davis repeatedly emphasizes the importance of tellers in gaining new depositors 
in the banking industry.283 Banking was providing a service rather than a product, and it 
was a service highly dependent on customer trust, especial given the history of the 
financial sector’s periodic crisis. 284  The banker to bank worker proximity decreased 
within the growing institutions, but the importance of the personal relationship between 
bank worker to the customer and the bank to the community helped maintain male 
privileges and create a corporate environment hostile to unionization.285 
Bank teller positions were first opened to women during WWI, and deskilling of 
the position began shortly after throughout the 1920s. Men perhaps remained in these 
positions despite the deskilling (responsibilities moving from paying tellers to head 
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tellers) because of the onset of the Great Depression in the 1930s.286 Although banks 
had female clerical workers, a study of fifty banks in 1935 demonstrated that bank tellers 
were still all men since “many of the banks’ patrons do not have as much confidence in a 
woman's financial ability as in a man's. This may be a foolish prejudice, but since it is so 
the bank hesitates to risk business by advancing women to positions where they deal 
with the public.”287 This “foolish prejudice” was quickly overcome due to a shortage of 
male tellers during WWII (See Figure 2 below), resulting in changed attitudes of bank 
managers: 
Women are capably filling key positions in all of our internal departments 
and their performance as tellers is surprisingly satisfactory. The speed, 
accuracy and general ability of the girls in the tellers' cages compare 
favorably with those of the men who formerly occupied these positions. 
We now have more women tellers than we have men tellers, and so far 
as I am concerned there will be no hesitancy on the part of our bank 
when it comes to putting women tellers all the way down the line.288 
 
Although the banks did not guarantee women these jobs, men coming back from 
WWII had a preference for higher-waged unionized jobs in the expanding manufacturing 
sector, resulting in most banks not only retaining female tellers, but also hiring more as 
banking expanded. In fact, “by the 1950 census, 45 percent of all tellers were 
women.”289 Women in wartime manufacturing and other sectors predominantly filled by 
men prior to the war were often pushed out of these jobs as men came back to claim 
them, while teller positions provided opportunities as one of the few jobs men did not 
reclaim. By 1960, women filled 70% of teller jobs, and compose over 90% today.290 
Another factor that facilitated this change after WWII was that “simultaneously the types 
of customers and services became much more common and less elite” and female 
tellers were willing to “work for wages lower than most men's but comparable to other 
women's.”291 Although a common explanation for the shift of clerical work and other jobs 
that move from female to male dominated is deskilling, Strober and Arnold argue this 
does not appear to be the case with bank tellers: 
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And now the tasks tellers have done for years, whether women or men—
checking an account balance and a customer's identification, paying out 
funds, taking deposits and payments, and recording it all accurately and 
speedily—are being done by electronic machines, a fate common to de-
skilled jobs after they have been inhabited by women or minorities. 
However, the teller job description did not change for forty years (1939-
79). It seems to have maintained its skill and judgment levels right up to 
the time it was mechanized. What changed was the financial status and 
gender of the customers, the age and gender of the people doing the job, 
and, perhaps consequently, the image and the status of the job. This loss 
of image and status for bank telling was a more important change in the 
job than any intrinsic de-skilling, of which we can find little evidence 
during the crucial years when the occupation was tipping from men to 
women.292 
 
 
Even though the decline of the image and status of the teller position was accompanied 
by decreasing wages for male and female tellers “relative to the average earnings of all 
men and women,” the salary ratio between male and female tellers “remained 
remarkably stable.”293 
The growth of women in the FIRE sector was primarily due to an increase in 
hiring women as clerks and bookkeepers; the feminization of the teller positions 
occurring only after 1930. 294  Also, women in the FIRE sector “made up a smaller 
proportion of bookkeepers and accountants but a larger proportion of stenographers and 
typists than they did nationally.”295 Overall, from 1870-1930, Rotella found that actual 
propensity to hire women was the most important source of female clerical worker 
growth, especially in manufacturing, trade, and finance. The professional services sector 
had the highest propensity to higher dominated, such as teaching, but the “expanded 
employment of women in clerical jobs accounted for nearly one-quarter of the 60-year 
growth in the size of the female non-agricultural labor force.”296 
The next chapter explores this data in relation to clerical workers’ salary, benefits, and 
unionization. 
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Figure 2 
Cartoon: Women Tellers during WII 
 
 
Source: Strober 119, from Banking, August 1942, p. 3. 
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Chapter 4  
 
The Rise of the First Clerical Worker Unions to the Present 
 
Industrial engineers documented worker resistance to changes in the workplace 
discussed in the previous chapter, but usually it was older clerks and bookkeepers with 
many years in a position who individually resisted scientific management measures that 
reduced their autonomy or habitual work processes. Clerical workers often resented the 
closer supervision ushered in by scientific management, and managers often 
complained about office staff not working every minute for which they were paid. 
Workers efforts to shave minutes off their work day were met with the implementation of 
time sheets as well as disciplinary and incentive systems to increase productivity.297 
While scientific management created reasons for resistance, it did not lead directly to 
unionization. In fact, Mills considered the mere threat of unionization of the office 
workers to be enough of an impetus for the development and use of new office 
machinery.298 
The drastic changes in attitudes in gender from the Victorian Era to the 20th 
century perhaps seemed to diminish the boss or the corporation as the target of 
discontent. As one former bank executive commented, “the old timers resented the influx 
of the women as they had always considered the banking business an Eve-less 
paradise” where they did not have to worry about their language and dress.299 Workers 
were experiencing a lot of changes, but the change in gender relations was perhaps the 
most obvious and confronting one for clerical workers since “women were, after all, one 
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of the most visible signs of the changed business environment.”300 Rather than blame 
their employers and see unionizing as a potential solution, “male clerks in the 1880 and 
1890s often pointed to female office workers as the cause of all their problems—their 
lower wages, the diminishing status of clerical work, its increasingly mundane and dead-
end character.”301 As firm bureaucracy increased due to the shift from entrepreneurial 
control to managerial control, and scientific management diminished workers’ job 
control, there was of course discontent. But Kwolek-Folland observed that overall, 
“women and men, workers and managers alike often described their dissatisfaction with 
fragmentation and lack of control as a function of gender relationships rather than job, 
position, or corporate structure.”302 
When stenographers first organized in 1886 in Chicago through the creation of 
the National Union of Stenographer’s, they approached the defense of their wage and 
conditions as an effort to defend their craft. Officially, they included women who were 
“competent workers and of good character.” 303  But they also complained of “scab 
schools,” “which every three months are turning out swarms of rats” who depressed their 
wages. Of course, these “scab schools” were reference to the new commercial schools 
linked with the invention of the typewriter and the promotion of women’s entry into the 
workplace, making these women “the rats.” 304  They tried futilely to control their 
profession by pushing for licensing and encourage employers to contract through their 
union hiring hall. The male stenographers linked skill with manhood, meaning machinery 
and women of commercial stenography were a threat:  
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But who is this silent man, the shorthand reporter, this man who quietly 
records court proceedings? Is he not a man of ability? Is he not a 
different person than a commercial stenographer? Does he not possess 
the educational qualifications beyond the scope of the clerical employee? 
Is it not time that you cease measuring the highly skillful work of the artist 
by the eight dollar a week stenographer?305 
 
With the force of industrial growth and the impact of the new technology in the 
office, the craft model offered little hope in protecting the stenographer’s craft, and 
employers were more than willing to hire the women willing to work in the expanding 
office. With the support of the AFL’s Women’s Trade Union League (WTUL), the 
Stenographers and Typists Association formed in 1908, with locals in four other cities. It 
had at most a couple hundred members. They believed the problem was the large influx 
of young workers into the field, who supposedly were willing to accept any wage, and 
requested the WTUL help it by providing an organizer. The organizing campaign had 
little success, and the union soon crumbled.306 
Most workers in unions around the turn of the century, however, were craft unions 
based on manual work and quite separate from white collar workers. Bjelopera, drawing 
on a study of bank architecture in Philadelphia during the period of the industry’s late 
19th century expansion in residential and commercial areas, provides additional insight 
into the unique features of banks that separated bank workers from industrial workers: 
Many of the city’s banks conveyed grandeur, permanence, and security 
through the construction of massive stone facades. Themes of security 
influenced the work lives of a bank’s staff. Architects placed executive 
officers near the banking room to allow management easy supervision of 
tellers and cashiers enclosed in cages. The cages separated the bank’s 
employees from one another as well as from customers. Unlike that of 
department stores, the banking workforce was largely male from 1870 to 
1920. Just as department-store saleswomen toiled in a segmented world, 
however, bank clerks found themselves laboring in an environment that 
distinguished them from both customers and management. Like their 
counterparts in the store, bank clerks could not help feeling the class 
distinctions of their workplace.307 
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While the federal government and private sector began hiring female clerks after 
the Civil War, banks only began to significantly hire women after WWI, at which point 
they also created departments to specifically serve female clients as female consumers 
increasingly became more important in the rise of mass consumer culture.308Compared 
to modern clerical work, clerical workers in the late 19th century, especially in the federal 
government, tended to be more skilled with more control over their work, even sharing 
class and culture with their supervisors, which promoted close social relations. This 
differed from industrial workers of that era, who also enjoyed fewer privileges than these 
clerks. This began to change after 1900 when clerical work became increasingly 
subdivided and rationalized to create assembly-line like work conditions and industrial 
workers increasingly organized and won better wages and conditions.309 Even though 
conditions and pay of white-collar workers increasingly became proletarianized and 
even often offered lower wages than blue-collar work, white-collar workers “continued to 
think of themselves as members of the middle class and to derive middle-class status 
from the white-collar labor in which they engaged.” 310  Mills also emphasized these 
employee-employer relationships as a hindrance to unionization, resulting in “loyalty to 
management” as “an insecure cover-up or fear of reprisal.”311 Even when skilled workers 
organized and commanded significant economic and political power in some cities, bank 
clerks, even if from the same neighborhood and families, may not have followed their 
lead. And if they did indeed materially achieve middle-class status, their social circles 
would move them further from contact with unionized workers, making their receptivity to 
unionization even lower.312 
 In a study of Pittsburgh’s clerical workers in the late 19th century, Devault found 
only one example of an entry level clerk (Harry Donnally) moving from bookkeeper, to 
teller in 1905, to president in 1933, which had been more frequent prior to 
industrialization. Devault characterized more typical expectations in the latter period in 
banking:  
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By the turn of the century, few expected to enter banking employment as 
a clerk, teller, or bookkeeper and end up owning a bank. While stories 
such as that of Donnally kept this dream alive to some extent, banks 
were best known for their job security; once employed by a bank, logical 
steps through its departments could be expected. The other side of the 
bank-employment coding, however, was that job security and 
bureaucratic promotions were often guaranteed only within a single 
bank.313 
 
Such mobility offered more opportunities than typical blue-collar work, and would 
have been a hindrance to unionization. Many workers, especially male workers raised in 
the culture of the 19th century, struggled with the changes that by 1910 meant “the size, 
systemization, and dominance of the big banks and other corporations” could limit their 
fulfillment at work: 
Although business historians today write of the modern business 
enterprise as a "logical" development in the evolution of economic 
structures, aspiring young men did not always see the logic in the lack of 
autonomy, authority, or control typical of bureaucratic employment. Many 
white-collar employees seemed entangled in complex operational 
hierarchies and subordinated to a rigid chain of command, and they 
lacked any realistic opportunity to direct the enterprise.314 
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, feminization of the banking industry was 
delayed compared to other industries, due to a combination of the firms’ histories, 
perceived market needs, promotional opportunities still available to men that required 
clerk apprenticeships, and active union avoidance. Since the decentralized structure of 
banking still allowed some proximity between the banker and the bank workers along 
with some upward mobility, this perhaps could explain the slightly delayed entry of 
women into clerical work in this industry. FIRE sector companies helped maintain 
“loyalty” through organizing social activities that reinforced the employers’ needs and 
values.315 
Devault’s study of Pittsburgh challenges some of the ideas of a new middle class. 
The expanding clerical work force of the late 19th century required so much labor that 
the workforce came most often from the urban working-class, often the children of 
                                                 
313
 Devault 1990, 158, referencing p 198-199 of Fiske, The Modern Bank. NY: D. Appleton, 1904 
314
 Davis 80-81 
315
 Kwolek-Folland 153-155; Bjelopera 82 gives an example of the Philadelphia Bank Clerks’ Beneficial 
Association 
 88 
immigrants and manual workers.316 Even when clerical workers were close to the most 
unionized sectors of skilled workers, it did not necessarily lead to clerical worker 
organizing. Devault argues that despite coming from parents who were union members, 
skilled workers and part of the labor aristocracy, they had legitimate reasons to 
encourage their children to enter commercial schools to pursue non-union and deskilled 
clerical work. Monopoly capitalism had begun to cause an erosion in the economic 
privileges and job control of industrial workers, so to maintain their social status and 
distinguish themselves from newly arriving immigrants, they encouraged their children to 
enter the expanding white-collar workforce. Why children coming from working-class 
families and communities with much union consciousness—especially in Pittsburgh 
which had a rich history of labor struggle—did not build unions in their workplaces, is a 
question that remains to be answered.317 What is clear though, many people in the US 
have had contradictory attitudes about which kinds of work are a source of pride and 
respect: 
At the same time, ambiguous (and often contradictory) distinctions 
between manual and non-manual labor contributed to society's 
perceptions of the social status of office employment for men. North 
American culture had always fostered a schizophrenic view of manual 
labor. One set of traditions glorified those who worked with their hands 
and scorned those who didn't-lawyers, politicians, financiers. Certainly 
Pittsburgh's workers upheld a working-class version of this tradition in the 
late nineteenth century, basing trade union and political power on their 
belief that it was their labor which created the city's and the nation's-
wealth. However, even the city's "aristocracy" of skilled labor often tried 
to escape from the very work they glorified, becoming full-time unionists, 
politicians or, in the case of clerical training, seeking something better for 
their sons. Less skilled industrial workers found less to glorify in their 
work and more to gain from having their sons escape it.318 
 
The erosion of skilled worker power, the defeat of the Homestead Strike in 1892, and 
economic downturns meant that even in cities considered union strong-holds, traditional 
methods of building working class power did not necessarily impact office workers who 
came from union families and grew up in union cities.319 The very corporations that 
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destroyed the material privileges of the skilled male workers of the 19th century, along 
with their dreams of a workingmen’s republic, provided the new machinery and jobs to 
their sons and daughters, instilling a less independent, business-oriented version of the 
American Dream, a distant departure from the Jeffersonian ideals of the working-class 
as discussed in chapter two. 
Regarding salaries and benefits, railroad clerks, one of the few examples of 
unionized white-collared workers, earned 13% more than skilled blue-collar workers in 
railroad transportation. But this was not the case in all white collar work; “by the 1920s 
the gap had completely vanished, and clerical workers increasingly relied on different 
measures to differentiate themselves from those in the blue-collar realm." 320  Such 
measures at the turn of the century included more job security, lack of physical exertion, 
office location and cleanliness. 321  Workers in the 1920s benefitted from economic 
growth in general with “median salaries ranging from twenty-four dollars to twenty-five 
dollars per week to eighteen dollars to nineteen dollars per week.”322 At the higher end 
of the pay scales were bookkeepers and stenographers, while general clerks and typists 
were in the middle of the pay scale, and file clerks the lowest paid. A study of female 
clerical workers in Chicago demonstrated wage improvements even at the onset of the 
Great Depression. The study also found variation in median weekly salaries for these 
workers depending on the industry of the establishment: “mail order houses ($75), 
insurance companies ($93), public utilities ($100), publishers ($106), banks ($114), 
advertising companies ($117)” and investment houses ($318).323 These female clerical 
workers averaged 42 hour work weeks (including a half-day on Saturday), and provided 
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vacation pay usually for two weeks with the exception of one office out of the eighty-one 
studied. Most office workers’ hours were less than those who worked in trade and 
industry, and perhaps only professional work offered better wages and conditions. Filing 
and typing, however, received lower wages. Women who became bookkeepers or office 
supervisors earned the highest wages, but these jobs remained highly dominated by 
men. Women were most likely to find the best wages by becoming secretarial 
stenographers or senior stenographers with job experience. The majority of the 9,735 
workers studied received sick days and had employer-employee paid group insurance 
plans. Several banks were noted for “providing free lunch and pension and retirement 
plans to their employees."324 Paying wages and providing benefits to clerical workers 
above the standards of other industries served as an effective means to union 
avoidance, especially during World War I when women factory worker and telephone 
operators struck for union recognition and wage increases to keep pace with inflation.325 
Men’s clerical wages began to stagnate starting in 1900, a product of the feminization of 
the labor force and new office technology. Also quite important was the expansion of 
universal free public high school, which provided commercial education that reduced 
businesses’ training costs and created a larger labor supply.326 The surge of industrial 
organizing in the 1930s and wage gains during WWII created blue-collar work with 
wages and conditions better than what clerical workers received, especially in the 
clerical industries that remained for the most part unorganized. 
 The Bank Clerks Athletic Association formed in Philadelphia in 1887, which 
reflected the growing relation between sports and masculinity in the US at the time. It 
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was first opposed by employers, and  then eventually accepted.327 This suggests that 
some forms of collective identity as bank clerks, as well as self-organization occurred in 
this early period, and should be investigated further. From 1870 to 1910 Bjelopera 
considers accountants clerical workers, but says by 1920 their occupation was 
professionalized and could not be considered in the same category as other clerical 
work, which perhaps explains later office worker organizing efforts taking broader craft 
approaches compared to traditional AFL unions from the trades.328 He also considered 
insurance agents, who mostly worked for large firms in Philadelphia, to fit in the category 
of clerical workers rather than professional workers, which helps explain the earlier 
organizing efforts of industrial insurance agents.  
The Knights of Labor had clerks organized in the Salespeople’s Local Assembly 
No. 4907 from the mid-1880s to 1905.329 At its peak in 1902, it had agreements with 
twenty five stores in Pittsburgh, and 1,200 members.330 These were salespeople of the 
retail industry, not the financial sector. Perhaps due to retail stores locations in traditional 
strongholds of the old republicanist unionism of the 19th century or because of the rapid 
growth in trade and department stores in the 19th century, clerks in retail were the first to 
organize unions. In 1870, trade consisted of almost 42% of all clerical employment, 
while the FIRE sector encompassed only 12%. Therefore, it is understandable why 
unions may have focused first on retail clerks in the 19th century. By 1930, however, 
clerical work in manufacturing encompassed about 25% of clerical employment, and the 
FIRE sector at about 16%, making it almost equal to Trade, which was then  at 18%.331 
The biggest contributor to clerical worker growth was manufacturing and trade, making 
union emphasis on such industries also understandable. 
In 1890, the Retail Clerks National Protective Union (later the Retail Clerks 
International Association/Union - RCIA), comprised of clothing and shoe store workers, 
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was chartered by the American Federation of Labor. It spread throughout the Midwest in 
the first couple of years, and within ten years was international due to a new local in 
Canada.  Boycotts were frequently used to improve wages and reduce hours, and the 
retail clerks were among the first to win overtime premium pay in their contracts. It grew 
from 3,000 members in 1890, to 50,000 in 1904, but they were reduced to 5,000 in the 
Great Depression before surging again during WWII.332 Bjelopera suggests additional 
explanations for the challenge of building clerk unions, especially in retail. Many clerical 
workers were removed enough from what they considered to be menial work to validate 
feelings of being middle-class, and believed opportunities for promotion could become 
available even as they became further out of reach. Because of this mentality, there was 
little unionization prior to the 1920s, and a lack of worker struggles for job control as was 
common within the US working class in the 19th century: 
Rather, lower-level white-collar workers tended to identify with those 
higher on the social and economic scale. In particular, men who aspired 
to rise into the professionalized managerial hierarchy or to become small 
business owners eschewed collective anti-management agitation. 
Poignantly, in 1905 the Retail Clerks' International Protective Association 
(RCIPA), one of the few clerical unions, lamented that one-half of 
America's male sales clerks dreamed of becoming small-business 
owners.333 
 
Saleswomen tended to change jobs rather than fight the boss, as union activity 
was not tolerated “bosses quickly fired dissenters,” and “enough men [at least until 
1920] received promotions to fuel the mobility dreams of their brothers in the office and 
stores of Philadelphia.”334 So informal resistance was perhaps more common, and was 
expressed through breaking rules such as dress codes, mostly through workers acting 
as individuals rather than a group.  
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The WTUL supported clerical workers in the Office Employees Association in 
Chicago as early as 1912, and these workers’ associations became the basis of trade 
unions. Most of their success was based on male civil servant worker membership.335 A 
labor report published by the Rand Institute in 1920 said that “up to very recently office 
workers as a class were impossible to organize into trade unions. Within the last two 
years, an impetus has been given to organizing various kinds of office employees.”336 
Most successful was the Federal Employees Union, and the Brotherhood of Railway 
Clerks is mentioned as well. The WTUL, however, had shortcomings and limits in its 
organizing efforts that diminished its impact on organizing women and the clerical 
industries: 
Like the quasi-professional shorthand reporters' associations, these 
organizers attempted to control, limit, and grade new entrants into the 
field to keep wages high. They envisioned a strictly regulated craft union. 
Because of the influx of women into the field and the increased 
mechanization and rationalization in many newer clerical fields, however, 
this style of union organizing was inappropriate. The dispersal of small 
numbers of clerical workers in a larger number of offices may have made 
union organizing logistically difficult and expensive. It is also possible that 
the Women's Trade Union League did not commit enough resources to 
get the organizing drive going. The league abandoned the 1912 drive in 
Chicago after just one year. Poor, immigrant women who worked in 
unsanitary, unsafe, low-paid, factory jobs probably merited more 
immediate attention from the league. There were certainly some limited 
successes in organizing clerical workers during this period in other cities, 
most notably New York City, but most were short-lived and did not 
receive the support from the male-dominated trade union movement 
necessary to achieve success.337 
 
The first and most successful office workers union, Bookkeepers, Stenographers 
and Accountants Union No. 12646 (BSAU) was formed in New York City in 1908, and 
was considered one of the most progressive unions in NYC.  Workers in Indianapolis 
and Washington, DC were the next to become chartered by the American Federation of 
Labor, and by 1920 locals were chartered in the US’s 20 largest cities.338 Most were 
named the Stenographers’, Typists’, Bookkeepers’ and Assistants’ Union, but they were 
open to “operators of the multigraph, stenotype, and all other office machines, and all 
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kinds of clerical workers.” 339  The fastest growing office workers union was in 
Schenectady, NY. Clerks in a General Electric manufacturing plant started with 50 
members in June 1918, and grew to over 900 members by September with the support 
of the Metals Trades Federations. Together with other plant workers, they went on strike 
and over 2,000 office workers won cost of living adjustments of 15-20% through a War 
Labor Board appeal. 340  This demonstrated the potentially favorable climate for 
organizing clerical workers, especially given relative wages at the time;  between 1914 
and 1918, the cost of food rose 73% during the war, factory wages over 81%, and 
clerical wages, which were already low, only 26%. Another sign of the favorable climate 
was inter-union conflicts over territory when organizing clerks. The BSAU sought the 
assistance of the AFL to rule in their favor against the International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters and the Brotherhood of Railroad clerks to win jurisdiction rights to the 
Express Clerks in New York City.341 
Despite being recognized as the strongest office worker union in the country at 
the time and leading the call for the formation of a national office workers union, Samuel 
Gompers revoked the BSAU’s charter in 1922. Both the AFL and local leaders 
complained of a communist take-over because of union delegates’ participation and 
support for the Communist led Trade Union Education League. They claimed that just a 
hundred communists in the union were able control outcomes of meetings through their 
disciplined attendance. Gompers and other leaders claimed their will was not that of the 
other 500 or more members.342 Twenty-three communists were expelled from the union, 
after which it was immediately re-chartered by the AFL. 
Nevertheless, the BSAU continued to grow, and even started a campaign to 
organize bank workers in 1923. A garment workers’ union newspaper reported that 
“New York’s bank employees long scornful of trade unionism” were starting “to realize 
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they that they need organization as much as the plumber or baker or other common 
laborer.”343 Another newspaper commented that skilled miners were starting to live in the 
homes on “the Hill” once occupied by white-collar workers, and the white-collar workers 
were moving to the working class neighborhoods in “the Valley” near the mines. While it 
was looked upon favorably by many that skilled blue-collar workers were improving their 
standard of living, a writer for an industrial journal noted “that there is something wrong 
when skilled head-workers have to live in worse homes, wear cheaper clothes, and eat 
cheaper cuts of beef than hand-workers."344 Some bankers apparently recognized the 
wages were low, with one saying “We have men who are financiers on $150 a month. It 
is perfectly amazing how they get along—and in most cases save a little on that 
salary."345  The Federal Reserve Board investigated the conditions of the 10,000 bank 
employees and found that “the great majority of the employees were not paid enough to 
meet living expenses.”346 
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Figure 3 
Bookkeepers, Stenographers and Accountants Union No. 12646 (BSAU-AFL) 
 in New York City 1935 
 
The men in the barrels have signs that say “Office workers!  Your white collar is all you have! 
You have nothing to lose! Organize!" and the others tell office workers to “Wake up!” and come 
to the next open meeting. Second from the left is Harry Avrutin, who later was a secretary of the 
NYC Central Labor Council. 
Source: Robert F. Wagner Labor Archives, Union Label Collection, Item no. 22006, NY. 
www.laborarts.org/collections/item.cfm?itemid=84 
 
 Thus the AFL’s BSAU, with 3,000 members in 1924, a couple years after the 
expulsion of the communist members, took on the task of organizing the 20,000 bank 
workers in New York City. A nucleus was built in a few union-owned banks, and 
picketing occurred on Wall Street. The union used pamphlets with the wages of skilled 
workers, who perhaps had less education than bank clerks, to agitate them to press for 
wage demands: “Bricklayers, $66; carpenters, $55; plumbers, $55; stone masons, $63; 
building laborers, $45; compositors, book and job, $50; newspaper compositors, $55; 
photo-engravers, $55 bakers, $47, $49 and $50 machinists, $49.50 to $55 pattern-
makers, $50; cloak-makers, $50; cloak-operators, $50; clothing-cutters, $51." 347 
Workers were apparently encouraged to accept low wages for the “gentility” of the job 
and the opportunities for promotion. Bankers gave multiple reasons against unionization: 
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The Magazine of Wall Street: banking is not a good field for trades-union 
organization. There are few occupations in which the application of a 
rigid scheme of hours is less warrantable or less feasible. Neither are 
there many occupations in which perfect standardization of work is as 
difficult to attain as it is in banking. What is very desirable is to establish 
in our banks a much better general basis of pay adjusted to capacity and 
performance, and with a fairly definite system of promotion resulting from 
efficiency and (to a moderate extent) seniority or length of service. 
 
The American Banker: men go into banking because they prefer it, and 
banks proverbially are among the most considerate of employers… 
banks have to pay just about the going wage for clerical work to meet the 
competition of other banks and other businesses…The 'closed-shop' 
policy in banking conceivably may bring a regulation of wages to the 
benefit of a few, but of a surety it foreshadows a result with catastrophic 
consequences to the brightest and therefore the most deserving among 
the men themselves. It will mean the 'closed door' to ambition, to worth 
and intelligence. Bank work will fall to the dead level of mediocrity, with 
antagonism and rebuke to him who sets out to excel and rise. Do the 
coming bankers of the country want this stumbling-block placed in their 
path?348 
 
One bank tried to avoid unionization by reinstituting Christmas bonuses and 
raising wages. BSAU secretary Ernest Bohm was quoted saying:  
Great discontent exists among bank employees because of the 
miserable salaries they are paid, but small raises of $5 or $10 a month 
will not accomplish what the bankers are aiming at. Just imagine 
expecting a married man with an education and brains and working fifty 
hours a week to get along on $30 or $35 a week. Is it any wonder that so 
many defalcations occur?349 
 
In addition to “defalcations” (embezzlement), another article reported a bank clerk 
guilty of forgery said that despite working at large bank in New York, “his thirty dollars a 
week pay was not enough to support his mother."350 Rather than engage in collective 
action, “disgruntled men and women in the office and on the selling floor turned to more 
individualistic forms of rebellion, breaking work rules and sometimes embezzling 
company funds.”351 Jerome P Bjelopera considers these actions as a type of informal 
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resistance, which he documents for several pages in accounts of multiple instances of 
workers who “illegally jump-start their socioeconomic ascent.” 352  These workers 
apparently subscribed to “get rich quick” ideas of the time, but rejected the employer 
class’s imposition of “temperance and thrift.”353 The banks used the Pinkerton Detective 
agency, which was also used for union-busting, to find culprits, but many workers were 
not caught. Workers were encouraged in some trade journals to avoid both the theft and 
secrecy described above, and to deal with problems individually: 
Rather, a manly confrontation of individuals was the preferred recourse. 
This individualization of conflict helps to explain the lack of unionization 
among clerical workers, especially men. Their dreams of eventually 
moving into management or small-business ownership allied them too 
closely to their bosses to contemplate collective action or unionization. 
Protest, if necessary, became a contest between two individuals- the 
overreaching boss and the aggrieved male worker—over their divergent 
understandings of the workplace virtues. Otherwise, it had to be shunted 
into veiled, behind-the-scenes deeds. Collective action meant 
challenging the individualism underlying the dream of mobility out of the 
clerical workforce and sacrificing this dream remained too difficult for 
most employees.354 
 
In addition to these obstacles, the AFL had a limited vision of family and work that 
expected the male wage earner to provide for the family while his wife was at home 
raising their children. Male trade-unionist support for clerical worker organizing was 
limited, and, even with the formation of the Women’s Trade Union League through the 
AFL’s support, was based on a view of women as a transient part of the labor force to 
be kept limited in defense of men earning the family wage. The AFL’s male leadership’s 
perspective on gender and its limited belief in the potential of women clerical workers to 
organize resulted in weak support for clerical workers forming unions. The AFL failed to 
challenge workers support for and employers use of the marriage bar, undermining 
worker solidarity and the potential of union struggle: 
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The marriage bar was especially useful to employers in creating the 
office labor force they and their male workers desired: one segmented 
primarily by gender. Employers and male employees used the marriage 
bar, perhaps both consciously and unconsciously, to regulate women's 
employment and also to discredit women workers. Although women left 
jobs for a variety of reasons, employers insisted that women could not be 
counted upon because they married. This convenient cultural convention 
had important economic benefits. By firing most women upon marriage, 
employers helped to ensure that women would continue to "fail" to live up 
to the ideal male model of a "career" and thus make the convention a 
reality. Women who left jobs because they were restless and unsatisfied 
could be shunted into the "women leave jobs to get married" category, 
thus confirming predisposed prejudices. At the same time, male 
employees may have been happy to countenance a system that secured 
their breadwinner dominance in the culture at large and their own specific 
families and eliminated an entire gender from the competition for better-
paying and more rewarding jobs. Stylized discussions of labor turnover 
diverted attention from women's real grievances in the office and served 
to reinforce the application of the marriage bar.355 
 
In addition to The marriage bar was also used as a mask to avoid job security for 
workers with grievances. Strom documented a case from 1923 where the marriage bar 
was used as an excuse by a bank to refuse the rehiring of a telephone operator who had 
left the bank on good terms, and wanted to return to work after marrying. The telephone 
operator believed she was in reality not hired because the company thought she was a 
union activist. This demonstrates how the marriage bar was a hindrance to the job 
security that can facilitate workers taking the risk to union organize.356 In another case, 
male union members pushed a company to enforce the marriage bar to protect 
themselves against dismissals in the railroad. The influence of feminist organizations 
that had recently won women the right to vote, however, helped push the male clerks to 
drop their demands.357 The high turnover rates of young clerical workers, which was 
used an excuse for low wages, was falsely assigned to marriage, when there voluntary 
departures were likely due more to their age; men in jobs with low skill levels had 
comparable turnover rates. Women actually left jobs for a variety of reasons just as men 
did, but suffered the additional burden of temporary employment that led to involuntary 
departure, no opportunities for advancement, and sometimes, sexual harassment. When 
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they received higher salaries and promotions, they had lower turnover rates, comparable 
to men in similar positions.358  
 Despite the growing importance of gender, during the period of 1900-1930, it was 
most likely the AFL’s attitude towards clerical workers in general rather than their 
attitudes towards women in particular that most hindered the growth of clerical unionism. 
Mary Elizabeth Adams, in her study of clerical workers and the BSAU, concluded: 
Regardless of the contributions of early locals like the BS&AU to an 
analysis of the position of male and female clerical workers, and to the 
development of organizing tactics, these early locals worked largely in 
isolation from the support of the mainstream labor movement. The 
presence of so many women within the clerical ranks suggests an implicit 
reason for AFL reluctance to organize these workers, but the record 
reflects more explicitly the AFL bias against clerical workers generally 
and internal political conflicts as cause for inaction in the clerical sector. 
By contributing to the isolation of women clerical workers from the labor 
movement, however, the AFL reinforced the containment of women in 
the low status, low paid sectors of the business labor force, just as it had 
in the trades.359 
 
The AFL repeatedly rejected requests for international charters of the local 
clerical worker unions. The leadership justified their rejection based on the lower 
membership numbers in the locals, but the AFL did little to increase resources and 
organizing staff to increase the membership.360 Adams does not consider the example 
of women telephone operators successfully organizing during this period, or the 
unionization of railroad clerks, and also admits that gender even if not the primary factor, 
was a significant factor since women in the office had to confront the boss as both a 
class and a male authority.361 
Fortunately, many of the worker leaders and organizers instrumental in the 
struggles of the Industrial Workers of the World helped form the Communist Party (CP) 
in the USA after the Bolshevik revolution in 1917. The Trade Union Educational League 
(TUEL), formed in 1922, was a means to organize a left-wing within the American 
Federation of Labor, with candidates who eventually challenged the AFL officialdom. 
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Growing success within the first year led to the communists' expulsion from the AFL on 
charges of dual unionism. Many Communist Party members were forced to renounce 
their TUEL membership to remain AFL members. When the COMINTERN entered the 
“Third Period” in 1928, expecting an upsurge in revolutionary activity worldwide, CP-
USA members formed dual “red” unions through the Trade Union Unity League (TUUL), 
which continued until 1935 and transitioned to the popular front period.362 Lewis Merrill 
led the CP’s Office Workers Union, and then joined BSAU No 12646 in NYC when the 
OWU was dissolved along with the TUUL. Merrill became a delegate in the AFL local 
shortly after.363 
At first the AFL ignored local unions’ requests for a national charter, so at the 
1936 AFL convention, Lewis Merill, who became president of the BSAU, organized with 
others to form the National Committee of Office and Professional Workers. When the 
AFL threatened to expel them, fourteen of these white-collar union locals, as well nine 
independent unions created the UOPWA. They started with about 8,600 members, and 
received a charter from the CIO on May 30, 1937.364 Trotskyists were active in these 
unions in at least New York and Chicago, but faced obstacles from the CP as the CP 
faced with the AFL.As a result, the Trotskyists were driven out of the leadership by 1938. 
The CP expected to maintain its dominance in using the UOPWA as a pipeline for 
recruiting to the party, and influencing the union’s direction.365 During this period the AFL 
continued to charter office worker locals, reaching 150 by 1942. This led to the creation 
of an international charter which federated them in 1945.366 
The Great Depression, in addition to inciting an upsurge of union organization in 
the 1930s, created ethnic tensions and competition, especially in New York City, the 
                                                 
362
 Kampelman 9-10 
363
 Kampelman 96-97 
364
 For more on the UOPWA, see: Eileen Boris’s Home to Work: Motherhood and the politics of industrial 
homework in the United States, pp. 306-31, “’With a keyboard in one hand’: White collars in the home” on 
UOPWA Local 16 NYC organizing. McColloch, Mark. White Collar Workers in Transition: The Boom 
Years, 1940-1970. “Lewis Hails New Union,” New York Times (1923-Current-file); Jun 3, 1937; ProQuest 
Historical Newspapers New York Times 1851-2007) w/ Index (1851-1993), p 16. The following year at its 
convention, in May 1938, the UOPWA committed to expand its organizing in finance, insurance, and 
social service. “CIO Office Union Plans Wider Drive,” The Washington Post (1923-1954), May 24, 1938, 
Proquest Historical Newspapers The Washington Post (1877-1994) p X14. 
365
 Duncan, Leonard; “Organizational Development Among Clerical Workers,” The Communist, April 1938 
pp. 367-368. www.unz.org/Pub/Communist-1938apr-00359?View=PDF, accessed March 20, 2014. 
366
 Barry Encly 1435 
 102 
center of the FIRE sector. As mentioned in the previous chapter, clerical work was at 
first the primary option of the daughters of the old middle-class, but increasingly became 
an option for second-generation white immigrants. Irish women were particularly 
successful in obtaining clerical jobs in the banking and insurance industries.367 These 
workers came from neighborhoods where the Communist Party faced extreme 
opposition due to racist and anti-Semitic sentiment. Another obstacle for the CP was the 
influence of anti-communist church leaders. Since the UOPWA included Jewish 
leadership with anti-racist commitments and communist sympathies, they faced 
considerable organizing challenges in the FIRE sector. The UOPWA vocally denounced 
the racist hiring practices of banks and insurance companies, challenged traditional 
seniority rights that would leave black people to be the last hired and first fired, and even 
accused companies like MetLife of being pillars of support for the rule of Jim Crow in the 
South.368 Many Irish-Americans who may have been uncomfortable with the UOPWA’s 
anti-racist struggle in the workplace may have been even more irked by the UOPWA’s 
efforts to challenge housing segregation, such as in the MetLife Stuyvesant Town 
housing projects.369 Efforts towards integration and interracial unity met spontaneous 
praise from the black community, but likely met resistance from many white 
communities. 370  Conservative AFL unions played on the these communities’ 
parochialism, and often organized almost exclusively on a program based on red-
baiting: “the OEIU largely relied for its appeal to clerical workers on simply being an anti-
Communist alternative to the left-leaning UOPWA.”371 Unfortunately for the UOPWA, the 
strategy worked and was especially effective at destroying the union after the passage 
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of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947.The OEIU bragged in its campaign literature to be the first 
union to sign anti-communist affidavits to comply with Taft-Hartley since it was a “real 
American union.”372 (See Figure 4 below) The OEIU counted on Catholic institutions and 
priests to direct workers to the anti-communist union:  
A number of Irish-Catholic girls worked in an office where the UOPW A, 
CIO, started an organizing drive. The girls told their parish priest of what 
was happening. He referred them to a Catholic [Xavier] Labor School in 
the neighborhood. The experienced leaders of the Catholic Labor School 
urged them to join the anticommunist OEIU, AFL. Other groups that often 
assist the OEIU in their organizational campaign are the anticommunist 
Association of Catholic Trade Unionists, and occasionally the leaders of 
the anticommunist veterans' groups.373 
 
Communist led unions such as the United Public Workers Union and the New 
York City Teacher’s Union were more effective because of their ties and influence in 
neighborhoods and sectors with Black and Jewish workers, but even they faced major 
set-backs due to Cold War politics.   
The CIO did not permit the UOPWA to organize in manufacturing, reserving 
jurisdiction for the industrial unions within those industries. It still went after some small 
manufacturing office workers, but also targeted sectors with little to no history of union 
organization, including “banking, insurance, nonprofits, graphic arts, publishing, and 
advertising.”374 Most effort was placed in the insurance industry, which the BSAU had 
previously attempted to organize without success in 1927. Metropolitan, John Hancock 
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Mutual Life Insurance, and Prudential Insurance Company of America were targeted, 
with the UOPWA winning a national agreement covering 18,000 Prudential workers in 
30 states on February 1, 1943. 375  Organizing victories were also achieved in 
Metropolitan and Hancock in the New York City area.376 In 1946, 500 insurance agents 
went on strike with the UOPWA in the Midwest, and after four weeks, won their 
demands.  
Figure 4 
OEIU Campaign Literature Using Taft-Hartley Act against the UOPWA 
(cont) 
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Source: NCIB, White Collar Unionization: Union Strategy and Tactics Analysis of Contracts 
Problems After Unionization, Studies in Personnel Policy No. 101, NY: NICB 1949, p 20-21. 
 
The base of insurance agent unionism came from industrial insurance agents, 
who worked for Met Life, Prudential and John Hancock selling this type of life insurance 
to low wage workers. It differed from “ordinary and group life,” and in 1954 the name 
“industrial life insurance” was changed to “debit life insurance.” The debit was a 
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“combination monetary-geographic unit,” with an average agent having an area with 250 
to 300 families. The agent had to collect the payments, and during the depression would 
sometimes pay payments for clients to avoid lapses since his commission was based on 
the total value of the debit plus the net increase in the debit, minus the lapses, which 
were quite high. The agents were responsible for paying for lapsed policies, or re-selling 
them to avoid salary loss, until NY passed a law in 1938 that limited their responsibility 
to three years. There were also laws eventually passed that gave them a minimum 
salary for going around and collecting the payments. 
Since there were frequent lapses, the rates often ended up being higher than the 
actual payouts, leading to reforms to protect policyholders. The agents experiencing 
minimum protection from the laws decided to unionize first with independent 
associations, some resembling company unions, and then with the Insurance Workers 
International Union.377 They were probably the worst paid and most exploited insurance 
agents, perhaps from the communities of their customers who were mostly unionized at 
that time, different from agents selling financial products to the upper class.378 The 
Knights of Labor and AFL rejected them since the unions advocated creating better 
group life insurance policies for their members; policies closer in resemblance to what 
the wealthy bought rather than what was considered an inferior, predatory product: “As 
late as 1895, the American Federation of Labor refused to admit life insurance agents 
into the union on the grounds that insurance was a scam perpetrated by salesmen on 
working people.”379 During the upsurge of unions in the 1930s, some of the left-wing 
leaders of white collar worker unions had a vision of organizing the insurance industry, 
and tried convincing the agents they could only have a strong union if they united with 
the office workers. They were not successful with other types of insurance agents who 
were higher paid. Membership peaked at about 35,000 in the late 50s, and declined as 
the type of insurance they sold became less popular as a variety of better insurance 
policies became available to a broader section of the population.380 The important effect 
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organizing successes in insurance companies could have had on bank workers is told in 
this account from a UOPWA organizer: 
Sometimes organization develops through activities in ways we do not 
always realize. In St. Louis, a bank of 125 employees has been 
organized because the teller in that bank had a friend who is a 
Metropolitan agent. This agent was In the business for about fifteen 
years. The bank teller told me that when he first went to his house his 
friend could never engage in friendly conversation or relax because he 
was always uncertain about his job, always on the case for the 
applications that would decide the attitude of the management to him. 
Then the teller noticed that his friend became more relaxed, seemed 
happy with his family. He found out why when his friend produced a copy 
of Insurance Career [formerly published by UOPWA Insurance Division]. 
When the teller found out what our union was doing for insurance men, 
he decided that if this could be done at the $7 billion Metropolitan Life, it 
could be done for the bank's employees. So they came down to 
organize.381 
 
In other cases, however, male insurance agents were an obstacle to creating one 
big office workers union since they preferred their own locals on a craft basis, excluding 
women clerical workers.382  
The UOPWA also had “small but notable foothold in the nonunion world of banks” 
by the 1940s.383 The first bank was organized in 1937, when the majority of the banks’ 
44 workers demanded collective bargaining rights despite the press calling the 
campaign an “invasion” and the bank’s effort to exclude itself from New York State’s 
Labor Relations Act.384 This same year the UOPWA also opened an office on 79 Wall 
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Street, and staffed five full time organizers to start the Financial Employees Organizing 
Committee among the 130,000 Wall Street workers in in banks, brokerage houses, and 
stock exchanges.385 Seven hundred bank workers from the Brooklyn Trust Company 
went on strike for a month in 1947. The UOPWA also had some success in the  “factory-
like offices of credit bureaus, direct-mail houses, and directory and catalog 
publishers.”386 
A variety of tactics were used to organize these targets. Generally, the UOPWA 
would build a secret contact network in the targeted company, or they would “salt” the 
workplace by sending trusted workers to get jobs. These underground networks would 
become the basis of worker “organizing committees” that would organize the union 
through agitating workers about their grievances and leading them to resolve them.387 
Because of the anti-communism sentiment among bank workers, the UOPWA 
sometimes used creative tactics to get into the banks. A bank official, whose anti-union 
interests may have distorted his perceptions of UOPWA tactics, reported that an 
“UOPWA organizer set up a dummy independent union” to win the union vote, and then 
“on the eve of contract negotiations” with the bank, “the planted leaders of the dummy 
independent union announced that they and the union had affiliated with the 
UOPWA.”388 Leaflets, pamphlets and literature in color and with cartoons were often 
used, and social activities were organized. (See Figure 5 below) 
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Figure 5 
UOPWA fights salary inequities through job classification demands 
 
Source: NCIB, White Collar Unionization: Union Strategy and Tactics Analysis of Contract 
Problems After Unionization, Studies in Personnel Policy No. 101, NY: NICB 1949, p 12. 
 
According to a UOPWA organizer, they also used house visits to workers to talk 
to them personally about the power union organizing could have to help them win better 
wages and conditions, and found this approach was effective with female clerical 
workers:  
One of the organizing activities of our local consists of home contact. It 
takes a lot of nerve to go into a strange neighborhood and ring a strange 
door bell. We feel that the results we get are good. We talk to girls, 
clerical workers, who are underpaid and know that they cannot get along 
on what they are making. Sometimes they feel they are not worth any 
more. Our job is to sell them to themselves and let them know what the 
union will give them.389 
 
UOPWA Organizing Director Richard Lewis 390  also noted that white-collar 
workers did not always attend union meetings, so it was a useful to organize social 
events such as cocktail parties to get workers together to discuss union issues.391 
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The union more than doubled its size in its first year, building from 8,600 to 
22,000 members among 40 locals by 1940. It nearly doubled again by 1943 with 43,000 
members in 118 locals.392 Its growth was limited during WWII because of no-strike 
pledges and CP popular front policies during the war, but it almost doubled its 
membership again between 1946 and 1948, when it reached 75,000 members. Strom 
has documented that  
trying to represent both higher-status professionals and lower-level 
clericals in the same industry and even workplace, as UOPWA did in 
many cases led to a pattern of privileging largely male professionals’ 
goals and needs over those of largely female clericals. Though in social 
work locals the professionals were often female and low-paid themselves 
and eager to make common cause with their colleagues, in insurance 
locals, at the other extreme, male agents insisted on organizing 
separately from clerical coworkers and rarely supported them in dealing 
with management.393 
 
This provides insight into the UOPWA’s limited bank worker organizing. Although 
the organization claimed to have a nucleus in every bank in New York City prior to being 
destroyed by the Taft-Hartley Act,394 what is documented, by Mark McColloch, one of 
the only researchers to specifically examine bank worker organizing, is about 2,500 
Bank workers unionized in NYC during the war, and an additional 5,000 joining the 
UOPWA after war, creating a union density of about 10% in NYC`s financial sector, with 
unionization spreading to banks in New Jersey and Albany by the middle of 1947.395 
Concurrent with these efforts at expansion, the UOPWA confronted the additional 
challenge of government repression through FBI labor spies who monitored its 
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organizing drive in John Hancock and other companies out of growing fear of communist 
influence.396 
The banks quickly smashed the growth of unionization once Taft-Hartley passed, 
and the UOPWA was down to only five bank contracts in 1948, and none by 1950.397 So 
it is likely government and employer repression were more significant in limiting the 
union’s growth than its attitudes on race and gender. The union was better in dealing 
with race issues than gender, as it did advocate for racial equality, organized black 
insurance workers, and challenged hiring practices in the industries it organized. (See 
Appendix 4 on Race and the Financial Sector to understand the significance of the 
UOPWA’s efforts to confront racism.) Conflict within and outside UOPWA over its 
leadership’s support for Communist popular front organizations and causes ultimately 
destroyed the union.398 The UOPWA refused to sign non-communist affidavits, causing 
difficulty for negotiations. 399  It was on the verge of organizing a strike of 14,000 
Prudential Insurance workers in 31 states when the lack of CIO support, government 
repression, and the company’s refusal to negotiate weakened the UOPWA’s 
membership’s support of its leaders.400 It also endorsed Henry Wallace for president in 
1948, which many members and CIO leadership did not support.  
 The Communist Party influenced about 40% of the membership of the CIO in 
1938, and was able to get about a third of the convention votes. This dropped down to 
15% of the CIO membership by the Portland convention in 1948, where the CP had only 
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50 of 800 votes in a CIO that moved increasingly to the right.401 At this point, CP 
influence was weak enough that CIO President Murray was able to attack the remaining 
CIO unions with force. He criticized the UOWPA for only having 34,000 members out of 
a jurisdiction of 6 million.402 The CIO then expelled two Communist led unions at its 1949 
convention, including the largest, the United Electrical workers. The CIO then brought up 
charges against ten other unions, including the UOPWA, which was whittled down to 
12,000 members because of the Taft-Hartley Act, opportunistic anti-communist unions, 
and CIO acquiescence.403 
 Merrill supported many Communist led initiatives; among such activities 
mentioned in a congressional house report on un-American activities was his support for 
the release of Brazilian Communist leader Luis Carlos Prestes.404 Support for these 
popular front activities of the CP-USA as well as leadership positions and press that 
closely tailed the CP’s changing policies were first investigated in the 1944 house report, 
and then taken up in the CIO’s investigation, which led to the UOWPA’s expulsion.405 
Merrill and the executive board attempted to align its political policy with CIO by claiming 
opposition to the intervention of any political parties or other organizations outside the 
union.406 Merrill was criticized by the CP for capitulating to red-baiting, and resigned 
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soon after, citing poor health.407 Their efforts were too late, with the new president 
James H Durkin and the executive board unable to prevent expulsion.408 Along with the 
other nine communist-led unions, the UOWPA was expelled at the conclusion of the CIO 
committee hearing in 1950, supposedly for following “the twists and turns, the zigs and 
zags of the Communist Party line,” including COMINTERN foreign policy positions that 
differed from those of the CIO.409 The consequences of eliminating the UOPWA was 
severe for office workers: 
The demise of UOPWA left office workers either without unions at all or 
with representation by more conservative white-collar unions, such as 
the OEIU, dominated by male professional workers and their agenda. It 
was not until the 1970s that office worker organizing revived significantly 
in the private sector. When it did, it was the women’s movement more 
than the labor movement that provided the spark.410 
 
In addition to banking and insurance, investment firms also experienced union 
organizing campaigns. Joseph P. Fitzpatrick, S.J., in his 1948 dissertation The White 
Collar Worker on Wall Street captures a world on “the street” before, or on the cusp of, 
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much of the deskilling and automation of its labor processes through new technology.411 
The only firm that had begun to centralize multiple financial services and had a large 
work force where many routinized tasks were broken down among workers was Merrill 
Lynch; this firm is perhaps the only one from Fitzpatrick’s study that most people would 
still recognize existing today. What is remarkable about this study in industrial sociology 
is the three hundred interviews the author gathered around the highpoint of union 
struggles on Wall Street, which he estimates had about twenty thousand workers, “a 
center of white collar employment.”412 
What drove the traditional white collar worker, according to Fitzpatrick, was that 
“he did not have just a job; he had a position, something implying a share in control and 
direction of an enterprise.”413 He expected to advance as the business grew. However, 
with new technology, division of labor, and practically universal levels of high school 
education among the labor force, including a large amount of women entering jobs once 
held by men as they joined the army in WWII, some of the prestige eroded. The jobs still 
possessing prestige were transferred to those with higher technical skills.414 The modern 
office worker, once close to an owner or management, now “has no more share in 
activities of control or direction than the men on the assembly line” and “is tied to his 
typewriter, IBM and record files as ruthlessly as a factory worker can be tied to a 
machine.”415 Fitzpatrick also pointed out, it was still the strikes of mostly male production 
workers that gained the attention of the community and had political weight, while an 
office worker on strike would not have the same economic leverage. He summarizes the 
challenge of the white-collar worker: 
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Office managers realize that the jobs hold relatively little chance for 
advancement, and are not valuable enough for more than a moderate 
salary. Therefore, apart from the fact that women are more efficient in 
these jobs who only filling in the time between high school and marriage, 
or who are supplementing a husband’s salary, he has little or no worry 
about the possible ill effects of a moderate salary, or the disappointment 
that attends the lack of advancement for a man in the same job. One of 
the officials of the New York Employment Service told me recently: “I 
have a dozen jobs, and good ones, for every woman who applies; but I 
haven’t one job for every dozen men that need one.” This defines the 
white collar problem, therefore, as a man’s problem at the present time. It 
may become a woman’s problem later.416 
  
As an industry composed entirely of white collar workers and concentrated almost 
entirely within a city block, it represented a key test for the ability of labor unions to 
organize white collar workers and the financial industry. To the degree that white collar 
work still was associated with status and privileges not afforded to blue collar work, Wall 
Street represented something other workers looked up to. In fact, many of the interviews 
Fitzpatrick documented demonstrate among workers a feeling of having the best job 
within the financial sector, with those having come from banking or insurance claiming 
they would never go back: “…clerks frequently mentioned: ‘I would never leave the 
Street to work in a bank,’ when ‘leaving the Street’ meant getting a job in National City [a 
bank] which is much more [geographically] on Wall Street than Merrill Lynch.”417 
Fitzpatrick’s study included nine firms, one with workers represented by the 
UOPWA, and two with the United Financial Employees (UFE), and all supportive of the 
Wall Street strike.418 Unionizing was started and controlled by floor employees, but most 
of the office employees were not union.419 Historically, the New York Stock Exchange 
was an organization of the rich. 420  In 1916, the first clerk was made broker, or a 
member, of NYSE. There was much dissent on the board, who thought the NYSE 
should be an “organization of gentlemen, not an association of clerks.”421 More pages 
became promoted, creating a friendly relation between brokers and pages. Promotion of 
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clerks to NYSE administration did not happen however. The broker had to like the 
employee and suggest the firm subsidizes membership since it was expensive: “his 
advance is dependent necessarily upon a close personal relationship and favoritism 
without which he is quite helpless to step out of the ranks.”422 High unionization in 
general may have helped give the UFE a base of many workers with previous union 
experience to facilitating organizing in such an environment. Wall Street workers’ union 
interests were also a product of the instability of the business. Brokerage houses 
depended on lots of trading to make commission, but lots of trading could also be a sign 
of an unstable market.  
Some brokerage houses would “maintain a large staff in poor times” for employee 
morale and office efficiency” which could be “less expensive in the long run.” Most did 
not replace workers when business slowed down, and most standard according to 
Fitzpatrick was lay-offs.423 There were 20,000 workers in Wall Street in 1945 and 1946, 
but in 1947, 20% were laid off.424 Fitzpatrick observed that “it is immediately evident that 
the Wall Street clerk faces a situation of strain and anxiety which is not met in other 
white collar areas.”425 NYSE did not allow corporations to have membership, instead 
requiring partnerships with unlimited liability “to insure more care in the handling of 
customers’ accounts.”426  While it may have been better for customers, it presented 
challenges for employees and union organization. Firms could come and go with little 
notice, and the worker could be left without a job. Mergers and the transferring of whole 
departments of back office work that could be transferred between firms caused job loss: 
This unstable form of firm structure… is used as a constant threat by the 
brokers against the union. If a union should form among employees, 
there is nothing the union can do to prevent the firm from (a) merging; (b) 
dissolving; (c) transferring its clearance, thus eliminating its employees. It 
is a serious hazard to union organizations.427 
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Changes in partnerships were a real threat, which Fitzpatrick documented in both 
the frequency of mergers and dissolutions, and the quantity of employee loss; as many 
as 300 employees could be lost from a larger firm.428 Fitzpatrick also documents the 
reasons for numerous cases of firm mergers and dissolutions, which include a variety of 
legitimate and illegitimate personal and business reasons, including union activity:  
 
1941: The CIO was organizing, Newburger, Loeb. They only had 41 
employees but it looked good for the union. Then the senior partner 
announced that, if the union won, he was going to give up the office and 
turn his clearance over to another firm. The union lost by one vote. But 
nonetheless, the firm stopped clearing shortly after that, and 41 
employees were out on the Street. The firm went back to clearance last 
year [1947]. Now has about 80 employees. None of the old employees 
seem to have returned.429 
 
Fitzpatrick interviewed many partners, who held typical anti-employee attitudes: 
I don’t see why these employees should complain. Haven’t we taken the 
risk that gives them their job? It’s not their money that’s at stake. If I put 
$100,000 into the business, it’s my money and my chance. Haven’t I got 
the right to protect that. Now how can an employee tell me if business 
get bad, that I have to leave that money in the business and keep the 
firm going just to keep him in a job. That doesn’t make sense to me.430 
 
The employers’ message was strong enough that employees even repeated it, as 
this worker did in an open letter he wrote to encourage co-workers to oppose the union: 
Think it over. There is no comparison between a corporation and a 
partnership. The former cannot very well dissolve but it can happen to 
the latter. In this business, it would be a very simple matter to transfer 
customers’ accounts, with connections being made for partners, and 
dissolve the firm. If the union demands are exorbitant, this could happen. 
Give me one good reason why, at this stage of the game, the senior 
partner of this firm should be bothered with union headaches. I don’t 
think this would happen, but it is a thought. Where would the union help 
then?431 
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And from another partner, who expressed dismay that some partners leave the 
business without giving anything to laid off employees who gave their life to building the 
business, but still did not believe in union benefits: 
The great difficulty with our business is that it is too personal. Benefits 
have to depend on the decision of employers because you never know 
when the business is going to be good or bad. You can’t write the 
benefits into a union contract. You bind yourself legally then to something 
you may never be able to meet432. 
 
The reality under capitalism was the employers were accustomed to many types 
of contracts, but did not want labor to have contract rights: 
When things get tight, the first economies we think of our employees. 
That seems to be pretty clear. I’m held by my lease for the office; I have 
contracts covering most of my other equipment. The only important 
expense that doesn’t bind me by a contract is the employees. They 
afford the easiest way out of a tight spot.433 
 
Another blames laid off workers for staying in weak firms, saying “if they just don’t 
provide for themselves the way that brokerage family did, too bad. That’s why there are 
Institutions, your Church has many fine ones.”434 In summarizing his interviews with the 
partners employees, Fitzpatrick writes: 
It would be safe to say that no conversation continues for half an hour or 
more, without one or two or more references being spontaneously made 
to friends or fellow workers who (a) went out in the last merger; (b) were 
left with nothing when the firm dissolved; (c) had to look for something 
else when the firm stopped clearing.435 
 
A worker who described himself as “faithful help” of seventeen years with a 
company lost his job when partners broke up their firm and moved to other firms, and 
then “bounded around for a while; war work, a bank job.” When he finally came back to 
another Wall Street firm, he returned to the department he was once head of “as the 
clerk with the least seniority.” He complained, “[I was] an old Wall Streeter with years 
behind me, and I see the kids here with four years of service way ahead of me.”436 
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Another complained of having twenty years of experience in the brokerage houses, but 
only five months of seniority because of firm volatility in his work history. Younger 
workers saw the frustration of the older workers, but also complained of being the last 
hired and first fired. Others spoke of being “displaced by the refugees brought in from 
Europe” at one point, and several referenced turning to “war work” when the opportunity 
came because of the low pay and instability of Wall Street work.437 As Fitzpatrick noted, 
these stories of frustration with lay-offs and seniority were common with everyone, and 
was told sometimes “with a tone of bitterness, sometimes with a sense of futile 
resignation.”438 While some employees did have the fortune of maintaining employment 
at one firm, “the common experience of others [was] a threatening reminder.” 439 
Fitzpatrick reports that 90% of the interviewees he questioned said they would not want 
their son or someone close to them do the work they were doing, mainly because of the 
“uncertainty” of the job.440 Fitzpatrick reports that partners blamed union activism on new 
employees, but he soon discovered they did not mean young by new. In fact, “the 
majority of employees had been with their present firm for less than five years…between 
the age of thirty and fifty years… [but] who had worked in Wall Street most of their lives,” 
moving from firm to firm through mergers and lay-offs. 441  Clearly, the “clerk who 
depends on his job for his livelihood” was “the main victim of the uncertainty;” the volatile 
business of brokerage houses made up of instable firm structures.442 NYSE enabled 
partners to easily abandon their firms with their capital, while a clerk would leave with 
nothing and be out of a job. In short, employers viewed the job as a gift to the 
employees; not a right, but a favor they had no obligation to maintain.443 
 Most employees did not stay, and employment decreased 60% between 1929 
and 1947, meaning three out of five employees were no longer employed on Wall Street 
from the generation he was studying.444 When workers mentioned going to other jobs, it 
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was typically war work and banks, which could reflect the importance organizing Wall 
Street might have had in organizing bank workers, both symbolically as the top of the 
pyramid of the financial sector, and concretely in terms of worker experience with unions 
in the industry. Many of the men who stayed and were disposed to union organizing had 
stayed on Wall Street longer than planned. They entered before the Great Depression, 
and felt it was necessary to hold on to the jobs they had and already learned. By the 
1940s, they felt less able to compete with younger workers in other industries.445 They 
were also led to believe “they were important people doing important work,” but found 
some employers were afraid of hiring them because they had a reputation of going back 
to Wall Street when business picked up. They were distrusted, judged to be too 
impatient for other financial sector work that required “methodical care” since they were 
used to few rules in handling large sums of money. Some potential employers believed 
they “cannot submit to the discipline of efficient offices” since they are used to working in 
highs and lows, and others viewed them as wild gamblers who drank a lot.446 
Fitzpatrick’s interviews included many male and female workers on Wall Street 
who came back to the investment firms even though the pay was lower because they 
enjoyed more autonomy and less supervision. Such autonomy included the freedom to 
get coffee, knit or read when they finished their work on a slow day.447 Also important to 
employee retention according to the interviews was “the strange fascination of the Street 
itself” and “the hazard in the minds of the clerks that they [were] not fit for any other 
work.”448 In terms of office work, one clerk summarized their attitude towards office work: 
“I would find anything else dull after this place.”449 While there were of course exceptions 
to this trend within the interviews by those who described it as filled with “madness and 
uncertainty,” it seemed within the financial sector, and perhaps compared to most white 
collar office work at the time, this was an exciting job to have because of its 
“informal…club-like atmosphere.”450 
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So in addition to grievances against the firms, there were enough perks to make 
workers want to stay and enough fears of limited opportunities elsewhere that would 
lead workers “to seek remedy within the system itself” that “would naturally lead to union  
activity.”451 They wanted to maintain the satisfying autonomy they enjoyed in their office 
work, but they also wanted the “permanence of employment” normally expected of white 
collar work. For some, the contractual benefits many union workers had at that time 
were also desired.452 Fitzpatrick saw unionization for these workers as a choice between 
fears: fear of losing a job, and “fear that forces men to seek some instrument of security” 
that will help them win some control over frequent threatening change.453 Technology 
and SEC control were causes of fear among the brokers regarding their own position, 
and “a strong union would introduce another element of control in a business already too 
extensively controlled for the broker’s peace of mind.”454 
“The Family Spirit” was the expression used by brokers for their relationship with 
the workers, which included a relationship that was informal, based on personal loyalty. 
Work conditions were relatively free, but with the expectation of staying to get the job 
done when necessary, and rewards as incentives.455 Workers could get loans on their 
terms from partners, and often were taken care of when sick: “What could I expect from 
a union? I got sick last year and this firm paid over $500 for my medical expenses; I 
didn’t ask for it; they just did it, as if that were as ordinary as giving a ten cent tip.” 
Fitzpatrick encountered many similar stories of employees feeling they were taken care 
of while sick or absent for vacation, and when they wanted to pursue education. 
However, Fitzpatrick documents in the interviews that this system of rewards based on 
personal loyalty was subject to favoritism, causing issues with overtime, bonuses, 
wages, grievances, and promotions.456 
The issue of overtime included the problem of complying with New Deal wage 
and hour laws, which required time and a half for overtime. Some of the firms used new 
laws to take away certain payments workers used to get for staying late. They also had 
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a problem in 1943 when the War Labor Board (WLB) capped wages and prohibited the 
bonus, which was an essential reward for the excessive hours clerks on Wall Street 
sometimes worked.457 Many partners found other means of getting around the WLB, 
such as allowing one worker to stay and clock everyone out with extra overtime. This 
rule-bending helped in building personal loyalty, but at the end of the war, the market 
slowed, partners prohibited this practice, and workers were hit with inflation at the same 
time. This lost income caused much resentment.458 
The bonus was usually 50% of the workers’ salary, and on a good year could be 
more than their salary. This served as a lure to get workers to stay during slow times 
and stressful times of work where they may not have been able to leave the workplace 
for an entire week. It was also cited as a reason not to organize the union since many 
workers thought they could lose it if they were unionized.  However, in some years and 
some firms, depending on the whims of a partner, this could mean workers received no 
bonus. While workers saw sick pay or coverage of medical expenses as a gift, there was 
a strong expectation of bonuses, with non-payment causing resentment beyond the firm 
culpable in not paying. Employers saw it as a gift, but employees saw it as deferred 
wages.459 As a result, a guaranteed bonus on a non-arbitrary basis became “one of the 
major objectives of union organization.” It was not possible to prove to the War Labor 
Board that the bonus was deferred wages, so the WLB looked at it as gratuity and didn’t 
allow payment. The UFE raised guaranteed bonuses based on the volume of trade as a 
demand in the Stock Exchange, winning it in its contract in 1945, and the Curb 
Exchange followed suit after the 1948 strike.460 However, the union only achieved this 
contract demand in one brokerage house, where workers divided 7.5% of the profits in 
proportion to their salaries.461 The firms had no independent grievance process, and 
only a few large firms had a personnel director, a new concept at the time. Wages were 
not based on experience, seniority, or job classification, and were very arbitrary between 
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employees and firms.462 Promotions were difficult to achieve, especially for back office 
workers.463 
 Sometimes management responded to workers’ complaints to avoid unionization 
and maintain the “family spirit.” In one firm, the union had held an organizing campaign 
and had filed for an election with good hopes of success. The absent senior partner 
heard of the situation; returned immediately to his office and called each of the 
employees separately and asked them what might have led to the desire for a union. He 
learned that deep resentment centered on an office manager. Without hesitation, he 
removed the manager and replaced him with another; the union lost the election.464 
Retaliation was also an issue that employers downplayed, but Fitzpatrick documented in 
his interviews, summarizing them: 
…one point of greatest trouble in the matter of grievance: the fear of 
reprisal. It is common talk among partners to discount this. Yet if any 
point appeared clearly in the dissolution of this matter with employees it 
was this. Where an employee must go over the head of a supervisor, he 
faces the inevitable risk of having the supervisor take it out on him 
later.465 
 
One such interview discusses a worker who was afraid of the partners, yet  
…had organized a CIO union in a machine shop, had led victorious 
strikes against the firm, and spent two years of untiring effort to take 
control of his union away from the Communists. A fearless, aggressive, 
shrewd union leader, yet he did not feel free as a brokerage clerk to go 
up and talk to the partners.466 
 
This quote also demonstrates how high unionization rates impacted the financial 
sector; workers got union experience, whether directly or through stories from friends, 
family, and news, yet unions responsible for financial sector worker organizing did not 
effectively take advantage of the pro-union climate. It was such a pro-union climate that 
Fitzpatrick even found partners at two firms with union representation who were positive 
about the union grievance process since it allowed the airing and resolution of problems 
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that previously would have been kept “secret” or “allowed to smolder out of sight and 
cause trouble.”467 
The unionized workers involved in the 1948 strike on Wall Street had a variety of 
visions of organization. The bond clerks of the UFE were almost like a craft union, as 
they worked closely together even though they were from different firms, yet they were 
originally organized by the UOPWA. The UOPWA was on the verge of winning a union 
recognition election, but anti-communist workers started to organize to push for a non-
CIO union. As the UOPWA expanded organizing efforts elsewhere on Wall Street 
through its well-funded “Operation Wall Street” campaign, so did anti-communist and 
independent union sympathizers, leading to the formation of the UFE by M David Keefe 
in 1942. The NYSE was the center of Wall Street and the UFE saw itself as the central 
union to unite all Wall Street workers since it originated from NYSE. To achieve this 
unity, Keefe believed in centralized power. The Curb Exchange members of the UFE, 
however, wanted a voluntary coalition. The UOPWA was successful in entering only one 
firm, and was destroyed by the UFE defeat in the 1948 strike. The Telegraphers on Wall 
Street had had a union since 1903, but were largely being eliminated due to 
technological change. Many of these union members organized work stoppages during 
their first contract fight in 1943, and ultimately won an increase through the War Labor 
Board.468 One of the weaknesses of the UFE was its dependence on Keefe, who was 
drafted to the war shortly after the signing of the contract. His Vice President, who said 
he “was willing to have Joe Stalin under the bed if it would bring some real strength to 
the union,” decided to seek the help of the UOPWA-CIO, which had spent money for 
three years organizing Wall Street workers, but ultimately lost his position. 469  The 
members of the union then put on the first point of its platform that it was anti-
communist, a way to express their opposition to the UOPWA and the CIO. The other 
points on the platform included equal pay and seniority rights, specifically expressing 
that they “do more important work” than industrial workers, and should make more than 
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them. 470  Union security and job security were also important, and they expressed 
interest in organizing bank and insurance workers. 
In the 1946 contract fight, workers threatened to leave the union if a strike was 
called, weakening Keefe’s bargaining position even though he held public negotiations 
to build membership support. He had to accept a contract with limited wage increases, 
and which gave the employers the right to break the contract with 30 days’ notice.471 
They realized they needed more support, and considered affiliating with the United Mine 
Workers, but they decided against losing local autonomy since they felt they knew their 
issues better. Demonstrating how strong anti-communist feelings were among these 
workers, they rejected the UOPWA even though it was offering hundreds of thousands 
of dollars of financial assistance to the UFE if it affiliated. Ultimately, they decided to 
affiliate with the OEIU because 
The Office Employees International Union of the AFL was a sound, right 
wing union. It promised the UFE a great deal of local autonomy, was 
willing to establish the financial workers In their own local, even though 
another local, of the same International had already been active in the 
banks and brokerage houses. It promised the aid of the AFL for strike 
support, legal advice and organizational help. It promised the financial 
aid which the UFE needed very badly.472 
 
The membership voted overwhelmingly in favor of the AFL, and voted to make 
Keefe a full-time president of the local with a $5,000 salary. As a result of the AFL 
affiliation, these Wall Street workers became close to a nearby Seaman’s union that was 
part of the AFL. In 1947, Keefe was able to win a contract for the Curb Exchange after a 
one day strike in which he called on the support of the Seaman, which greatly impacted 
his thinking on strategy.473 
 The union had many battles with individual brokerage firms that were 
unsuccessful, and winning union security and the right to not handle goods from striking 
firms (“hot work” clause) were the most difficult demands to win from the exchanges. 
The exchanges forced the union to hold a vote to demonstrate the membership 
supported these demands, which Keefe won overwhelmingly: “691 - 67 on the stock 
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exchange, 74 – 6 on the cotton exchange, 178 – 12 on the curb exchange.”474 The 
cotton exchange accepted the vote, but the stock and curb exchange refused to settle, 
leading to Keefe giving a 30 day strike notice, and going on strike March 29, 1948. 
 The first weakness of the strike was the lack of success in organizing all of Wall 
Street. Wall Street workers’ anti-communism feelings led them to reject the UOPWA-
CIO, which had more organizing experience with white-collar workers and resources for 
big campaigns.475 The only successfully organized brokerage firm, and the firm with the 
workers with the most solidarity, was organized by the UOPWA. However, without being 
centered in the exchanges, the UOPWA did not have the central point advantage to 
spread its program through the brokerage firms, leaving the UFE with the advantage. 
Nevertheless, the UFE was unsuccessful, and Fitzpatrick offers the following reason:  
the "social situation” of the Exchanges made them more vulnerable to 
union organization than the brokerage houses. It was clear also that the 
attitude of so many clerks, strongly resistant to union activity, was 
fostered by the nature of his work in a brokerage house, and by the 
individualistic relationship he has with his employer.476 
 
There were likely gender and skill issues involved, but most important seems to 
be the proximity to the employer, as has been discussed previously as an early 
challenge to the potential for bank worker organizing in decentralized small firm 
structure. In such environments where clerks had individualized job classifications and 
closer relationships with management, one-on-one anti-union campaigns to dissuade 
workers were easier and more effective.477 The following passage describes the typical 
Wall Street firms’ anti-union tactics of spreading misinformation about what privileges 
could be lost with unionization: 
Once the union arrives, therefore, out go the theatre tickets, the ball 
games, the easy coming and going, the payment of salaries during 
illness and the payment of bills for doctors; the personal loans on 
                                                 
474
 Fitzpatrick 342 
475
 For example, of the 1,492 bank tellers and clerks from the headquarters and 75 branches of the Corn 
Exchange Bank Trust Company eligible to vote, 768 voted against UOPWA union representation, and 609 
were in favor. 
476
 Fitzpatrick 385 
477
 See McColloch ‘83, p 68-70 
 127 
generous terms; the ability to talk to your employer as person to person; 
finally, the ace in the pack, the bonus.478 
 
Fitzpatrick also found those workers who were with the same firm for a long time 
had less propensity towards unionization than those workers who were forced to move 
from firm-to-firm because of recessions or other instability. 479  Whether a worker 
previously had positive or negative experiences with unions also was significant. 
Fitzpatrick described the women interviewed as having only a vague idea of what the 
union was about, but if they were supportive, it was out deep conviction. As a whole, he 
thought the women as a group would move with the herd (“because the men told them 
to”) if there was support.480 The feminization of clerical work that had already effected so 
many other industries was most delayed on Wall Street:  
The threat of the woman worker appeared in 1942—as a further' 
challenge in the fading opportunity. Before that time, Wall Street was a 
man's world and it was kept so deliberately. But with the coming of the 
war and the withdrawal of men either for military service or the higher 
paying jobs in the defense plants, Wall Street reached for the only 
employees it could get; they were the women. Previous to this there had 
been a certain conviction amongst the men that their job was a man's 
job; there was a roughness and ruggedness about it that made it 
unsuited to feminine refinement. But since the war, women in large 
numbers have entered the jobs in brokerage houses and, in a significant 
number of cases, have done the job as well as men…An important 
change in attitudes implied in this. It marks the willingness on the part of 
the managers to admit frankly, a conviction that has been in the back of 
many a partner's mind for many years: the conviction that the routine job 
of a clerk is not valuable enough to command a decent wage.' Secondly 
that with the decrease in opportunity, they will have much less trouble if 
women are in the jobs than they would with men. Women are generally 
there only to fill in time between high school and marriage, or to 
supplement a husband's income. They haven't the vital stake in the job 
that a man has. Therefore in these jobs the low rewards and little hope of 
advance, the presence of women will leave a partner's mind much more 
at rest than men would.481 
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Individualism, whether real or masking fear, was a cultural obstacle that was 
expressed with following type of frequent anti-union comments: “anybody who could 
stand on his own two feet has little need for a union; a person who is man enough to talk 
up to the boss is well able to do his own bargaining, he doesn't need Dave Keefe; only 
those who cannot get anything for themselves try to get it through a union.”482 There 
was also the question of maintaining white-collar status and perceptions of middle-class 
privilege: 
A Wall Street clerk has a dignity, a respectability which he apparently is 
supposed, to preserve. Always well dressed, he knows the way men do 
things, presumably. Surely he knows the "Wall Street way" of doing 
things. 
Neatly pressed pants, a tie, clean shirt, he must never do anything to 
make a show of himself. And if ever a union came and called a strike, 
picketing would become a "must,” and that would spoil the impression. 
People would make fun of him. He would be looked upon as the one who 
had stepped down from the lofty level of a Wall Street clerk, to join the 
company and adopt the behavior of ruffians. He could not…walk up and 
down with a picket sign, shout out his cause to the passersby, try to 
persuade his fellows to respect the picket line; he is…much too timid to 
carry on an effective strike. 483 
 
One group of workers that was interested in organizing with the CIO in 1937 
ended up rejecting them and throwing them out of the office after “they made a bad 
impression” by “wearing sweaters under their coats.”484 Keefe believe the main problem 
of the workers was fear: 
They want a union; they need a union. But they are beaten by fear and 
timidity against taking the step toward salvation. All the talk about men 
who can stand on their own feet is just a cloak of words to hide their 
childish submission to employers. If they went into a union, then they 
would be really daring, really aggressive, really standing on their own two 
feet. All the talk about walking up to the boss as a man is just a legend to 
keep the clerks from seeing how they cower before the word of a partner. 
They are, in a word, slaves to an atmosphere and they do not know it.485 
 
Based on this analysis, and remembering the success of the Curb Exchange one 
day strike, Keefe thought using the Seamen for support in another strike could help with 
increased numbers on the picket line, and the worker would also have the fear of being 
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called “yellow” by the Seamen if he or she crossed the picket line. Keefe wanted to use 
the symbolic power of masculinity the Seamen represented—their image and their 
numbers—as a substitute for building a shop-floor organization and a culture of 
solidarity based on the consciousness and conditions of his workplace. Ultimately, Keefe 
and the UFE were unsuccessful in building a “Street wide” union: 
At 8:55 this morning violence broke out in Wall Street. Massed pickets 
from local 205 of the United Financial Employees union, supported by 
members of an AFL seamen’s union, knocked over four policemen at the 
entrance to the stock exchange and lie down on the sidewalk in front of 
the doors. One hundred police officers swarmed up and, in several knots 
of furious club-swinging, 12 people were hurt, 45 seized and arrested. 
The outbreak was over in 30 minutes, but most of the day, 1200 massed 
pickets surrounded the stock exchange building and shouted epithets at 
those who entered the building…486 
 
Having the Seaman at the center of what was supposed to be a show of solidarity 
of a Wall Street wide strike hurt union support among Wall Street workers, and the 
public. The AFL elevator operators on Wall Street also did not support the strike, which 
could have had important leverage to slow operations. Ironically, Keefe, who was so 
aware of the limits of his co-workers fears and individualism, did not realize his own 
fears and individualism may have prevented him from aligning with a union such as the 
UOPWA that may have had a better strategy to win.487 
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Figure 6  
NYT Pictures of UFE Strike 
     
Pictures from the New York Times, March 30, 1948, demonstrate the militancy of the 
picket lines.488 
 
Figure 7 
Police Violence Against UFE Picket Line in front on Wall Street 
     
On the second day of the UFE, AFL strike, police attempt to break the picket line on 11 
Wall Street. March 30, 1948.489 
 
 The strike loss was devastating for efforts to organize banking workers, and 
actively used by management to discourage workers from unionizing. Documents on the 
UFE’s attempt to organize workers at the Guaranty Trust Company, a bank, 
demonstrated the company held a rigorous anti-union campaign which the union could 
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not overcome, resulting in a union loss in an election for 2,599 bank workers on 
November 28, 1951.490 The archives contain many letters to the workers from company 
Vice President HP Sherman, evidence of captive-audience meetings, and possible 
evidence that O’Keefe offered the company a sweetheart back-door deal for instant 
recognition since his efforts with the workers were failing and the UFE was running low 
on funds. Saved for distribution two days before the vote, the bank workers received a 
letter along with media demonstrating the devastating loss the UFE faced on Wall Street 
(See Figure 8 below). Only 503 workers voted for union recognition, while 1,955 voted 
against it. The high voter turn-out demonstrated how active of a role the bank 
management took in union avoidance among the clerical workers at its main office and 
branches.491 
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Figure 8 
Anti-union letter used against UFE bank worker organizing drive 
 
Source: Xavier Labor School Archives, Fordham University 
After the failure of the UFE, and with the communists driven out the CIO, what 
was left of the former UOPWA union that remained in the CIO was merged with the 
OEIU shortly after the AFL and CIO merger in 1955. Not long after, the newly united 
federation had a conference on the white-collar worker.492  Most  of  the speeches  
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discussed organizing white  collars  within production industries, although Stanley H. 
Ruttenberg, AFL-CIO Director of Research, mentions the bank clerk and financial 
institutions in passing: “during years past, the teller at the local bank was often 
considered a person to whom the manual worker paid deference,” but it was the bank 
clerk now who could not afford a home in the suburbs. He cited wages of the average 
production worker and compared them to those in finance, insurance and real estate, 
finding production workers earned more, especially more than women, even if the 
managers, owners, and top commission sales agents in the financial sector were 
included. 493  While the Industrial Union Department’s unions focused on their own 
jurisdictions, leaving the OEIU the financial sector, the OEIU controversially focused on 
its outmoded idea of an all white-collar union and the right to organize in other unions’ 
jurisdictions. Delegate Al Kadlin from the OEIU stressed the need to prevent job 
replacement by automation, and argued that although some white collar workers should 
be organized by industrial unions, white collar workers’ conditions are unique: not all 
clerks should be organized by them, and certainly not with “manual-worker tactics and 
manual–worker contracts.”494 Delegate John Pastin from the steel workers responded: 
“we have jurisdiction in the steel industry and we have confined our organization to the 
steel industry…You just can’t organize people in a vacuum.” He went on to defend his 
union for bringing white collar wages up to those of production workers. 495  (See 
Appendix 6 OEIU vs the Production unions on the white-collar organizing issues) 
James B. Carey, Secretary-Treasurer of  the AFL-CIO’s IUD recognized 
organized labor’s historical failures: “Old-time unionism [of seventy or even fifty years 
ago] just failed to organize white-collar workers. Furthermore, it didn’t want them 
organized…especially in production unions.”496 He notes there were few white-collars in 
the Knights of Labor out of its 700,000 members, and that the AFL maintained the same 
attitude towards white-collar workers for years later. He also criticized the Industrial 
Workers of the World, saying “even those who believed in one big union for all didn’t 
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define unionism to include white-collar and professional workers. All referred to 
manufacturing workers, to workers in foundries, to miners, to those in the established 
crafts.” He explains why there was “this indifference—even opposition—to” organizing 
white-collar workers:  
It was distrust, distrust not only on the part of union leaders but on the 
part also, no doubt of the majority of the rank and file. / First of all, went 
the argument, white-collar workers were not really workers. They didn’t 
labor with their hands or their brawn. Therefore, they had little or nothing 
in common with factory and mill workers. The interests of white collar 
workers, the complaint continued, were invariably on the side of the 
bosses. They couldn’t be relied on in times of crisis. White-collar workers 
couldn’t be tough; they couldn’t be militant. Even if you got them out on a 
picket line they would be worse than useless. / In those days one almost 
never saw reference to the working class in print. Yet before the turn of 
the century, American newspapers spoke constantly of the working class 
and talked of working class solidarity. They talked of working class 
militancy. It was a term of pride denoting toughness, cohesion, and a 
common bond of brotherhood unknown to other sections of society. / 
From this working  class brotherhood white-collar employees were 
theoretically and practically excluded. The working class was going to 
change the world and it didn’t want the changes loused up by wishy-
washy white-collar people, clerks and such. It was a class conscious 
labor movement that the AFL founded seventy years ago this month.  
Even if there weren’t other evidence, we know it from the famous 
preamble of the AFL Constitution. Remember these opening words: ‘A 
Struggle is going on in all the nations of the civilized world between the 
oppressors and the oppressed of all countries, a struggle between the 
capitalists and the laborers which grows in intensity from year to year.’ / 
In that struggle between the capitalist and the laborer, most union 
leaders saw no room for the white-collar worker. Or if the white-collar 
worker did have a role it was to be considered on the side of the 
employer and capitalist. Therefore, the white-collar worker was almost a 
class enemy to begin with. The class consciousness of the American 
labor movement never produced a revolution, as we know, but ironically 
a revolution did occur in the thinking and attitudes of the labor movement 
toward white-collar workers. The revolution was a gradual one, caused 
by the gradual revolution in our economy and in our means of 
production.497 
 
He then goes on to refer to some of the statistics Stan Ruttenberg described of 
the new white-collar majority, and then notes: “There is irony in the fact that the once 
disdained white-collar workers are increasing rapidly while the aristocrats of labor who 
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once disdained them, the production workers, are decreasing in number.”498  James 
Carey unfortunately ignored the inspiring example of the UOPWA’s effective organizing 
of white-collar workers—specifically women—who demonstrated in struggle their 
capacity to be tough, militant and useful on the picket-lines in the clerical worker 
industries.499 
The leaders seemed to lack concrete plans for organizing compared to the 
articulate leaders and organizers of the UOPWA,; they almost completely neglected 
financial sector workers, and made little reference to gender, or at least in any way that 
would be conducive to respecting and organizing women. For example, William F 
Schnitzler, Secretary-Treasurer of the AFL-CIO said  
the traditional hand bill at the plant gates does not click when given out at 
the office door. Why? Well, maybe insofar as the average girl in an office 
is concerned, it’s because she isn’t headed homeward, like the factory 
worker. She’s headed for a date. Her day hasn’t ended with the 5 o’clock; 
rather it’s just beginning. Maybe—and I say this with the certainty of a 
man long married—we just don’t understand a woman’s mind. Maybe we 
need, in our ranks of organizers, more women—women with office 
experience; women who understand the grievances of the typist; 
women who understand women.500 
 
Another leader commented “certainly we could go on for hours talking about what 
we think the ladies want. But—and again I speak as a married man—we’d just be 
wasting our time guessing.”501 They did note the need for house visits and closer contact 
with workers to organize banks, but despite this awareness of their shortcomings, they 
did little if nothing to support women’s movements, even with the later explosion of 
feminist organizing. 
Dorothy Sue Cobble found that the relation between female clerical workers and 
unions has always been problematic. For much of the twentieth century, “union leaders 
viewed female clerical workers as ‘virtually unorganizable.’ In many instances, their 
views were accurate. Not only did office workers tend to see themselves as ‘white-collar’ 
                                                 
498
 AFL-CIO 22 
499
 On Detroit picket-line, for example, a black women and a white woman in the UOPWA local leadership 
were arrested and subjected to police violence for militantly holding a picket line and preventing scabs 
from crossing: Jones, Issac, “Violence Flares on Picket Line of Insurance Company, “Atlantic Daily World 
(1932-2003), Jan 12, 1949, ProQuest Historical Newspapers Atlantic Daily World: 1931:2003, p 5. 
500
 AFL-CIO 43 
501
 AFL-CIO 43 
 136 
or part of ‘management,’ but the occupation attracted a disproportionate number of 
married women, many of whom defined themselves as short-term and ‘secondary 
earners’ regardless of their income or length of tenure.”502Indeed, Lockwood noted that 
the lowest paid clerks in the period from 1850 to 1880 in Great Britain had salaries 
equivalent to the highest (10-15%) paid members of the working class, plus with better 
conditions. These circumstances were probably similar in the US, where Braverman 
estimates the pay of US clerical workers was double that of manufacturing workers. By 
1971, all clericals made less than all blue collar workers on average.503 During a period 
when blue-collar workers were significantly unionized and enjoyed higher wages as a 
result, Cobble does not discuss the OEIU, UOPWA, or the OPEIU in her otherwise 
thorough research on women in the labor movement. She skips this rich history to 
discuss the 1960s, when even though government, hospital, hotel, and university “white-
collar” workers were organizing, “many labor leaders remained skeptical about the 
potential among private sector office workers.” 504  Labor leaders believed “many 
secretaries had strong personal loyalties to their bosses; moreover, the hostility to 
unions in insurance and banking—where close to a third of clerical work was 
concentrated—was legendary.” 505  Since the unions made little effort to capture the 
energy of the feminist movement and organize these workers, some women “organized 
largely apart from the labor movement, forming their own independent clerical worker 
associations.”506 Over a dozen of these organizations with over 10,000 members in all 
joined together in the National Association of Working Women in the 1960s. They not 
only fought for job control and higher wages, but challenged the expectations associated 
with being the “office wife,” and challenged rules requiring them to wear dresses. They 
were quite successful, but found little union support for their efforts to organize clerical 
workers. Karen Nussbaum, a leader from 9to5 recalls attempting to get union support: 
                                                 
502
 Cobble 211 
503
 Braverman 296 ct Lockwood 6 
504
 Cobble 212 
505
 Cobble 212 
506
 Cobble 212; See also McColloch ’83, p 148-151 for a review of union efforts in 1960s, where he cites 
fierce banker resistance to unionization and a lack of AFL-CIO investment in the organizing as the key 
contributors to failed organizing campaigns. 
 137 
One of the group went to the local Teamsters. She was told, “well you 
can’t organize women workers because they think with their cunts, not 
their brains.” Not everyone was as bad, but everyone said no. [Years 
later, in the late 1970s, SEIU] offered us money—practically nothing, but 
money—and a charter, and a chance to organize workers. So we started 
our own union [SEIU District 925].507 
 
This organization was then able to support eight women bank tellers who went on 
strike after being repeatedly passed over for promotions. The bank president’s 
explanation was, “we are not all equal, you know.” 508  The women gained national 
attention in 1981, and SEIU District 925 tried to start “a national campaign to organize 
women clericals in insurance and banking.”509 
 Unfortunately, there have been few significant developments since, but in light of 
how low the unionization rates are, any worker effort and union investment is 
commendable. In 1979, demonstrating the potential of labor and feminist movement 
alliances, 53 insurance workers from a firm connected to a teachers’ trust fund in 
Wisconsin struck against low wages and poor conditions like management and sexual 
harassment. What was exceptional about this group of workers was the previous contact 
and experiences with unions, according to Cynthia B. Costello.510 By this time, 80% of 
clerical workers were women, and “35% of all employed women were working in clerical 
jobs.”511 The first legal bank strike in Canada also occurred in 1979. About 950 OPEIU 
members struck the Montreal City and District Savings Bank for two days, but it was 
able to keep about 60% of its 112 branches open for customers. Nevertheless, 11% 
wage gains were won.512In the banking industry, 180,000 teller jobs were lost between 
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1983 and 1993 to ATM’s,513 and to make things worse, Bank of America tried to get 
employees to adopt an ATM, which meant cleaning without pay outside of their regular 
workday. 514  In 2011, over a thousand Allstate Insurance Agents affiliated with the 
OPEIU, with the purpose of asserting contractor rather than employee rights, but it has 
not expanded significantly beyond its base in the non-profit insurance company 
BlueCross/BlueShield.515 OPEIU had disputes with a large bargaining unit of insurance 
workers in Madison, WI, gained new real estate members, and credit unions, three of 
which went on a ten day strike in Western New York in 2008.516 Most of the credit unions 
OPEIU represents have union stakeholders that facilitated the process, but the limited 
significance of credit unions in banking, especially those with union stakeholders, does 
not make this a viable long-term strategy for organizing bank workers. In banking, it had 
the most members in NY and NJ, and was involved in legal dispute when National Bank, 
the only union bank in Washington, DC, was taken over by the FDIC and all employees 
lost their jobs.517 This bank was originally owned by the United Mine Workers Union, and 
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most other banks represented by OPEIU had some type of union investment in the 
ownership that facilitated unionization without seriously confronting financial capital. 
Even then, at its most successful moment during the height of the feminist, anti-war, and 
student movements between 1968 and 1972, it only organized eleven banks in a ten 
year period.518 Without the competition of the CIO and its anti-communist fervor, along 
with an outdated all-encompassing white-collar strategy for unionization, the OPEIU 
remains scattered and offers little hope for FIRE sector workers: 
OPEIU represents white collar professionals working in many diverse 
fields. Their members include computer analysts and programmers, 
data entry operators, copywriters, nurses, healthcare certified and 
licensed employees, doctors, attorneys, hypnotherapists, models, 
artists, museum curators, law enforcement officers, accountants, 
engineers, secretaries, bank employees, insurance workers and 
agents, and Wall Street employees, among others. OPEIU has 115 
chartered local unions in the U.S., and 55 in Canada. OPEIU is 
affiliated with the AFL-CIO and the Canadian Labour Congress.519 
 
There are perhaps around only thirty commercial banks and six savings and 
loans associations unionized in the US. Other unions, such as AFSCME, UFCW, UAW, 
Teamsters and independent associations, have a few FIRE sector workers as well, and 
a much longer list of other unions have also attempted and failed at union recognition 
efforts within the FIRE sector.520 UNI Finance has gotten 35 global financial companies 
to commit to the UN Global Compact in respect to “freedom of association and the 
effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining,” but in the absence of US 
workers confronting US financial capital, not one of these companies is from the US.521 
The Brazilian CONTRAF and CWA collaboration with UNI through the Committee for 
Better Banks is the only recent, publicly visible campaign to improve the conditions of 
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bank workers.522 UNITE HERE Local 5’s support for the campaign stands as a unique 
example of how other unions can support the effort to unionize and improve conditions 
of bank workers. An executive in a company that Local 5 was organizing also directs a 
state-wide banker lobbying group, creating a natural link for strategic solidarity between 
workers of different unions and industries. Local 5 discovered that while the banks in 
Hawaii were supporting a food drive, they were paying their own workers less than a 
living wage in a state that has perhaps the highest cost of living in the US. The union 
denounced the outrageous salaries of the bankers when tellers in the same banks 
qualify for public assistance, meaning taxpayers subsidize the banks’ profits (See Figure 
9, below).523 
 
Figure 9 
UNITE HERE Local 5 Supports Bank Workers 
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compared to workers abroad has gained significant press coverage, and worker engagement through 
surveys. For more on these recent efforts, see Stephen Lerner, Hina Sheikh, and Rita Berlofa’s 
forthcoming chapter in a book on financialization of the economy. 
523
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It remains to be seen if the CIO-style organizing that the UOPWA was developing 
in the FIRE sector will be restored to put worker organizing committees at the center of 
fights to reform the industry. Organizing to directly take on the bosses within the FIRE 
sector can allow “new and more militant…types of leaders to emerge,” the kind 
necessary to transform an industry.524 Without such militant organizing and the building 
of a labor party that can repeal Taft-Hartley and improve the labor legal regulatory 
framework in the US, increasing union density in the FIRE sector will remain difficult. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Conclusion 
 
Particular features of the development of US capitalism, including both the 
decentralized nature of the financial sector and the power of the US financial capitalists 
domestically and internationally, have left the US without a public financial sector or a 
regulatory environment conducive to labor organizing. The US labor movement, due to 
these external challenges and its own internal weaknesses, has missed many 
opportunities, both in times of crisis and in times of economic growth, to organize 
financial sector workers. It is possible that without the regulatory restrictions on banking 
discussed in the beginning of chapter three that the development of the financial sector 
would have occurred in a manner that would have caused the AFL to take more 
engaged approaches with its workers. Chapter three also noted that both Germany and 
England had a more stable financial structure earlier than the US, and this coincided 
with earlier union organization and higher union density in both countries. France and 
Brazil did not have as stable of a financial structure, but did experience early 
developments of government bureaucracy and civil servant unionism, and in particular, a 
public banking sector in Brazil.525 Unionization overall, and especially of office workers, 
is also  highest in the public sector in the US, suggesting a nationalized financial sector, 
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or even increased public institutions, probably would have resulted in higher rates of 
unionization than the current 1%.  
It is also possible that organizational efforts of bank workers to come later by the 
UOPWA-CIO could have been easier if, rather than unit banks, the UOPWA confronted 
nationally branched firms, resembling some of the insurance companies it organized 
with more success. In the largest companies within a concentrated and consolidated 
manufacturing industry, the CIO especially had success. If the new regulatory framework 
for bankers is truly more efficient than what bankers knew in the previous two centuries, 
this is one less reason for the industry to be able to claim it cannot afford the costs of a 
unionized workforce with excellent pay and benefits. 
In aligning with the interests of the workers and yeoman farmers and workers 
aspiring to property ownership within the framework of the producer class, the early 
labor movements inadvertently contributed to the creation of the dual banking system, 
which created a high level of bank fragmentation. Such fragmentation would make 
banks difficult to organize using methods the CIO applied to other industries at its high 
point in the 1940s. The UOPWA, for example, was able to organize Prudential 
Insurance agents primarily in and around New York City, and then win national 
bargaining rights. The structure of the banking industry would have made this impossible 
for nearly 200 years of the US’s history (despite consolidation in periods such as the 
1920s), not changing until the banking deregulations of the 1980s and 1990s. However, 
even as capital organized on a more national scale in the late 1800s, labor struggles 
took on a local and regional character. Banks still would not be an obvious target for 
organizing because the highly competitive banking industry promoted smaller firms, 
which offered a closer proximity of the banker and the bank worker, creating both 
perceived mobility and actual opportunities for promotion. Furthermore, banks in the US 
had a high failure rate as result of more banking panics, a product of “the lack of asset 
diversification under unit banking, as well as the difficulty of coordinating large numbers 
of banks to deal with collective problems” the industry faced.526 Such an environment 
created employee turnover rates that hindered union organizing, especially since the 
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craft unionism model of the AFL was dominant in the late 1800s. Although the South 
experienced more branch banking than the North, perhaps due to Scottish merchants 
who pioneered the branch banking model, labor unions have historically had little power 
in the South. 
The AFL organized on a craft basis even as “rapid technological changes and 
mechanization of steel, food processing, machine production, and other major industries 
increased overall per capita productivity and broke down remaining craft skills.”527 It also 
failed to advocate for Black workers, encouraging separate Black locals, with Black 
workers making up only 3% of its members even by 1920. During this period the 
Populist Party continued the program of the Greenback-Labor party, and although it 
sought solidarity with the labor movement and won participation from some AFL locals, it 
remained mainly a rural based party. But local labor struggles of the 1880s and 1890s 
tried to continue reconstruction efforts, which “culminat[ed] in the Farmers’ Alliance and 
the People’s party, the most extraordinary democratic popular uprising of the late 
nineteenth century.”528 These movements ultimately did not create a labor party, leaving 
the US without a labor regulatory framework conducive to organizing during a period 
when bank worker unionization accelerated in many countries.529 
Despite the Sherman Anti-Trust Law of 1890, corporations continued to centralize 
control of industry, especially during upswings in the business cycle. Despite steps to 
strengthen enforcement, “the period from 1915 witnessed unprecedented activity both in 
mergers and in the centralization of control over apparently unrelated businesses 
through interlocking directorates and bank controls.”530 Whatever “personal responsibility 
for steadiness of employment, wages, and working conditions” industrial capitalists felt 
or were compelled to feel through previous movements of local unionism’s access to 
management was destroyed by “the centralization of financial control and operating 
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policy in the hands of financial magnates far from the job.”531 According to one author, it 
was specifically this increased control that made labor’s organization of workers more 
challenging: 
There can be little doubt that in the manufacturing field the consolidations 
reinforced resistance to unions and made unsuccessful most of labor’s 
efforts to organize the industry. The large influence of bankers on the 
directorates of important mergers unquestionably intensified hostility to 
unions. Bankers as a class have had less understanding of unions and 
less sympathy for them than industrialists. Bitter as the opposition of a 
large number of industrialists to unions has been, there have been many 
whose attitude was sympathetic and who modified the intolerance of their 
group. This has been true of very few bankers.532 
 
Given this attitude towards interests they controlled, one can imagine how much 
more challenging to organize the workers in their own industry. 533  The US labor 
movement has experienced difficulties in organizing its white collar sector—especially in 
the FIRE sector—but even within that sector, the banking industry efforts have faced 
unique challenges. Indeed, historical evidence throughout this text, and even recent 
efforts of unionization, demonstrate the banker as a class may be even more pre-
emptive and aggressive in union avoidance than other sectors that are by no means 
easy to unionize in the US. 
Years of Jeffersonian political and labor union traditions based on creating a 
democratic republic of skilled male workers created a union leadership ideologically 
unprepared for the erosion of skilled workers privileges and job control in the end of the 
19th century. Some unions outright excluded financial sector workers, and others simply 
ignored them, a product of populist leadership seeking to make an enemy of financial 
capitalism out of nostalgia for a capitalism that supposedly facilitated self-management, 
independence, and upward mobility. Clerical work greatly expanded, in particular among 
women previously excluded from much of the workforce, especially in the skilled 
unionized positions that formed the basis of the labor aristocracy. Suffering defeats such 
as the Homestead Strike, insecurity from economic downturns, and increasing job loss 
and deskilling from automation, unions were unequipped and often not interested in this 
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new workforce. Patriarchy and Victorian ideals of women inhibited union leaders from 
organizing women, and effectively divided working class unity, as did white supremacy 
and racism as well. One exception was the organization of railway clerks, who were all 
male and all white, already an anomaly at the end of the 19th century when women 
increasingly dominated clerical work. The railway clerks also benefitted from having a 
union leadership that wanted to include them, unlike some production union who signed 
clauses to exclude office workers or horse-traded them for other contract gains until as 
late as 1961.(See Appendix 6) 
Like the railroad sector, the financial sector also experienced the influx of female 
workers later than other industries, but there was nothing like the Railroad Brotherhood 
in the financial sector. Craft union traditions did not have strategic industrial organizing 
strategies that sought to increase unionization among expanding industries and 
occupations. Labor leaders disconnected from the feminist movements and influenced 
by Victorian era ideas of segregated gendered space and the defense of the family 
wage were not prepared to organize a newly and highly feminized workforce. The 
strength of craft unions with predominantly male clerical workers like the Railroad 
Brotherhood did not have to question their status through maintaining such exclusivity, 
and were able to focus on organizing rather than worry about being replaced by women, 
at least for a period longer than what occurred in other industries. Given that the 
exceptional example of the Railroad workers was based on exclusion, it likewise did not 
directly lead to increasing unionization of clerical worker in other sectors, but existed 
more as an anomaly from the past from the perspective of labor market trends. In fact, 
the Railroad Brotherhood was eventually susceptible to the feminization of its clerical 
staff, and the union was weakened as a result since it was also lacking a leadership 
perspective based on gender equality, racial inclusion, and worker solidarity.534 Although 
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the defeat of the UOPWA during the cold war marked the largest setback in almost thirty 
years of developing financial sector unionism in the US, the first major lost opportunity 
for creating financial sector unionism was at the turn of the 19th century when clerical 
work grew dramatically, but without clerical worker unionization. 
The banker-bank clerk proximity and mobility inhibited bank worker organization 
for years, even after such mobility declined. Reformist labor leader attitudes regarding 
gender and the potential for workers to organize in the clerical industries may have 
alienated bank workers. When labor leaders did attempt to organize in the FIRE sector, 
they faced the challenge of a workforce segmented not only by gender, but filled with 
ethnic divisions formed by distinctive communities often divided in their political 
perspectives. Communists who had the foresight to organize FIRE sector workers 
succumbed to popular front politics, and failed to build a labor party at a moment it was 
most possible in the US, softening the labor movement’s political power and opening the 
door for the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act.535 Having tried to limit strikes and control 
the continuing upsurge of working-class shop floor militancy and strikes during WWII, 
Communists lost some of the support and respect from elements of the working-class 
who even if they did not agree with the CP’s politics, followed their union leadership.536 
Ultimately, the non-communist affidavit oath required by the Taft-Hartley Act made 
supporting government-persecuted labor leaders untenable for the sustainability of the 
                                                                                                                                                              
labor pool for low-paying machine jobs with no chance of promotions.” (Strom 1994, 198) Railroad men 
express hostility towards women and sometimes harassed them (perhaps because they were used as 
strikebreakers during WWI), but feminization could only be delayed, not stopped: “Particular male unions 
slowed down the pace of feminization and even retained the best positions for men in return for labor 
peace, but once labor shortages occurred or management perceived the hiring of women to be 
economically advantageous and was forced to consider ways of cutting costs, protests of male workers 
were simply ignored.” (Strom 1994, 203) 
535
 See Art Preis, Labor’s Giant Step, Bert Cochran, Labor and Communism,  Charlie Post’s “The Popular 
Front: Rethinking the CP USA’ History,” www.solidarity-us.org/node/2363 from Against the Current 63, 
July-August 1996. The Communist Party under popular front policies ultimately was the biggest defender 
of the US’s imperialist rulers by “declaring their opposition to any and all efforts to hamper the war effort by 
dividing the American people,” breaking from the Leninist tradition of turning imperialist war into class war. 
As a result of trying to police the working class and refusing to wage class war during a period in which 
worker struggles were on the upsurge, the Communist Party rapidly lost its base and ability to build 
financial sector unionism. “Legion Denounced by the Office Union,” New York Times (1923-Current file),  
Sep 10, 1942, ProQuest Historical Newspapers New York Times (1851-2007), p 48. 
536
 See Nelson N. Lichtenstein, Labor’s War at Home: The CIO in World War II (1982); Martin Glaberman, 
Wartime Strikes (1980); and James Green, “Fighting on Two Fronts: Working-Class Militancy in the 
1940’s” Radical America, 9 (July-Aug, 1975), 7-48. 
 149 
union from the perspective of the average union member. Liberal labor leaders in the 
AFL and the CIO took advantage of this tenuous situation the McCarthyists had created, 
and decided to drive the Communists out of their positions once and for all, with the 
leadership of the OEIU the most opportunistic among them. Thus, some of the most 
experienced worker leaders and staff with the vision and capacity to organize the clerical 
industries were permanently driven out of the labor movement. Worse, they were driven 
out at moment when they were rapidly increasing the size of the union, and were making 
significant inroads into the banking sector in some cities. The example of the AFL’s 
relation to the UFE discussed in the previous chapter demonstrates their incapacity to 
build industrial unionism in the FIRE sector, and the OPEIU has proved itself to be just 
as incompetent over the last fifty years. The absence of sustained radical left 
organizations and a labor party has aided the recurrent return of outmoded populist 
solutions; and the more left alternatives fail, the harder they are to resurrect.  
Communists overcame some of these challenges and were increasing 
organization in the sector during the period when women were increasingly becoming 
tellers, but popular front politics that limited confrontation with the capitalist class had 
further entrenched capitalist development with each populist defeat. Today, the position 
has been deskilled, and over 90% of positions are occupied by women. Tellers 
increased substantially until 1980, when ATMs became popular. Even with ATMs and 
now internet banking, the teller and other clerk positions consist of numerous feminized, 
low wage jobs, now often filled by people of color, that have been neglected by the labor 
movement. Despite justified anger towards the financial sector for its role in the 
economic crisis and home loss, returning to populist approaches that equate the banker 
with clerk would be a mistake, as would returning to 19th century anti-corporate reforms 
based on Jeffersonian traditions seeking to reverse the capitalist system to its idealized 
ascendency. Such mistakes must not be repeated if social movements are to increase 
union density in the sector, and the best militant industrial union organizing and socialist 
political traditions must be critically revived. 
The shortcoming of existing studies on white collar workers, or even more 
specifically on clerical and office work, is financial workers are neglected, which is a 
tragedy especially considering their lack of unionization. Many of the major industrial 
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unions have organized the white collar workers within their industry, while government 
workers and teachers have also built strong unions. The OPEIU has filled some gaps 
where other unions with an industrial oriented strategy or craft based strategy have not 
covered, but it has not positioned itself as the financial workers union, unequivocally 
taking on the financial services industry. Mills’ white collar category has met success 
when one considers the strength of public sector unionism in the US since the 
publication of White Collar, and even new categories of professionals, such as interns, 
residents, and doctors in the medical profession are organized. In fact, this limited 
success may be why we do not hear the term white-collar unionism so frequently. Where 
unions had a base, such as in the automobile industry, administrative workers 
increasingly organized. University administrative workers also increasingly organized. 
What was blurred in the actually highly differentiated white-collar category was an 
orientation to the actual clerical industry, the FIRE sector. Given the unionization rates, 
low wages, and conditions, further investigation into the history of FIRE sector 
organization efforts is needed more than ever, along with urgent action to implement 
strategic industrial unionism campaigns to at least quadruple the union density of the 
sector, simply to catch up to the already dismally low average rates of unionization in the 
US. 
In summary, the leading explanation for why the US does not have vibrant 
financial sector unionism compared to other countries varies by time period. Prior to 
1870, the structure of the financial sector was a leading determinant. This was not only a 
question of the scale of development, but the structure of the financial sector being 
fragmented as a result of anti-national bank sentiment and other resistance to 
centralizing tendencies in the financial sector. This fragmented structure was in fact 
partly a result of the victories of popular movements that resisted centralized and 
concentrated power. This created a financial structure that was unstable, but also 
offered proximity between the bank employee and employer, creating opportunities for 
promotion given the importance of trust and relationships in the financial sector. Given 
the development of the labor movement at the time and its anti-bank populist 
beginnings, it is understandable why financial workers were not organized during this 
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period, especially given the difficult conditions dictated by the labor regulatory framework 
of the time. 
From 1870 to 1930, there were radical changes that came with the growth of the 
financial sector, increasing its importance in the economy and total employment, and 
creating a massive increase of clerical workers which included ever growing numbers of 
women entering the workforce. Despite the US experiencing the industrialization and 
increased government bureaucracy that facilitated bank worker organizing in other 
countries during this period, significant union growth in the FIRE sector did not occur in 
the US during this period. The US had little public banking compared to other countries, 
and banking still remained fragmented because of the dual banking system. The labor 
regulatory framework was not as favorable as other countries, which tended to create 
labor parties by this time. Most significantly in this period, there was little self-
organization of the workers, and even less initiative among the trade union  leadership 
to support the self-organization that did occur. The leadership’s lack of initiative was not 
necessarily because of gender discrimination. Although this was an obstacle that limited 
the union leaders, there was a delay in the feminization of the financial sector, meaning 
gender cannot be the only explanation for the leadership’s failure. It is likely that 
prejudice towards organizing clerical workers in general, and financial workers in 
particular, due to populist and producerist ideologies carrying over from the 19th 
century, most inhibited the organization of financial sector workers at the point when 
potential organizing opportunities began to arise. 
The next period, 1930-1947, was the most critical period for establishing financial 
sector unionism, and one wherein major opportunities were lost. While the structure of 
the financial sector still provided obstacles, certain financial products existed that 
facilitated the unionization of insurance workers. An overall climate of unionization 
created opportunities for organizing Wall Street workers. The successful organization of 
some of these workers began to aid the unionization of bank workers, at least in New 
York City, the center of the financial industries. Although the Communist Party had a 
leading vision to organize financial workers, along with other white-collar workers on an 
industrial basis, it lost its base of support through popular front policies that limited 
worker militancy during World War II. CP leaders in the UOPWA made inroads into the 
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banking sector, and even confronted racist hiring practices in the industry. They did not 
fully overcome sexist perceptions that likely inhibited organizing, but they advanced in 
involving women much more so than the trade unionists in the AFL. Because of their 
failure to build a labor party when they had the chance during the social movements of 
the 1930s, again, submitting the independence of the working class to a popular front 
with the Democratic Party, they faced an increasingly difficult regulatory environment as 
judicial decisions in favor of employers began to whittle away the gains won through the 
passage of the NLRA. This process was complete with the passage of the Taft-Hartley 
Act in 1947. With this devastating law, the labor regulatory framework became difficult 
for trade unionists in general, and all but impossible for communists. By 1950, the 
UOPWA was all but destroyed. 
From 1950 to 1990, given the UOPWA’s previous inroads into the financial 
sector, the failure of financial sector unionism growth rests primarily on the poor 
leadership of the OPEIU. They competed aggressively with the UOPWA and did all that 
they could to see that it was destroyed by Taft-Hartley, yet did almost nothing to rebuild 
in the aftermath. Besides choosing some easy organizing targets such as credit unions 
that were given to them through the pension funds of other trade unions, they did 
nothing to build financial sector unionism as the UOPWA had envisioned. While the 
structure of the financial sector was becoming more concentrated, it was still fragmented 
compared to that of other countries. Much of the period provided opportunities 
nonetheless, as staffing levels and bank teller-client proximity still mattered prior to the 
widespread use of ATM machines. The upsurge of the feminist movement in the 1970s 
and feminist efforts to take the movement into the office to inspire clerical worker 
organizing presented new union organizing opportunities. The absence of the OPEIU in 
such movements demonstrates the problem with a union leadership dominated by men 
who do not challenge patriarchy and fail to develop an aggressive program to build 
women’s membership and leadership in the union. 
Since 1990, economic crisis and the loosening of regulation has facilitated the 
concentration and centralization of financial sector firms, but the OPEIU has not taken 
the leadership to organize those workers. Perhaps race and gender differences between 
the entrenched leaders of the OPEIU and the non-union workers in the financial sector 
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is still an issue to be overcome. The absence of the OPEIU in campaigns coordinated by 
UNI, and the need for other unions to fill the vacuum, demonstrates the tragedy of the 
OPEIU’s role in destroying the UOPWA. Despite the UOPWA’s limited inroad into 
financial sector unionization, it remains to be seen if the OPEIU or other unions would 
be willing to be so bold in taking it on. 
A new civil rights movement of workers, similar to what occurred among mostly 
Black and Eastern European industrial workers in the US in the 1930s, is needed for the 
service workers who are the majority of the US labor force today. One measure of its 
success will be the question of the bank worker, and the ability of organized labor to 
build the type of social movement that elevates the dignity and respect of the bank 
worker. This social movement would likely involve building a labor party with a vision of 
not only changing the labor regulatory framework of the US to facilitate union organizing, 
but also to inspire and move the working-class to replace the reign of the capitalist class 
over the financial sector through the creation of a revolutionary workers’ state. Military 
and self-defense strategists sometimes argue there is no such thing as an effective 
defense without combining it with an aggressive offense. From this perspective, it is 
necessary for embattled public sector unions who still have significant resources and 
union density, such as the teachers union, to heavily invest in both a corporate 
campaign against the financial industry, and intensive efforts to unionize its workers. 
Ultimately, government and industry answers to financial capitalists; it is time for the 
reverse—through a revived leadership of left-wing social and political movements with 
workers playing a central role. 
 
Suggestions for Future Research 
 In order to explore questions of financial sector development and unionization, I 
gave an overview of the entire history of the question of financial sector unionization. 
The following includes suggestions for future research that places women, FIRE sector 
workers, and unionization at its center to build upon this initial exploration of the 
question. 
A thorough study on financial sector workers in the 20th century, when there were 
the first efforts towards organization of the bank workers, is necessary. This organization 
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began in AFL locals, primarily those with significant socialist and communist political 
influence. Left-wing labor activists of the period were the first to recognize the need to 
organize the growing white-collar category of workers, and pushed ahead with the 
organization of office workers despite impediments from the AFL officialdom. The early 
organization efforts of these workers, through the lens of gender, needs to be examined 
more closely. Differences culminated with the separation of over a dozen of these AFL 
locals, who formed the United Office and Professional Workers of America, a Congress 
of Industrial Organizations (CIO) affiliate. Led by communists with a vision to build 
industrial unionism in the financial sector, this period was perhaps the most hopeful 
moment for the creation of financial sector unionism. The UOPWA was so threatened by 
McCarthyism after it was destroyed by the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947 that its archives were 
guarded far from the main financial centers it organized, in University of California-Los 
Angeles. Close examination of these archives to tell the complete story of the UOPWA, 
playing close attention to race, ethnicity, gender, and left wing political debates is also 
necessary.537 Their efforts in the FIRE sector should be center of the story given the 
failure to organize the sector since. Perhaps within this work, Finley’s White Collar 
Union: The Story of the OPEIU and Its People should be submitted to rigorous scholarly 
criticism since it leaves out and distorts certain aspects of the OPEIU’s history, 
especially in relation to the UOPWA and its failure to organize FIRE sector workers. 
The next period to be studied brings us to the present. In the last forty years, the 
impact of revolution in the Information, Communication, and Technology (ICT) sector 
has had radical effects on labor productivity. Its effects, along with deregulation, have 
contributed to an explosive growth of the financial services industry, making the workers 
of the industry a crucial part of the labor force and therefore instrumental in any 
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discussion about building a strong labor movement. This study should analyze the 
organization of the financial sector workers in the aftermath of the UOPWA and the 
growth of OPEIU, including efforts outside unions as a result of the influence of the 
feminist movement in the 1970s. The recent history and existing organization of unions 
within the US financial sector could be explored, as well as the practical implications on 
worker’s wages, conditions, and power within the economy. The largest and most recent 
effort by SEIU to organize Santander workers in Boston, though small, is important in 
the context of recent calls for global union solidarity to meet the challenge of current 
economic conditions. Particular attention should be paid to the challenges of 
international organizing between US, Brazil, and Spain’s labor unions, coordinated by 
UNI, along with comparative studies with countries that have strong financial sector 
unionism. 
Another study should examine the history of capital strategies campaigns of US 
unions from the perspective of how this work may be used by unions to gain a foothold 
into the financial sector workforce as an essential part of their advocacy for larger 
financial reforms. Efforts towards public sector banking in the US (See Appendix 2) and 
other alternatives could be explored, as well as discussions around labor’s capital, which 
possibly could be leveraged to advance the interests of the bank worker and the entire 
working-class.538 
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Finally, I propose a future study for unions which explores the significance of the 
financial sector within the service sector and the economy as a whole in the USA. The 
role of the US financial sector in the ongoing economic crisis should be considered. A 
sector analysis could be presented, as well as relevant data on unionization rates, 
membership and strike activity, presented in a comparative manner. US financial 
Service workers demographics data as available should be highlighted. The financial 
sector data within the US could be examined in relation to the global financial market, 
and strategic thinking about international union campaigns. Trade unions could benefit 
from an analysis of what are the most important leverage points within the US economy 
to build working class power and what is the extent of foreign capital penetration in the 
US market, and to what extent US banks are significant in other countries’ markets. This 
could enable us to understand where international solidarity may be useful to potential 
US bank worker organizing, and how a non-union US financial sector may be limiting the 
strength of bank workers internationally. 
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Appendix 1 
US Labor Regulatory Framework Timeline539 
Social regulation affecting the organization of US workers 
Independence to the Great Depression 
Prior to independence, British law governed US employment relations, and continued to 
have influence through the predominance of common law, which is based on court 
cases and precedents rather than executive or legislative branch government decisions 
(statute based law). Reasoning for future decisions is based on past decisions with the 
goal of maintaining consistency where there are similar facts and circumstances. 
1794 Founding of the first permanent US union, The Federal Society of Journeymen 
Cordwainers. Through many strikes they were able to form closed shops in the 
Philadelphia shoe industry. 
1806 Commonwealth vs Pullis, the first use of the judicial branch against US unions, 
convicted the strike leaders as illegal conspirators and bankrupt the union. 
Combinations were considered illegal conspiracies, a defeat for Jeffersonian democracy, 
and a victory for the Federalists who feared the working class. 
In 1828 the first labor party in the US, the Working Men’s Party, was founded in 
Philadelphia to fight for a ten hour work day, free public education, and universal male 
suffrage. It expanded to New York in 1830, but soon died in fraction splits. In 1834 the 
first national trade unions were founded. 
1842 Commonwealth v Hunt, overturns previous case, ruling unions are legal 
organizations and have the right to strike as long as they did not advocate violence or 
illegal activities, or use coercion, as a result of the case of the Boston Bootmakers' strike 
of 1839. This case served as the legal basis for union struggles for almost a hundred 
years, with anti-trust suits and court injunctions used to hamper their activity during this 
period. 
                                                 
539
 I was not able to complete the references for this section because of the strike in IFCH. If the banca 
decides to keep appendix in the final version, I will add the references. 
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1850 Tax requirements and property restriction lifted to achieve almost universal white 
male suffrage, until states began passing literacy requirements to exclude Irish-Catholic 
immigrants in 1855. 
American Civil War and Reconstruction Amendments to the US Constitution 
Chattel slavery of black Americans made illegal in the 13th amendment, the first addition 
to the constitution in 60 years. The north tried to impose reconstruction on the south to 
advance former slaves’ economic and political interests against the old slave owning 
aristocracy, but they were defeated by the organized white terrorism of the KKK and 
other organizations that defended state rights against federal interference, causing 
involuntary servitude to continue in many areas of the South. “Jim Crow” (segregation) 
laws, vagrancy laws, and voting restrictions (poll taxes & literacy tests) were passed to 
limit the full citizen rights of black Americans, and were not overcome until the civil rights 
movements of the 1960s. The 14th amendment of 1868 which was supposed to grant 
civil rights, and the 15th amendment which was supposed to grant voting rights, were 
severely limited with the power of the old South left intact. With the North’s victory, 
industrial monopoly power rose, leading to calls for antitrust reforms. Before and after 
the Civil War, trade unions in both the North and South often excluded black workers. 
1866 Founding of first national federation, the National Labor Union, which died six 
years later. It was against strike activity and favored political action for the 8 hour day, 
and excluded black workers (who then organized their own organization) and Chinese 
Immigrants. 
1869 Knights of Labor founded and reaches its peak in the 1880s before quickly 
declining. It was against socialism and radical politics, and supportive of cooperatives. 
They eventually gave limited support to strikes after pressured by depression and 
militancy from the ranks in the 1870s and 1880s. Women and black workers whether 
skilled or unskilled gained membership, but segregated locals were tolerated in the 
South. Asians were excluded with the organization supporting the Chinese Exclusion 
Act of 1882. 
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1886 Craft unions against the Knights of Labor acceptance of industrial unionism formed 
the American Federation of Labor under the leadership of Samuel Gompers. Anti-
socialist, prevented disputes between unions, advocated for higher wages, formed an 
alliance with the Democrats in 1907, and supported WWI. In 1902, they became the 
main union in Canada to expand, but weakened in the US under much employer hostility 
through open-shop movements in the early 1900s. 
Antitrust suits and injunctions 
Laws were designed to limit anti-competitive, monopoly behavior and unfair business 
practices intended to be used against monopolies, but used by the employers against 
unions. In the 1890 Anti-trust law, the Sherman Act, multi-firm collusion was judged 
more harshly than single firm behavior. However, farmer and labor organizations were 
also subject to prosecution for violation because their organization, strikes, and boycotts 
were seen to interfere with interstate commerce. The Danbury hat maker’s union 
struggle in 1901 lead to Loewe v. Lawlor(1914), which ruled secondary boycotts were an 
illegal restraint on trade under the Sherman Antitrust Act, and held labor leaders liable. 
The unions tried to limit the use of these laws against them by passing the Clayton 
Antitrust Act, but the Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering 1921 Supreme Court case 
still ruled the secondary boycott illegal even with the new language in the Clayton 
Antitrust Act meant to protect labor. The difficulty of sympathy actions, secondary strikes 
and boycotts, have historically and continue to be restricted under US, UK and 
Australian law, unlike many countries where such activity is part of general political 
freedoms. 
1896 Vegelan v Gutner is a famous example of court injunctions being used by the 
employer to stop strikes and boycotts, with the union being accused of interfering with 
employer contracts, resulting in conviction of intentional tort (violation of civil duty to 
others). Even if not criminal, union activity could be hindered within common law tort and 
contractual obligations. This was around the time of major strikes of railroad workers 
(Pullman Strike), steel workers (Homestead Strike), and the struggle for the 8 hour work-
day (Haymarket Riot and the Chicago Martyrs). 
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Dissenting judges made the following types of arguments to defend that labor 
organization was necessary to meet the combination of capital on a level playing field to 
create a fair market: 
One of the eternal conflicts out of which life is made up is that between 
the effort of every man to get the most he can for his services, and that of 
society, disguised under the name of capital, to get his services for the 
least possible return. Combination on the one side is patent and 
powerful. Combination on the other is the necessary and desirable 
counterpart, if the battle is to be carried on in a fair and equal way…If it 
be true that workingmen may combine with a view, among other things, 
to getting as much as they can for their labor, just as capital may 
combine with a view to getting the greatest possible return, it must be 
true that, when combined, they have the same liberty that combined 
capital has, to support their interests by argument, persuasion, and the 
bestowal or refusal of those advantages which they otherwise lawfully 
control. I can remember when many people thought that, apart from 
violence or breach of contract, strikes were wicked, as organized refusals 
to work. I suppose that intelligent economists and legislators have given 
up that notion today. I feel pretty confident that they equally will abandon 
the idea that an organized refusal by workmen of social intercourse with 
a man who shall enter their antagonist's employ is unlawful, if it is 
dissociated from any threat of violence, and is made for the sole object of 
prevailing, if possible, in a contest with their employer about the rate of 
wages. The fact that the immediate object of the act by which the benefit 
to themselves is to be gained is to injure their antagonist does not 
necessarily make it unlawful, any more than when a great house lowers 
the price of goods for the purpose and with the effect of driving a smaller 
antagonist from the business.540 
 
Lochner Era (1905-1937) 
1905 Lochner v New York New York State Law reducing the work day for bakers was 
struck down by the courts, as many legislative efforts of the Progressive Era and Great 
Depression were limited by the judicial branch. The decision was based on the 14th 
amendment rights of due process, which were said to include freedom of contract. They 
ruled the labor law was not about health conditions as the state argued, but about 
regulating employment relations and illegally restricted the individual’s contract rights. 
This era ended in 1937 in the West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish when the Supreme Court 
                                                 
540
Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92 (1896) Dissenting opinion of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. 
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upheld the constitutionality of Washington State implementing minimum wage laws, 
breaking the pattern of court rulings against economic regulation. 
1905 Preceded by the short lived American Labor Union of 1902, and created by the 
Western Mineworkers Federation, the Industrial Workers of the World challenges the 
exclusion of socialist ideas and industrial unionism by the AFL, growing with success 
until repression during and after WWI against leftists due to fear of the Russian 
Revolution. 
1913 Direct election of Senators (17th Amendment) 
1920 After decades of struggle, women won the right to vote with passage of the19th 
amendment to the US constitution.  
1924 Native Americans won the right to vote 
US Modern Labor Law 
1928 Railway Labor Act US federal law to regulate labor relations in the railroad and 
airline industries by mandating bargaining, mediating and arbitration to avoid strikes, 
which had been so big in the railroad industry that federal troops had to be sent in to 
break them (in 1877, and 1894 Pullman strike). Consolidated previous arbitration 
legislation that had failed, and created stronger enforcement by National Mediation 
Board (NMB), used as an alternative to maintaining nationalization after WWI, gained 
consent by negotiation with both unions and employers. More interventionist than NLRA: 
strikes banned for minor disputes (interpretation and application of contract), many 
processes must be exhausted to strike in a major dispute (modification of contract). 
However, when a strike is permitted under the law, unions have more leeway in tactics 
than under the NLRA, such as legal right to secondary and intermittent strikes. Worker 
who lawfully strike cannot be fired or be permanently replaced by temporary workers, 
but workers with less seniority who cross the picket line can keep their new jobs, as well 
as new workers who completed proper training procedures. The NMB defines the craft 
or class for elections, usually company-wide rather than site, and conducts elections 
which requires at least 35% of the unit to sign authorization cards. Employer can agree 
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to card-check certification, otherwise a mail-in ballot vote is typically conducted. Unlike 
the NLRA which gives all legal authority to the NLRB, employees may sue employers 
(for reinstatement, back pay, etc) in federal court for violation of the RLA. 
Current Controversy: It is harder to organize a union under the RLA, hence FedEx 
Ground Express has argued to be covered under the RLA to avoid unionization. The 
company-wide rather than site-by-site organizing requirement makes it hard for unions 
to win an election. In addition, the NLRB recognizes election victory based on a majority 
of the voters, where the RLA, up until last year, required a yes vote from a majority of 
the unit to authorize the union. This reform passed last year and has so far not been 
overturned by the legal efforts of the airline industry trade association. UPS campaigned 
for years to be moved from the NLRA to RLA, and after failing to win, has joined the 
Teamsters union in lobbying for FedEx to be classified under the NLRA even though it 
has more airline centered work. However, FedEx claims it is a fair way to organize, 
giving the evidence the 70% of those covered under the RLA are unionized. 
1932: La Guardia-Norris Act Exempted unions from court injunctions based on antitrust 
laws, and upheld as a total exemption as long as unions were acting in self-interest and 
not combined with non-labor groups in US v Hutcheson (1941). Also banned “yellow-
dog” contracts, which involved an employer as a condition of employment making an 
employee sign a contract agreeing to not join a union.  
Current Controversy: Used in a 2011 dispute between the National Football League and 
Players Association (NFLPA). The NFLPA decertified itself (“Fake suicide” according to 
the owners) during the NFL lockout, and then tried filing an anti-trust lawsuit under the 
Sherman Act. The NFL owners then used LaGuardia-Norris Act to argue against federal 
injunction. A lower court served an injunction against the lockout, but a higher court 
overturned it, ignoring the decertification and interpreting the La Guardia-Norris Act as 
an intent to keep federal courts out of labor disputes, encouraging solution at the 
bargaining table. The National Basketball Association’s union has also decertified itself 
and is following a Sherman anti-trust law strategy, but has not used to stop a lock-out so 
far. The La Guardia-Norris Act could become relevant again if it does, and it could be 
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interpreted by the judges to not prevent them from issuing an injunction against a 
lockout. 
1933 National Industry Recovery Act Guaranteed workers’ right to organize and strike. 
Organizing advanced and a strike wave for union recognition occurred in 1933, with 
company’s also forming unions to impede real unions, resulting in the election process 
to determine the sole bargaining agent. If worker struck over company violation of NIRA 
rights, workers were ordered reinstated by the newly created National Labor Board, but 
not if it was an economic strike, starting the tradition of accepting the legality of 
strikebreakers. Legislative efforts by Wagner to make replacement workers illegal failed 
in 1934, partly because of employer opposition, but also because of the lack of support 
from organizations that were against AFL policies of racial discrimination. 
1935 National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act)Despite employer and government 
opposition, militant waves of recognition strikes by the CIO pushed the passage of a 
new labor statutory framework: a comprehensive federal labor law that protects all forms 
of concerted worker activity, including organizing, collective bargaining and striking, 
excluding the following sectors: federal, state or local government workers, agricultural 
workers, independent contractors, domestic employees, managers and those covered 
under the RLA.  The exclusion of agricultural and domestic workers comes from the 
power of the racist “Jim Crow” South. 
“It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of certain 
substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these 
obstructions when they have occurred encouraging the practice and procedure of 
collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of 
association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, 
for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other 
mutual aid or protection.”  
It prohibits interfering with or discriminating against employees engaged in union activity, 
mandates only one authorized bargaining agent for a bargaining unit, and requires 
employers to bargain in good faith with the union. The National Labor Relations Board is 
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responsible for registering official bargaining agents, either through a card check 
process if the employer agrees, or an election after authorization cards are received. Its 
original intent was for plant wide recognition, favoring the CIO and industrial organizing, 
but after AFL pressured congress, smaller based craft unions were allowed to break up 
bargaining units. The NLRB is also in charge of enforcement of the law, and prosecution 
of violations.  
Hundreds of bills were introduced to overturn or amend this law since it was seen by 
employers as too pro-worker, but none were successful until the Taft-Hartley Act of 
1947. As unions have declined for various reasons, including Taft-Hartley and weak 
enforcement and penalties for violations, efforts to make the act stronger have also 
repeatedly failed. 
1937 National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation Court ruled 
in favor of the NLRB that the NLRA is constitutional, ending court injunctions against 
New Deal measures, increasing the power of congress. NLRB had ordered Laughlin 
Steel to rehire ten workers fired for organizing, which the company tried to fight by 
claiming the NLRA was unconstitutional, as many employers had been doing since the 
implementation of the law. Justification for this new government role came through 
congresses rights to legislate over matters involving interstate commerce. 
1938 NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co 
(Permanent Replacement Workers and the undermining of NLRA right to strike) 
The Supreme Court ruled that strikers are still employees, but replacement worker may 
be hired and continue working at the end of the strike. Returning strikers can be forced 
to wait until positions open up since the replacement workers can be permanent. Cases 
in the 60s ruled that super-seniority can’t be given to permanent replacements, and only 
temporary workers can be used in lockouts. A “gentlemen’s agreement” for labor peace 
existed in the 1930s through the late 60s to avoid permanent replacement, but the use 
of permanent replacement worker became more and more common, made most famous 
by Reagan’s permanent replacement of the striking air traffic controllers in 1981. Since 
then employers threatening to use strikebreakers is very common, and actual use has 
increased as well. This has forced unions to be more innovative through methods such 
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as strategic corporate campaigning, or the comprehensive campaign. In 1994 a bill 
(Workplace Fairness Act) to ban permanent replacement worker passed the house but 
was killed in the Senate. The following year Clinton created an executive order that 
federal contracts would not be given to companies that use permanent replacement 
workers, but it was overturned in the courts. The contradiction of an employer not being 
allowed to fire a worker for protected union activity, but being allowed to hire permanent 
replacement workers, continues today as a remnant of the Lochner era despite criticism 
from the ILO and Human Rights Watch. 
1938 Fair Labor Standards Act (Wage and Hours Bill)Applying to any business involved 
with interstate commerce, established a national minimum wage, time and a half pay for 
overtime, prohibitions of child labor. The 1946 Supreme Court case Anderson v Mt 
Clemens Pottery Company defined the working time as any activity benefiting the 
company, requiring pay for some work preparations that were being conducted off the 
clock, and put burden of proof regarding wage and hour violations on the employer, who 
would be expected to keep records. Clarifications on work-time added in 1947 Portal-to-
Portal amendment. Amendments made several times to raise wages, including in 1961 
granting national minimum wage rights to more  workers, but limiting the interstate 
commerce business definition to those with over $500,000 a year in revenue. The Equal 
Pay Act of 1963 was an “Equal Pay for Equal Work” amendment passed to prevent sex 
discrimination in wages, allowing for difference based on merit or seniority. A 1966 
amendment expanded coverage to farmworkers, state and local government workers. 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) of 1967 prevented discrimination of 
workers over 40 in workplaces with at least twenty workers. A 1974 amendment 
expanded coverage to more government workers, domestic workers and increased the 
minimum wage. The 1977 amendment increased wages to $3.35/hr, but also began to 
distinguish tipped and un-tipped employees, as well as weakening overtime pay rights 
for the hotel sector. 1985 amendment allowed payment in comp time instead of overtime 
pay for government workers, and changed language to make sure volunteer activities 
were not restricted. 1986 amendment repealed 8 hour overtime pay requirements for all 
federal contractors. 1989 amendment raised minimum wage to $4.25, but allowed 85% 
pay for 90 days of training. The Small Business Protection act of 1996 raised the 
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minimum wage to $5.15, but froze tipped workers at $2.13 rather than requiring 50%, 
leaving it to states to set tipped worker wage regulations. In a 2004 amendment, Bush 
ended overtime pay for supervisors. Minimum wage was raised to $7.15 in 2007, and 
nursing mothers received the right for the break time and space to express milk. Many 
states have minimum wages higher than the federal level, and many communities have 
living wage ordinances as a result of community and union coalitions. 
1940 Apex Hoisery v Leader Supreme court overturned lower courts award of triple 
punitive damage to company for the union’s violation of the Sherman Anti-trust act. The 
court ruled even though the sit-down strike was illegal and unions can be subject to anti-
trust action, there was no violation in this case and the lower court had gone beyond the 
intent of the anti-trust law. 
1941 Fair Employment Act Prior to this law, at-will employment, based on common law, 
meant employee or employer could terminate the employment relationship for any time 
at any reason. This prohibited racial discrimination in the national defense industry, 
federal employers and all private contractors. 1948 Executive Order banned segregation 
in the military. Court cases involving railroad worker unions racially discriminating 
members also established the concept of the union’s duty of fair representation in both 
the RLA and NLRA. 
Post-War II 
Employment Act of 1946is the watered down result of efforts to implement Keynesian 
type full employment measures into the economy, limited by business opposition. Rather 
than a comprehensive set of guidelines and regulations to ensure full employment and 
control inflation, the executive branch is only required to publish the Economic Report of 
the President, and is encouraged to “promote maximum employment, production, and 
purchasing power.” 
1947 Taft-Hartley Act (Labor Management and Relations Act)An amendment to the 
NLRA called the “slave-labor bill” by labor leaders that was passed by congress over the 
veto of President Truman. It provided new restrictions on unions and gave more power 
to employers. 5 million workers had participated in strikes in 1946, the year following the 
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end of WWII, and they were on average four times longer than war-time strike. 
Employers mobilized behind the Taft-Hartley measures, and worked to drive radicals out 
of the labor movement. Where the NLRA created employer unfair labor practices, Taft-
Hartley created union unfair labor practices. Secondary boycotts were banned, as well 
as jurisdictional, wildcat, solidarity and political strikes, mass picketing, closed shops 
(have to hire union members) and union donations to political campaigns. Union shops 
(30 days to join) were restricted, states were granted the right to pass “right-to-work 
laws” that outlawed union shops (union security clauses), union officers had to sign non-
communist affidavits (not valid today), and the executive branch of the federal 
government was granted to right to strikebreaking injunctions if a threat to national 
health and safety is involved. Employers can request hearings over disputed issues to 
delay union certification, and a process of decertification was created. So a company 
could hire permanent replacement workers during a strike and then have them decertify 
the union. Unions have to provide employer and mediation board 60 days notice before 
engaging in any strikes or other actions in pursuit of  a new contract. Bans supervisors’ 
rights to unionize and allows firing of supervisors for union activity, makes it challenging 
for professionals and non-professionals to be in the same union, and grants employers 
rights to oppose the union. Federal court district language intended to enable liability 
claims in illegal strikes through federal courts (right for employer to sue unions for 
sympathy strikes for example), but has been the basis for setting up arbitration 
procedures rather than litigation. Set standards on using employer funds for employee 
benefits such as health and pension plans. 
Unions continued to support the Democrats even though they voted for it along with 
Republicans, and backed President Truman for re-election even though he used Taft-
Hartley against the unions. Attempts to repeal parts of Taft-Hartley during the Carter and 
Clinton years failed. 
Arizona, Mississippi, Florida, Arkansas, and Oklahoma have right-to-work laws in their 
state constitutions, and 17 other states having legislated right-to-work statutes, including 
the entire Deep South (the 7 original confederate states). 
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1959 Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act Created further government 
interference of unions including federal monitoring of internal elections of officers, 
standards for disciplinary procedures, and fiduciary standards. Secret ballot elections 
required, communists and convicted felons banned from holding office, unions required 
to submit annual financial reports, and limits trusteeship powers. Members’ free speech 
protected, and standards set for expulsions. Striking working also allowed to vote in 
decertification elections within one year of the start of a strike. LMRDA applies to 
workers covered by the RLA and NLRA, but not public sector workers. Also amended 
Taft-Hartley to place further restrictions on secondary boycotts, banning “hot cargo” 
strikes, when employees work but refuse to handle goods from struck companies. Also 
banned was recognitional picketing at a location more than 30 days without filing for a 
recognition election with NLRB. 
Civil Rights Movement 
The Civil Rights Act of 1957 and 1960 protected and expanding voting right.  The Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 banned discrimination in hiring and promotion in the workplace, and 
created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission for enforcement. Employers of 
less than 15 and nonprofit private membership organizations were excluded. It 
specifically states that discrimination against Communists or front organizations is 
allowed. It also had all sorts of provisions to end discrimination of consumers, 
desegregate the South, strengthen voting rights, and weaken the power of 
segregationist judges. A 1965 Executive Order banned discrimination in the construction 
industry by any employer working on government contracts, and required affirmative 
action hiring of minorities and women. The Civil Rights Act of 1968 prevented 
discrimination in housing, adding gender in 1974, pregnancy in 1981, and disabilities 
protection in 1988, as well as rights for families with children. Sexual orientation and 
marital status protections added in some state level legislation. The Age Discrimination 
Act passed in 1967 to protect those over 40, and the Immigration Reform and Control 
Act prohibits certain discrimination based on immigration status (also required I-9s). The 
American Disabilities Act of 1990 protects the rights of the disabled on the job, both 
allowing and not allowing different forms of discrimination; defends workers’ right to do 
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job with “reasonable accommodation” to known physical or mental limitations. Civil 
Rights Act of 1991 passed to help address enforcement of previous acts, where courts 
were not ruling awards in discrimination cases. There are four laws related to federal 
contracts and preventing discrimination and promoting equal opportunity for those 
seeking work or doing business with the government 
Public Sector Unionism As private sector unionism decline, the 1960s saw a wave of 
strikes for public sector union rights, with membership growing rapidly from 1960 to 
1980. Wisconsin and NY were the first states to recognize public sector organizing 
rights, with NYC teachers striking in 1960. Kennedy gave federal workers limited 
collective bargaining rights in 1962. Today 27% federal, 32% state, and 42% of local 
government workers are union members, compared to just 7% of private sector workers. 
Job dismissal Civil Service systems of federal and state government offer the most 
protection from unjust discharge, and public workers can even claim property rights to 
their job in some cases and receive extra protection from the due process clause of the 
14th amendment of the constitution. Most workers have at-will employment, unless they 
have a union contract where dismissal only for just cause is permitted, but where 
individual contracts might list exceptions to weaken job rights. 
Labor regulation passed related to federal contracts (Prevailing Wages):  
Wages in Supply & Equipment Contracts- Walsh-Healy Public Contracts Act 
Prevailing Wages in Service Contracts - McNamara-O'Hara Service Contract Act 
Prevailing Wages in Construction Contracts - Davis-Bacon and Related Acts 
Hours and Safety Standards in Construction Contracts - Contract Work Hours and 
Safety Standards Act Prohibition Against "Kickbacks" in Federally Funded - Copeland 
"Anti-Kickback" Act 
1970s 
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 Health and safety standards in the 
workplace, and whistleblowing protection for those going to the government with 
complaints, and the right to refuse work in unsafe conditions if circumstances warrant. 
Also there is the 1977 Federal Mine Health and Safety Act, which requires inspections 
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four times a year and health benefits for black lung victims. Longshore and defense 
base workers also have special health programs. 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 Private pension fund standards and 
fiduciary duties, protects employee rights and promotes disclosure. Passed as a result of 
employee losses in failed pension funds. 
(Failed) Labor Law Reform Act of 1977proposed to increase NLRB board members and 
terms limits, allow them to rule to protect specific rights, expedite elections and decisions 
on ULP cases that cause loss of employment, increased fines for company refusing to 
bargain first contract, three year ban on public contracts for companies violating final 
orders in USP ruling. 
1978 California Agricultural Labor Relations Act NLRA for farmworkers in California, a 
result of major farmworker struggles in the 60s and 70s lead by Cesar Chavez 
Federal Labor Relations Act of 1978 Allowed federal employee unions and collective 
bargaining modeled on the NLRA, except it’s an open shop 
Humphrey–Hawkins Full Employment Act of 1978  Amendment to Employment Act of 
1946, with purpose of formalizing congress’s role in economic policy, advocating for full 
employment and monetary policies that minimize inflation. Sets goals for full 
employment, growth in production, price stability, and balance of trade and budget to be 
driven by the private sector, with government as employer of last resort. Requires 
Federal Reserve to report to congress twice a year. 
1983 Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act (MSPA) Protections for 
migrants and farmworkers related to pay and work conditions. US DoL requires farm 
labor contractors to register with them. 
1993 Family and Medical Leave Act Right to unpaid medical leave and continued 
medical plan coverage to take care of health issues for self or family members for up to 
12 weeks, with some states granting more time 
Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act of 1988 Private sector employers 
must give employees sixty days' notice of large-scale layoffs and plant closures, except 
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for in case of emergencies. Some states have stricter measures. Useful to give unions 
time to organize. 
Can’t be fired for illegal reason, like discrimination, or because wages are being 
garnished because of failure to pay taxes or pay other debt (Consumer Credit Protection 
Act). Lie Detectors not allowed in hiring. 
Other: Workers Compensation, Unemployment Insurance, Social Security, Employer vs. 
National Health Care. Organized Crime/corruption in unions & RICO. 
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Appendix 2 
 
State Development Banks in the US 
 
State Development Banks have been proposed as a means to weaken Wall 
Street’s power, with the North Dakota bank held as the example. Other forms of public 
finance exist at state and federal levels, but overall these traditions of reform are weak in 
the US. They are unlikely to advance without a stronger labor movement, further failures 
of private financial firms ,or anger towards public bailouts of these companies. 
Nationalization is even less likely, but proposed in Dan Labotz’s articles, and by many 
other socialists or socialist organizations.541 
Despite repeated efforts and failures during recessions by cooperative enterprise 
efforts of consumers and workers, labor unions started many credit associations in the 
early 1900s. Massachusetts had 95, New York 104, and North Carolina 25 credit 
societies in 1923 for example, and labor unions had established thirty three banks 
between 1920 and 1926.  The one remaining labor bank (Amalgamated) is now partially 
privately owned, but the Carpenters union has recently bought a bank with its pension 
fund money. Credit unions are more popular and seem to be easier to unionize since 
they are the only banks unionized by OPEIU.  
Labor and community organization’s financial reform efforts do not raise issues 
around financial service workers rights, except for the short-lived SEIU calls for 
Whistleblower rights in the industry, and Committee for Better Banks efforts. Private 
equity ownership of companies makes private equity companies the largest employer in 
the US, so unions looking for new strategies to gain leverage with them and win 
organizing rights. Labor did not have the political power, will or program to campaign for 
stricter stipulations, such as requiring card-check neutrality agreements, in banks 
receiving bail-out money. Perhaps even the central bank could influenced by a labor 
movement with more political power since the president appoints the chair of the federal 
reserve and congress must approve. 
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4, 2009. Monthly Review Zine. http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2009/labotz040309.html La Botz, Dan. 
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Labor’s “employee ownership” and “capital stewardship” programs based on 
accountability or an increased voice for workers since pension money contributed by the 
employer is deferred wages, and therefore the property of the employee. About $7 
trillion comes from private sector, state and local government employees, another $1.1 
trillion from federal employees, $3.5 million from Individual Retirement Account (IRA) 
contributions, and another $3.5 trillion in the annuitized pensions of insurance 
companies. The idea behind Economically Targeted Investment (ETI), sometimes called 
double bottom line, or triple line investment, is about considering the social concerns of 
workers and their communities, not just financial returns, when fund managers make 
decisions regarding workers institutional investment money. 
Advocates, such as Change to Win and AFL-CIO campaigners, believe a 
competitive rate of return are possible along with such benefits as green jobs with living 
wages, public infrastructure, and affordable housing. The idea is to align the values of 
the pension fund owners with their investment, but without the sacrifice of return. 
Campaigners are also often involved with corporate governance reform in conjunction 
with ETI efforts. 
Given the fact that many countries with strong financial sector unions, such as 
Brazil, also have (or had) a significant part of their financial sector within the public 
banking system, perhaps public sector banking offer a path for financial sector 
unionization in the US. Since the public sector union organizing victories in the 1960s, 
unionization of government workers in the US rapidly increased while union density in 
the private sector declined. As workers in other countries have made substantial gains 
within the public sector banks to serve as a base to raise standards within the entire 
industry and organize private sector banks, perhaps a similar path is possible in the US. 
One challenge is a labor framework that is quite different from Brazil for example, where 
negotiations in the public sector banks can create a template that is followed in the 
private sector even without a lot of worker organization. 
Nationalization of the banking system would be a difficult path to imagine for the 
US in the near future. When the Australian and US labor movement were at similar 
peaks of power, nationalization of the banks was never on the table in the US, and the 
labor movement failed to build a labor party. In Australia, where the labor movement did 
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build a party, nationalization of the banks was defeated even at the height of the labor 
party and labor movements power. While it would be quite a difficult task to build the 
political will for nationalization, the recent economic crisis and the development of the 
Occupy Wall Street movement open opportunities to discuss a variety of reforms. Some 
trade unionists wanted to use the crisis and financial reform efforts to force organizing 
agreements onto the banks, and others thought it was an opportunity to give the 
government more control in the sector, possibly enabling the unions to gain more 
influence. With the growth of Occupy Wall Street, there has been an increase in anger 
that Wall Street was bailed out while Main Street declined, and there have been growing 
movements to resist bank foreclosures of homes, calls by student movements to refuse 
to pay college debt, and growing efforts to move consumers’ bank deposits from 
corporations to community banks. 
Public banks have not received much attention as they are quite small in the US. 
Currently there are four types of public banks in the US that are part of efforts by the 
government to “leverage and localize finance.”542 
1) Green Banks: Green Bank of Kentucky and Connecticut Clean Energy & 
Investment Authority 
2) Infrastructure Banks: California Infrastructure and Development Bank 
3) Land Banks: Michigan Land Bank Trust Authority (over 30 land banks in MI) 
4) State Partnership Banks: Massachusetts Small Business Banking Partnership 
and Bank of North Dakota 
The problem with development banks is they are unlikely to provide the core of a 
Financial Sector workers’ union. Where union interest has existed in the US, it is the call 
centers and retail banks of major corporate depository banks that have generated 
potential interest for campaigns because of the large number of employees, the profits 
these banks generate, and the strategic leverage possible because of brand recognition 
by consumers and international connections that provide a basis for international 
solidarity. However, these efforts to leverage and localize finance have largely grown in 
the last couple of years in the aftermath of the crisis (Massachusetts’s Green Banks in 
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2011, for example).If such efforts continue to expand they should be monitored closely. 
Currently they are specific to state development goals, such as green development, 
public infrastructure, a specific issue of high foreclosures in Michigan, and to help 
specific groups, such as small businesses who need loans in Massachusetts, or 
agriculture, commerce and industry in North Dakota. 
 Efforts to start new state development banks meet resistance, and require 
insistence that they are not looking to compete with retail banking.  North Dakota was 
able to build its state bank under particular conditions, when Wall Street speculation was 
causing farm foreclosures prior to the time around the banks founding in 1919. State 
banks as non-depository institutions would be gaining a role provided by current private 
non-depository institutions, and would have to show this loss would be more than 
overcome by an improved economic environment and partnership (making the case 
within capital’s terms at least). Perhaps state role in commercial banking raises the 
eventual possibility of entry into retail banking, so opposition would have to be assured 
this would never happen. 
 From the union side, these situations could present opportunities.  Regulations 
separating commercial and investment banking have been lifted in the US, so an 
increased role of state development banks, if they had a prominent enough role, could 
affect both. Some strategizing on how play off regional capital interests against national 
or international capital interests on Wall Street might be necessary. If labor had the 
political power where a state development bank existed and the union was meeting 
fierce resistance in organizing private retail banks, perhaps it could push for the 
expanded role of the state development bank if the companies did not end anti-union 
campaigns. With the current political environment and lack of strength in the labor 
movement, as well as the lack of state banks, this strategy would be just as unlikely to 
win as having the power to call on the government to nationalize anti-union companies. 
Labor may need to win some basic reforms like a true right to strike without the fear of 
permanent replacement if it is to have the organization and militancy to push for public 
sector banking and unionization of the financial industry. Given current efforts by OWS 
to shift to community banks, it would make sense for the movement to support the 
creation of state banks since they have been instrumental in strengthening North 
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Dakota’s community banks. Whether organizing financial sector workers would be easier 
to organize in a centralized or decentralized banking environment is another question 
the labor movement would have to explore if organizing bank workers was part of their 
agenda. 
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Appendix 3 
 
Financial Sector Office Automation 
 
In the early 1900s, scientific management in the office involved time and motion 
studies of the workers to find the most efficient way to accomplish tasks, and 
reorganization of the office to make the flow of work as efficient as possible. The lowest 
paid worker would do as many tasks as possible, reserving higher skilled work for higher 
paid workers as needed. Scientific management was a method for executives to take 
worker and even lower manager control out of the office to ensure maximum profitability 
is extracted out of the work process.543 These methods of reorganization, along with 
increased hiring, helped businesses deal with the ever increasing volume of office work. 
While some small offices remained traditional and unaffected by scientific management 
efforts, and others simply hired more workers, most office workers in the US were 
affected by scientific management to one degree or another.544 
Increasing division of labor and new technology other than the typewriter, such as 
the adding machine and postage scale, continued to alter clerical work and contribute to 
its feminization. A stenographer and typewriter might send out as many as 100 letters a 
day, a feat previously impossible with a copyist, and other positions also increased their 
productivity with new technology and job rationalization.545 The adding machine reduced 
the skill necessary to be a bookkeeper, who tended to be male, and even replaced 
some of his tasks with female clerks who earned almost half the wage.546 The invention 
of new office machines was essential for the FIRE industries efforts to increase their 
clients. Other than the typewriter, important machines included “the addressograph and 
the arithmometer (a machine for multiplying and dividing)” which “enabled life insurance 
companies to process and keep fast, accurate records on an expanding clientele, while 
the bookkeeping machine performed the same service in banks.”547 
All companies may benefit from office automation since most companies have 
office worker as part of its control center, research, development or sales. The financial 
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sector, however, composed entirely of office work, perhaps has gained the most from 
the history of office automation and innovation in the Information, Communications, and 
Technology sector. 
Job Categories 
Operational: clerks, secretaries, admin assistants, and data-entry 
Specialist: engineer, accountants, agents, loan officer, brokers, corporate professional 
Managerial: delegate info management 
Goal is to increase office productivity through technology 
1930-1940: Back Office Automation: Accounting machines and electric typewriters 
1950-1960: Data Processing: Time-shared computers, intelligent terminals, data communication 
equipment. automate record-keeping functions, especially in accounting and financial areas  
1960s: Xerox copying became standard and controlled market until late 70s. 
1970-1980: Front Office Automation: Word processors, minicomputers (personal 
computers)/distributed data processing, digital private automatic branch exchange (PABX). 
Optical character readers (scanners), facsimiles 
1980-1990: Integrated Office System or Integrated Electronic Office: innovations in word 
processing, communications (teleconferences). Multi-function workstations, microcomputers, 
electronic mail, communications network548 
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Appendix 4 
 
Racism in the Financial Sector 
 
The UOPWA’s efforts to confront racist hiring practices within the financial sector, 
especially given the likely acceptance of racism by many of the very employees it was 
trying to organize, is quite remarkable. By the turn of the 19th century, clerical work was 
the fastest growing occupation, including and perhaps even more rapidly in cities with 
significant black populations. For example, in Chicago, 0.1 percent of the labor force 
was in clerical work. This rose to 9 percent of workers and 9.8 percent of female workers 
by 1890.549 In Philadelphia, the blue-collar workforce tripled between 1870 and 1920. In 
the same period, the white-collar workforce grew sevenfold, and “the proportion of the 
total workforce composed of white-collar workers doubled, from one in six to one in three 
workers.”550 Pittsburgh was the city with the second most typewriters (after New York), 
illustrating the expansion of white-collar administrative work in heavy industry following 
the innovations of Taylorism and scientific management. 551  Some cities such as 
Philadelphia had mainly native born workers from middle class families entering the 
expanding clerical workforce, while cities like Pittsburgh experienced an influx of the 
sons and daughters of working class immigrants entering clerical occupations. 552 
Nationally, white, native-born, protestant women were the most likely to be hired into 
these new jobs, with preference given to younger single women until the 1970s553 
Women’s employment grew because of women working in nonagricultural occupations. 
The average age of working women increased, both as a result of increased schooling 
and older women’s participation in the labor force. Relative to increasing participation of 
native white women in the labor force, the “share of black women and foreign-born 
women in the work force declined.”554 While immigrant women were increasingly hired 
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by 1930, black women were only hired for clerical work in significant numbers in the 
1960s.555 
The financial industries were for the most part racially segregated both in hiring 
and customer access. The refusal of white companies to hire black workers and their 
justification of financial product exclusion was based supposedly on “higher death rates 
and precarious economic condition prevalent in most black communities,” forcing the 
black community to form their own companies.556 In reality, white merchants feared 
white customers would not want to patron their business if they hired black workers. 
White employees resented white employers who hired black workers, perceiving black 
labor as menial labor, and therefore lowering the status of their white-collar jobs.557 The 
failure of radical reconstruction enabled ex-slavocrats to keep black labor in menial 
positions through encouraging white terrorism against the black population, and by 
criminalizing all black people alike. Vagrancy laws were passed to target not only 
supposed criminals, but even black insurance workers were subject to arrest and certain 
conviction by the racist judicial system. Insurance work, like other jobs black businesses 
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created, were declared non-essential, and subject to the same penalties as vagrancy, 
resulting in the punishment of forced labor.558 
Nevertheless, black men and women increased in the FIRE industries, but mainly 
in the African-American owned and operated businesses. These “race businesses” were 
the basis of a new (usually light-skinned) black middle and upper class that increased 
between 1900 and 1920. Black owned business opened more opportunities for black 
women in certain positions than those offered to white women in white owned 
businesses (see Tables 6 and 7 below).559 LA had a black owned insurance company 
that offered the only white-collar employment for black workers in California. Typical of 
white-collar work in LA, at Security-First National Bank in LA it was not enough to be 
white; an Anglo-Saxon culture was maintained by hiring almost exclusively workers of 
British descent.560 
San Francisco and other cities had no African American bank tellers before 1930, 
and in fact, “black women could not enter clerical jobs until the 1960s,” demonstrating 
that “who fills what position in society and what value that position commands is 
determined by more than market forces.”561 Clerical jobs were not just given to workers 
who would accept the lowest wages since “managers, whether they wanted to or not, 
were increasingly placing white, native-born, predominately young, single, female 
workers into some of these jobs, and this reality itself altered the nature of these jobs 
and their positions within the hierarchy of the firm.”562 Some scholars argue this could be 
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a consequence of “capitalists' strategy of segmenting labor forces not only to undermine 
working-class unity, but also to reduce wages generally by provoking competition among 
groups for jobs. Workers were divided by underscoring racial, sex, ethnic, and skill 
differences.”563 The entrance of women (and later racial minorities) reflected gender and 
racial hierarchies, demonstrating additional factors to market forces impacting clerical 
work: 
…not only did the advent of monopoly or industrial capitalism, which 
altered the size and nature of the office force and routinized some office 
jobs, facilitate women’s entrance into the office, but also, the women who 
were entering these jobs affected the size, nature, and position of the 
office forces and the value that society placed on these occupations. 
Women's presence in the office not only signaled fundamental shifts in 
the nature of American capitalism, but also altered the direction and 
expression of these shifts. The sex of the worker had at least as powerful 
an effect on the definition and position of a job as did market forces.564 
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Table 6 
Race & Gender of Insurance Workers by Job Classification, 1910 and 1930 
  Men Women Total 
Black 
Men 
Black 
Women 
Black 
Total 
Women 
as % of 
Total 
% Black 
Women of 
Black Total 
Managers & 
officials         
1910 9,376 125 9,501 101 4 105 1.3 3.8 
1930 27,556 1,752 29,308 409 12 421 6.0 3.0 
Accountants 
& auditors         
1910 1,215 123 1,338 3 0 3 9.0 0.0 
1930 5,950 1,018 6,698 36 4 40 15.0 10.0 
Agents         
1910 82,743 2,521 85,264 1,387 309 1,696 3.0 18.0 
1930 243,974 12,953 256,927 5,200 1,086 6,286 5.0 17.2 
Bookkeepers 
& cashiers         
1910 6,385 4,222 10,607 27 113 140 40.0 81.0 
1930 7,931 18,634 26,565 61 253 314 70.0 80.0 
Clerks         
1910 15,678 6,219 21,897 69 132 201 28.0 66.0 
1930 34,442 55,986 90,428 259 534 793 62.0 67.3 
Stenographers 
& typists         
1910 1,334 14,418 15,752 4 58 62 91.0 94.0 
1930 1,249 75,202 76,451 16 636 652 98.3 97.5 
Source: Adapted from Angel Kwolek-Folland,  Engendering Business: Men and Women in the  
               Corporate Office, 1870-1930 (Baltimore: JHU Press, 1994), Table 2.  
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According to Strom, many black children lived in southern rural communities 
lacking the educational opportunities urban immigrant children had. Black children in the 
urban centers, even though they had access to public high schools, faced racism that 
prevented them from transferring to better schools, such as technical schools that could 
provide immediate job opportunities in office work. In one case, white students went on 
strike when the black youth from a Gary, Indiana black trade school successfully 
transferred to the traditional public school. The strike forced the black students to leave 
Table 7 
Race & Gender of Bank Workers by Job Classification, 1910 and 1930 
  Men Women Total 
Black 
Men 
Black 
Women 
Black 
Total 
Women 
as % of 
Total 
% Black 
Women of 
Black Total 
Bankers & 
bank officials         
1910 22,353 325 22,678 55 4 59 1.4 7.2 
1930 87,429 5,297 93,526 68 12 80 6.3 15.0 
Bookkeepers 
& cashiers         
1910 106,130 6,280 112,410 115 36 151 5.6 24.0 
1930 35,753 36,184 71,937 38 51 89 51.0 57.0 
Stockbrokers         
1910 13,522 207 13,729 32 4 36 1.5 11.0 
1930 69,157 1,793 70,950 90 5 95 2.5 5.3 
Accountants 
& auditors         
1910 1,967 115 2,082 1 0 1 5.5 0.0 
1930 15,338 1,109 14,447 13 0 0 7.7 0.0 
Clerks         
1910 45,997 3,748 49,275 143 27 170 7.5 16.0 
1930 136,386 57,435 193,821 401 78 479 30.0 16.2 
Stenographers 
& typists         
1910 2,001 11,287 13,288 9 26 35 85.0 74.0 
1930 1,682 56,287 57,969 6 67 73 97.0 91.0 
Source: Adapted from Angel Kwolek-Folland,  Engendering Business: Men and Women in the  
               Corporate Office, 1870-1930 (Baltimore: JHU Press, 1994), Table 2. 
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the school, and they had to wait for a new segregated high school to open. Completion 
of commercial courses did not guarantee black youth office jobs as it did for white youth. 
Many young black women had to give up any hope of office work, and were forced into 
housekeeping or factory jobs. Even when branch banks opened in black neighborhoods 
to serve black clients, they often only hired white people. There were exceptions (see 
Table 6 and 7 above), but those African-Americans who did make it into clerical work 
usually had more education than their colleagues, and would more likely find openings 
in the public sector than the private sector. Within the private sector, “banks and 
insurance companies owned by blacks provided the most substantial clerking 
employment for black men and women.”565 Chicago had seven black owned insurance 
companies, and the only banks where African-Americans could get jobs in Chicago were 
two African-American owned banks, which were forced to shut down in the Depression. 
Such efforts were essential for creating a black middle class amidst racial hostility, and 
demonstrated both the importance and fragility of Black Nationalist anti-racist 
strategies.566  
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Appendix 5 
 
Lewis Merrill, UOPWA President, Statement to Congress on Insurance 
and Finance Workers 
 
Lewis Merrill, the President of the UOPWA-CIO, made a statement to congress in March 
1947 against the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act by giving stirring testimony to the need 
for white-collar unionization. He notes current hardships to organize with company 
hostility, and predicts it would be much worse with Taft-Hartley. Reproduced here is 
sections discussing insurance and finance workers. 
I represent the United Office and Professional Workers of America, a union  composed 
of some 70,000 men and women employed in insurance, social service,  industry and 
commerce. We are deeply concerned with the labor bills now being studied by your 
committee. These bills run from measures ostensibly designed to deal with jurisdictional 
strikes to the abolition of the Wagner Act itself.  If enacted, they would rupture the whole 
fabric of democratic development in the United States and would set our country on a 
course certain to be replete  with great social strife. The labor movement is a powerful 
force of the whole people. Efforts to weaken the labor movement by punitive legislation 
and attempts to prevent it by law from performing its functions in the Nation cannot but 
have the gravest economic and social consequences… 
THE INSURANCE AGENT 
A large number of our members are employed by such powerful corporations  as the 
Metropolitan, Prudential, John Hancock, Boston Mutual, and other insurance 
companies. The industrial insurance agents employed by these companies perform a 
service of importance to our economy. They directly bring about the sale of hundreds of 
millions of dollars of insurance annually. They service millions of policyholders. They are 
respected and trusted members of their communities. Yet before these men organized, 
they were subjected to the most inhuman type of treatment by their powerful employers.  
In 1936 they organized and immediately met with the most vicious resistance on the part 
of management of the companies to obstruct the union. Some companies appealed to 
the courts and dragged out costly legal procedures for years. Without the protection of 
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the Wagner Act, these workers would have been greatly handicapped in coping with 
these powerful employers. Should the Congress adopt measures to weaken the Wagner 
Act, it is certain some of these companies will consider it an invitation to bust the union. 
They will not succeed, but much costly turmoil will take place before they relearn that 
fact.  
Have not these employees the right to demand of their Government that they should not 
again be required to prove their right to belong to an effective union? And would not their 
Government be more than remiss in its obligations to the people if it should demand it? 
Yet this is the course that is proposed by legislation before your committee.  
Hampering legal restrictions would not only bring harm to these thousands of citizens 
and their families but would be the direct cause of disturbances affecting millions of 
policy holders. Yet as a result of collective bargaining, insurance men today have 
comparative peace of mind, are not at the mercy of every super- visor and cannot be 
recklessly dismissed from their jobs.  
Has this hurt the insurance industry or the American people?" Obviously it has helped 
the American people and the insurance industry. Production was never as high as under 
a union contract, and service to the policy holder was never better…  
FINANCIAL EMPLOYEES  
Among the other workers who make up an important part of the UOPWA are financial 
employees, those who work for the great banks and other financial institutions of our 
large cities.  
It is not without cause that Wall Street has become a symbol of greed and exploitation 
for millions of Americans. The influence of banks upon the lives of the people has long 
disturbed millions of Americans, not only in the ranks of labor, but among our farming 
population, small businessmen and others.  
The attitude of the giant Wall Street firms to the organization of their employees is 
consistent with their reputation. Bank employees have been among the worst-paid 
workers in our Nation. Prior to the efforts of the UOPWA to organize these workers in 
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large numbers, salaries of $20 and $25 per week were typical for young women clerks 
and salaries of $40 for experienced tellers were high in many banks. Under the threat of 
union organization, these salaries have been raised slightly, but in terms of real income 
the plight of the bank worker is actually worse when compared with the prewar period.  
In recent months, the UOPWA has organized workers in the Irving Trust Co., 
Manufacturers Trust Co., National City Rank, Bankers Trust Co., and other  institutions 
which are among the 25 largest banking institution in the United  States. Invariably, 
these firms have resisted organization of their employees, who have had to overcome 
the fear of losing their jobs and the fear of other forms of discrimination used by their 
employers, even with the existence of the Wagner Act.  
At the Irving Trust Co. where a collective bargaining election covering an important 
section of the employees was won by the union, the bank management has resorted to 
terrorizing the employees to prevent free collective bargaining.  Detectives have been 
employed in large numbers to spy on the employees, to follow them about, to serve as 
scabs in the event of a strike. This and other companies, while professing horror at the 
thought of strikes in banks, have absolutely refused to accept any form of arbitration.  
These 200,000 bank employees of the Nation are certainly entitled to some 
consideration from the Congress and from your committee. They are respectable men 
and women, whose character must be above reproach, who are investigated thoroughly 
before being hired, and are expected to be above temptation. Restricting the rights of 
such workers to organize, bargain collectively, and strike means condemning them to a 
permanent low standard of living, since there is no evidence that the powerful men of 
Wall Street are voluntarily going to make possible decent living standards for Wall Street 
workers...567 
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 US Congress Senate. Committee on Labor. Labor Relations Program: hearings before the Committee 
on Labor and Public Welfare, US Senate, Eightieth Congress, first session, on S. 55 and S. J. Res. 22, 
and all other bills and resolutions referred to the committee having the object of reducing industrial strife in 
the United States, 2257 2265 
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Appendix 6 
 
Conflicting Visions: Production Unions and the OEIU 
 
 Carly Dean Styder, in White-Collar Workers and the UAW,  examines the 
challenges of organizing office workers in the auto industry. Snyder describes white-
collar workers as “people with a persistent desire to maintain a separate identity,” going 
back to the influence of middle class backgrounds and aspirations, and says “it is all too 
easy for the union to make the error of seeking to impose its own image of the white-
collar worker upon this group, rather than seeking to discover and work with the white-
collar worker’s own self-image.” 568  Snyders interviews confirmed many of these 
perceptions, as well as the view that many (42% of his sample) unorganized white collar 
viewed unions as too militant, but most (81%) held Walter Reuther, UAW president, in 
high regard. However, he also found that although they join industrial unions, their 
preference was for an all white-collar organization, noting OPEIU would do well if it had 
resources to compete. 60% of the unorganized workers surveyed said they strongly 
preferred an all office and professional workers union, and another 20% said they mildly 
preferred it. Snyder suggest the “industrial union to provide the maximum possible 
degree of autonomy for the white-collar segment” to deal with this issue.569 
The UAW originally horse traded white collar workers it organized for blue collar 
workers, or sometimes agreed in contracts to not organize them as late as 1941.Only in 
1946 did they forbid the signing of contracts that excluded their future organizing. Even 
when white-collar workers became a priority to organize, rumors and memory of past 
actions perpetuated the belief by many white-collar workers that they could not be part 
of the UAW, possibly damaging white-collar workers attitudes in general towards unions 
for years.570 It wasn’t until 1958 that white-collar workers were sufficiently organized in 
the auto industry to demonstrate real power, and only at Chrysler, where 8,000 white-
collar workers (20% women) struck for six days. 571  As resources and experience 
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increased, the UAW went from losing more representation elections to winning most of 
them from 1963 to 1971.572 
OEIU would seek elections with 30% cards, while UAW would require 60%, 
showing the OEIU relied more on a hot shop strategy.573 One of the challenges to 
sustaining UAW white-collar worker organizer were costs, which were double the costs 
of organizing blue-collar workers, measured per worker.574 Snyder refutes some of the 
OPEIU claims that only a white-collar craft union could meet the needs of white-collar 
worker, but in defending industrial unions from a service to members perspective on 
unionism, he misses the main advantage. The UAW could create solidarity throughout a 
chain and industry between previously divided workers, potentially creating stronger 
actions and bargaining leverage. The OPEIU, on the other hand, was quite satisfied with 
being separate and negotiating from a place of weakness. It seems eliminating industrial 
unions from the white-collar “craft” would help the OPEIU since it had a hot shop method 
of building organization, but it was unlikely to be successful without a strategic 
perspective of organizing on an industry basis that workers interests could be 
maximized. Nevertheless, Snyder’s points about the services members received, and 
the respect for the leadership development and autonomy of the white-collar segment is 
a significant refutation of some of OPEIU’s criticisms of production unions involved in 
organizing. 
Snyder is mistaken in believing the sharp increase in white collar workers alone 
would lead to increased unionization.575 He was writing on eve of the neoliberal period. 
Snyder also believes organizing white-collar workers into a blue-collar workers union is 
“organizing across class lines,” which seems to be confusing class with privileges.576 
Snyder believe white collar workers have more respect, which blue collar workers 
desire, but blue-collar workers achieved more economic gains, which white-collar 
workers desire.577 
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Snyder notes that UAW’s expansion in white-collar organizing in the auto industry 
was limited by jurisdictional disputes with OPEIU.  When the AFL chartered OPEIU, it 
gave it jurisdiction to organize all white-collar workers in the private sector, to pursue a 
craft union building strategy.  The CIO, on the other hand, gave its industrial unions 
jurisdiction over all the workers within a particular industry, or industries, to pursue an 
industrial organizing strategy. The AFL-CIO merger left the tension in place since it 
respected the previous jurisdictions of member unions, and the situation remained as 
such as of the 1973 publication of this book.578 In a June 1967 publication, for example, 
OPEIU called for “one giant white-collar union for white-collar workers.579 When the AFL-
CIO Industrial Union Department backed industrial union organization of white-collar 
workers in 1961, the OPEIU withdrew in protest.580 Industrial unions of the CIO drew on 
their tradition of uniting production workers and skilled trade workers to unionize large 
corporations that craft unions never successfully organized.  With the growth of white 
collar workers, it was argued that both blue-collar and white-collar workers would benefit 
from solidarity of the entire base within a corporation or an industry being able to bargain 
with the decision-makers in corporate management. The production local would already 
know the management, and either workers could benefit from the support of each other. 
Some AFL-CIO leaders suggested compromise by pointing out the strengths of white-
collar union’s knowledge of its category, and that both unions work together in 
organization and bargaining to build on each other strengths. Plus, as Snyder noted, 
blue collar workers were increasingly more educated, while white-collar work was 
becoming less middle-class as a result of its expansion and the effects of technological 
innovation.581 
Automation was less of a threat to jobs than some people feared. Perhaps partly 
due to the threat of unionization, but also to the actual nature of the work, automation of 
office work did not result in immediate job loss. 582  Snyder does not point out the 
opportunism behind OPEIU’s program. Snyder’s study showed white-collar workers, 
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whose work, family, and community lives were tied with the blue-collar workers that 
made the UAW a strong union with respectable leadership. OPEIU picked organizing 
targets where there was already a high level of union consciousness relative to an 
industry like the financial sector, where union consciousness was much lower. 583
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Appendix 7 
 
OEIU and Gender 
 
In a newsletter from 1953, OEIU Local 153 President Howard Coughlin complains about 
the effect of Taft-Hartley on union security for white collar workers, despite using this 
very law to help destroy the UOPWA. The officers listed in the newsletter were all men, 
the stewards corner profiled a male steward, and the only article addressing women is 
included in full here. A 1955 newsletter stated the organizations focus was on salesmen, 
commercial officers, hotels, and union office employees, with no mentioning of bank 
worker organizing. The UOPWA seemed to encourage a more active role for women 
and had 35% women in attendance at its 1944 convention along with two women on its 
executive board, but it also often demonstrated condescending attitudes towards women 
office workers.584 
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Appendix 8 
 
Notes on books comparing white collar unionism 
 
Hans Speier, German White-Collar Workers and the Rise of Hitler, describes 
bank employees as the “aristocracy of salaried employees, while the low-salaried 
insurance employees were the pariahs,” but this flipped after WWI because insurance 
employees unionized, and bank employees conditions worsened through mechanization 
and mergers in industry restructuring after the war.585 Only 4.4% of bank clerks were of 
working-class origin prior to WWI because of high school degree requirements.586 As 
mechanization enabled entry of unskilled white collar workers, this number increased.587 
Kracauer in The Salaried Masses: Duty and Distraction in Weimar Germany 
argues that proletrianization doesn’t create a proletariat. Sturmthal, White-Collar Trade 
Unions: Contemporary Developments in Industrialized Societies, has authors with 
chapters on Australia, Austria, France, Germany, UK, Japan, Sweden, US, ending with a 
comparative essay. Challenges include the uniqueness of the US in its concept of the 
“white collar” category. Japan had the best percentage of white collars organized in 
relation to their size in the labor force, but countries with generally high levels of 
unionization also had higher rates of white collar unionization.  
Bob Carter, in Capitalism, class conflict and the new middle class discusses 
historical Marxist and sociological approaches to the middle class (theorists of the new 
middle class), and more recent ideas around middle-class trade unionism, white collar in 
general, and managerial trade unionism, providing and a review of thinking in sociology 
around the middle class since Mills. Carter challenges Blackwood’s position that the 
more union-like and militant the union in banking, the less likely it was to have many 
members, promoting the effectiveness of the staff association model around middle 
class workers. Carter challenges this position, but does not challenge the notion of bank 
clerks as middle class, which is probably necessary in the current conditions of US 
tellers and office workers in the financial sector, but could require complicated 
elaboration of debates in sociology and Marxism around class. Carter seems to have a 
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more sophisticated understanding of consciousness and is right in some of his criticisms 
of previous works, but also lacks understanding around the question of program and 
leadership in union formation. It also seems strange today in the context of current 
conditions in the US to equate white-collar and middle class, and working class only with 
manual worker. Service work, even the least manual of retail work, and much office 
work, often has lower wages and benefits than traditional blue collar “working class” 
work, and its non-union workers have less of a voice than unionized blue collar workers 
perhaps. Carter puts bank clerks in same category of managerial unionism efforts, as 
well as scientists and engineers. “Middle Class” unionism is just as confusing of a 
concept as “white collar” unionism, with such categories causing more confusion than 
clarification in organizing non-manual workers outside what is called the productive 
sphere of industrial manufacturing. There may be situations where scientists, engineers 
and other professionals have a level of job control and negotiating power that makes 
them as powerful as managers or more powerful than lower management in certain 
industries, but the question of whether they hire or fire other employees still seems 
crucial. Office workers, except for the exceptions of formed professionals such as a 
CPA, are of another category as well. Rosemary Crompton and Gareth Jones in White-
Collar Proletariat, give a post-Braverman sociological review and study of nature of 
clerical work, with BIFU (British Bank and Insurance workers union) members included 
in study.  
Michel Crozier, in The World of the Office Worker reviews Schmoller, Bernstein, 
and Kautsky differences on analysis of the middle class. He draws on Marx and Lenin 
and sees white collar worker changing negative attitudes towards blue collar workers 
because of deteriorating conditions and eroding trust and confidence in the petty 
bourgeoisie which they are usually closer too. Emile Lederer, following Schmoller, sees 
the white collars as oriented toward “social progress and compromise,” not having 
independent politics based on its occupational identity, but changed more towards 
Kautsky’s position as their position in society declined in crisis in the 1920s, pushing 
them to choose sides in Germany. Kracauer and Dreyfuss had spiritual alienation 
arguments in the 1920s that Mills built on after WWII, falling into the “proletarianization” 
camp but abandoning Marxism.  
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Crozier has an excellent chapter on nonmanual worker unionism in France. 
Banks were shut down by workers in May and June 1919 general strikes, even though 
they were under the influence of Catholic unions, and “the last bastions of bourgeois 
respectability.”588 France has history of civil service unionism that starts early and is 
stronger than what exists in US history, which points to a source of bank union power 
similar to Germany and England. In May-June 1936 “a half-dozen Parisian insurance 
companies,” along with many factories and department stores, “were occupied by 
strikers.”589 Crozier notes white collars were as militant as blue collar workers in some 
cases, with one financial firm occupied for 155 days, and 20,000 members of the CGT in 
banking and insurance companies. The CFTC, the conservative Catholic union, 
although it was excluded from negotiating in most industries, did have enough of a base 
among white collar workers in banking and insurance to take part in negotiations. The 
November 1938 general strike failed, partly because of CFTC’s lack of participation. 
Prior to WWII, Blue collar and manual workers were closest to unions influenced 
by the Communist Party, civil service workers with the Socialist Party,  while white collar 
workers in the private sector were closest to the Christian unions, except for the 
department stores which were under CGT influence. Unity was built around resistance to 
fascism during WWII, but divisions returned in 1947, with communists gaining more 
influence over white and blue collar workers in the nationalized gas and electricity, but 
less so in nationalized mining. The CFTC maintained its influence over bank and 
insurance workers even through nationalization, which the author notes most of their 
employees regarded with neutrality or opposition, and had major strikes in 1947 and 
1957. 590  Crozier attributes the “paradoxical situation” of the stronger white collar 
unionism in the conservative catholic unionism of banking and insurance compared to 
the communist influenced unionism of the department stores to nationalization. He 
believes in South America bank unions have also developed ahead of much of the labor 
movement. He explains: “It is really impossible for the directors of nationalized 
enterprises directly to oppose unions; and as for enterprises which have remained 
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private, they have long had a tendency to align themselves with nationalized enterprises 
in matters of working conditions and relations with unions, for fear of attracting attention 
and bringing up again the problem of their status. White-collar employees in this sector 
are therefore relatively well protected. They receive regular salary increases as a 
function of seniority; they enjoy a relatively rationalized system of promotions; and, 
finally their union freedom is respected.”591 The downside is under the control of the 
financial ministry, their salary is not as high as other industries, and can only be raised 
through influencing public opinion.592 Some CFTC members wouldn’t be part of the 
CFDT until it gave up blue collar members.593 
French unions are less staff driven than their US, England, and Northwestern 
Europe counterparts, although the civil service and white collar areas have more stable 
situations where there is more staff collaboration with management. 594  White collar 
employees can have more explosive direct action that is harder for leadership to control 
or use for negotiations, and even bank and insurance workers have demonstrations and 
one day actions, though less than other sectors.  There are some unique attributes of 
French unionism, but the author does not see white collar unionism behind the rest of 
the labor movement as it is in England or the US, and attributes it to cultural and 
national reasons related to social distance and communication.595 
The second half of book is based on 1957 study of six insurance companies in 
Paris, but only employees in central offices, which make up about half the employment 
in the industry. Central offices were where back office work (clerks, policy writers, 
archivists/file clerks, keypunchers- line and supervisory) took place, with brokers and 
agents in branches throughout the country. Only 2 or 3% of the workers were affected 
by new electronic technology being introduced at the time.  
For English bank worker comparisons, see Gregor Gall, Labour Unionism in the 
Financial Services Sector: Fighting for Rights and Representation, Farnham: Ashgate, 
2008. For Japan, Makoto Kumazawa,. “Twenty Years of a Bank Worker’s Life” in 
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Portraits of the Japanese workplace : labor movements, workers, and managers, 
Boulder: Westview Press, 1996 and Yuko Ogasawara, “Why Office Ladies Do Not 
Organize” in Office Ladies and Salaried Men: Power, Gender and Work in Japanese 
Companies, Berkeley: University of California Press,  1998. For Pakistan see, Jasmin 
Mirza, Between Chaddor and the Market: Female Office Workers in Lahore. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002. A Canadian bank work struggle is told by the Bank Book 
Collective in An account to settle: the story of the United Bank Workers(SORWUC), Vancouver: 
Press Gang Publishers, 1979.
596
 
                                                 
596
 Robin Archer’s comparison of the US and Australia to understand the labor party question could be 
modeled for comparisons of financial sector unionism development. Perhaps Canada serves as an even 
better “more-similar” comparison since it often experienced the same union leadership as the US, allowing 
for the isolation of other variables, possibly showing leadership factors were more important than the 
differences in countries’ financial sector structure and development. 
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